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Preface
THE INSPIRATION FOR THIS VOLUME is to be found in the life and career of Thomas M. Izbicki. Tom has touched every one of 
the authors whose work is found herein, whether as peers, collaborators, 
or mentors. The appreciation by Jerry Christianson that appears in the 
final section of the book conveys more than adequately Tom’s professional 
contributions as a scholar who embodies the rare combined talents of on-
the-ground rigor and visionary insight. Each of the chapters contained in 
this volume reflect one or another dimension of his extraordinary capac-
ity to synthesize vast amounts of literature—primary and secondary—
into a cohesive account of the transformations that occurred in Western 
thought between the so-called “medieval” and “modern” periods. We sus-
pect that Tom’s greatest academic joys emerged from working with col-
leagues (attested to by the bibliography with which this book ends), draw-
ing together intellectual communities in various ways, and (unbelievably!) 
preparing indices for books. Of course, Tom also has gathered a large group 
of friends who deeply appreciate him and who value his love and support 
(as well as his distinctive laugh and subtle sense of humor). Although he 
may have formally retired from his appointment at Rutgers University, he 
appears to be working harder and more productively than ever.
No collection of essays can be completed successfully by the sheer 
will of its editors. Therefore, we wish to thank the contributors whose 
scholarship is represented in this volume. Each and every one met dead-
lines (early!) and cooperated unselfishly in the publication process—a tes-
tament, we think, to their respect and true affection for Tom. The staff 
of MIP was supportive and professional from beginning to end; in this 
regard, we wish to thank Theresa Whitaker and Ilse Schweitzer, as well 
as Simon Forde at Arc Humanities Press. Ben Peterson of Texas A&M 
University made Herculean editorial contributions well beyond expecta-
tions (as well as enduring the not-always-pleasant to-and-fro between the 
editors). The late Dennis Wm Moran of the University of Notre Dame 
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took a keen interest in the project, suggested many names to approach 
about contributing, and would have loved to add his own appreciation for 
Tom. Alas, Dennis passed away only weeks before we completed the final 
version of the manuscript. And, most importantly, we thank you, Tom, for 








Bettina Koch and Cary J. Nederman
A VISITOR FROM A DISTANT LAND AND CULTURE travel-ling through Europe will most likely eventually find herself in the 
historic center of a medieval city or town. The center’s most impressive 
building is almost assuredly the city’s main church or cathedral, which 
dominates its urban architecture. The cathedral or church may still serve 
its initial religious purpose, though it might have been secularized to be 
used as a café or community center. The visitor might be interested in 
its contribution to art or architectural history. But she may also wonder 
whether the cathedral is still part of a living culture or whether the build-
ing is nothing but a relic of a way of life that has long ceased to exist. The 
artifact, then, would be little more than an assemblage of stones that had 
meaning in the past but not in the present and that is simply too large to 
be placed in a museum.
Thus, our visitor instantaneously, if unwittingly, encounters the 
imposing remnants and continuing (in)significance of a religious value 
system impressed upon this society. In broader terms, she is confronted 
with the dilemma of what constitutes European or Western modernity 
and the degree to which the premodern past is still present in the socie-
ties of today. Indeed, the current discourse related to the reemergence of 
religious fundamentalism may return meaning to these buildings dating 
to the so-called Middle Ages, or may add new layers of significance not 
previously evident.
Here, it may be useful to invoke the German philosopher and intel-
lectual historian Hans Blumenberg, according to whom we need to “free 
ourselves of the assumption of a stable canon of ‘great questions’ that 
throughout history occupy humans’ thirst for knowledge with constant 
urgency and, thus, motivate the aspiration for world- and self-interpretation.” 
Blumenberg suggests instead that a surplus of questions is a problem of 
a threshold of epochs (Epochenschwellen).1 There is indeed a certain set 
of questions that we raise presently, and have raised for the last several 
decades, that may rise to the standard of such a “surplus.” Whether the 
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current experience of change eventually turns into a new epoch is some-
thing future generations will have to judge. For the moment, however, it 
seems safe to say that we are confronted with a transformation in narratives 
that compelled Jürgen Habermas, for instance, to remark that “the split 
within the West” caused by the political revitalization of religion(s) “is 
rather perceived as if Europe were isolating itself from the rest of the world. 
Seen in terms of world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now 
appears to be the actual deviation.” For Habermas, this takes the form of a 
“secular awareness that one is living in a post-secular society.”2
Whether one agrees with or disputes Habermas’s observation about 
a “post secular” society or age, his suggestion hints that the perception 
of secularity qualifies as one of the key features, if not the key feature, of 
European Modernity, even though, more recently, sociologists of religion 
seem to have abandoned the explanatory value of a theory of seculariza-
tion. Scholars like José Casanova see this turn as a change of perception 
rather than a change in reality.3 Yet, such a change of perception has not 
affected other disciplines in a similar way. Among philosophers, it is still 
common to associate Modernity with secularity and an unwavering com-
mitment to reason. As Blumenberg notes, “[n]ot so much the totalitarian 
claim of modern reason but rather the totalitarian obligation towards it 
could be described as secularity.”4 This notion is echoed in Charles Taylor’s 
A Secular Age.5
It is not, however, philosophy alone that emphasizes secularity, 
together with (scientific) reason, as the key characteristics of European or 
Western Modernity. A similar point, made to very different effect, centrally 
grounds the post-colonial critique of Western or European cultural, politi-
cal, and economic hegemony and hegemonic discourse. With reference 
to the Arab Middle East today—with the exception of the early Muslim 
community under the Prophet Muhammad—Gudrun Krämer notes that 
“religion and state have never been fused in ‘Islamic’ societies and that the 
link between religion and politics was not fundamentally different from 
that found in contemporary ‘Christian’ Europe.” Yet, simultaneously in 
post-colonial discourses “secularization is widely portrayed as the center-
piece of a modernizing project imposed from outside and/or above, by 
colonial and post-colonial authoritarian regimes, one that jeopardizes the 
identity of Muslims to the benefit of the enemies.”6 The assumptions that 
to be modern means to be secular, and that whoever is not secular is not 
fully modern, contribute to this perception.7 To some degree, the so-called 
Thomas Theorem (“If men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences”) seems predominant in discourse.8
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Yet, the emphasis on the secular, whether conceived as secu-
larization, secularism, or secularity, is not without justification. As José 
Casanova suggests, it needs to be emphasized that the secular, as secu-
larization, initially emerged as a purely theological concept in Latin 
Christendom “that has no equivalent in other religious traditions or even 
in Eastern Christianity.” Thus, these categories might be completely inap-
propriate if applied to contexts outside the domains of Latin Christianity, 
whether it is South Asia or the Arab world.9 In this sense, the visitor to 
our fictional medieval town may perceive the cathedral not simply as a 
symbol of a (past) belief system, but also as a symbol of its power to over-
come itself. If one accepts secularity as a key characteristic of European 
Modernity, how is one to read the “return” of fundamentalist or extremist 
religious movements? Are these movements, whether they are some ver-
sion of evangelical Christianity, fundamentalist Islam, or the South Asian 
Hindutva movement,10 signs of the end of the modern European era, as 
Habermas’s notion of postsecularism implies, or do they simply require 
that the secularity narrative needs to be reconsidered? It is evident that 
the emergence of fundamentalisms is dependent on the modern condi-
tion, however defined.11 At the same time, they are interpreted as signs of 
the decline, if not the disintegration, of European Modernity.
Olivier Roy offers an intriguing alternative reading. First, he sug-
gests that the “expulsion of religion from the public space [...] automati-
cally places it in the hands of radicals and the self-taught.”12 His position 
goes hand in hand with more recent arguments favoring greater inclusion 
of religion in the public sphere.13 Second, Roy argues that
[s]ecularization has not eradicated religion. As a result of our 
separation of religion from our cultural environment, it appears on 
the other hand as pure religion. In fact, secularization has worked: 
what we are witnessing today is the militant reformulation of 
religion in the secular space that has given religion its autonomy 
and therefore the conditions for its expansion. Secularization and 
globalization have forced religions to break away from culture, to 
think of themselves as autonomous and to reconstruct themselves 
in a space that is no longer territorial and is no longer subject  
to politics.14
Furthermore, he advocates the need to draw a clear distinction between 
“new” religions and “traditional” religions. For traditional religions, 
reason and belief are not contradictory, but rather “faith and knowl-
edge mutually reinforce each other.” The deculturation of new religions, 
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by contrast, “destroys this dialectic[al] relation: the sacred texts must be 
able to speak outside any cultural context.”15 In the eyes of the infidel, this 
dichotomy leads to the perception of the born again believer as “incongru-
ous, even fanatical.” By contrast, for the born again, “the lukewarm, the 
cool or those who have not been born again belong to the secular—or 
even pagan—world.”16
Yet, except for the “new” aspect of deculturation, no serious student 
of medieval or (early) modern history, not to mention philosophers, theo-
logians, or political theorists who focus on those historical epochs, would 
regard such waves of “fanaticism” as surprising—let alone shocking—
“news.” In the past as in the present, the dissonant voices of fundamen-
talist or “born again” movements reflect a very small number of believ-
ers, who seek, occasionally forcefully, to reclaim the public sphere. Too 
often today, headline hunting media attention blows their significance 
out of proportion. Ironically, while contemporary discourses emphasize 
the decline or even disintegration of what is usually termed Western or 
European Modernity, the conditions for the emergence—indeed, inven-
tion—of what is commonly understood as Modernity remain understud-
ied and, consequently, far from fully understood. The present volume 
constitutes a contribution to the project of remedying this relative igno-
rance about the origins of European Modernity. Despite the current trend 
toward trans- and inter-cultural research (which is in general terms lauda-
tory), the express goal here is to bring into clear focus the intellectual and 
institutional transitions in Europe that crystallized in the modern era. To 
the extent that Modernity represents a palpable shift in perspective (“per-
ception”) that has direct implications for current times, it becomes espe-
cially imperative to investigate the specific contexts out of which it arose.
Of course, there exist disagreements surrounding problems of 
periodization. Over the last few decades, scholars engaged in studying 
the “medieval/modern divide”—some of whose research is represented in 
this volume17—have pushed questions about the roots of Modernity fur-
ther backward in time. These developments challenge precisely the can-
onicity to which Blumenberg alluded, whether a single historical event 
(e.g., 1492, the “discovery” of the “Americas”18) or a particular author 
(Machiavelli or Hobbes are often the first choices). This habit might be 
useful pedagogically, but not necessarily epistemologically. The point 
of view broadly advocated in the chapters contained in this collection 
directly rejects such neat historical platitudes. The contributing authors 
also together acknowledge that the “invention” of European Modernity 
was a long and multi-disciplinary intellectual process. As a glance at the 
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table of contents reveals, the volume concentrates on the period from 
ca.1100 to ca.1550. This chronological choice is not arbitrary. Rather, 
placing the terminus a quo at roughly 1100 takes into consideration fac-
tors that are commonly regarded as typical of medieval Latin Christianity 
at its peak: developing monasticism, ecclesiastical reform, literary and 
philosophical revival—and, of course, the First Crusade, which was 
just under way. Our point is that if we may begin to ask questions (in 
Blumenberg’s sense) concerning certain emergent features of Modernity 
identifiable already during the High and Later Western Middle Ages, 
then we have extended the “threshold of epochs” that ultimately yielded 
the full-scale invention of Modernity.
The second aim of the present volume suggested above is the refu-
tation of the view that narrow disciplinarity (and especially theological 
transformations) was the driving force behind the shift toward the modern 
mindset. This is certainly a prime implication of the current emphasis on 
(post)secularism and Latin Christendom. As the chapters contained here 
testify, the invention of Modernity was a project that involved interaction 
between the fields of metaphysics, theology, ecclesiology, canon and civil 
law, and political philosophy, among other disciplines. Taken together, 
the many intellectual transformations (and concomitant institutional 
changes) that occurred from the twelfth century to the fifteenth were the 
product of micro-level developments that came together in a multiplic-
ity of ways. The contributions to this volume are intended to mirror the 
multidisciplinary character of emergent Modernity. They are authored by 
scholars representing diverse disciplines: historians to be sure, but also 
philosophers, theologians, and political theorists, all engaged in a coop-
erative effort to identify and attempt to propose answers to the myriad 
questions arising from the transition(s) to the modern world.
Yet, as many of the chapters contained in this volume attest, the 
transition(s) to the modern world by no means reflect a linear process 
that, once put into motion, followed through in a logical and straight-
forward manner. Rather, that an idea developed centuries ago gets picked 
up and transformed or adjusted for contemporary needs most likely 
happens by chance than intentionally. This reality only complicates the dif-
ficulties of conceptualizing the “true” meaning and content of European 
Modernity. In a number of instances, there is still no common knowledge, 
if any awareness at all, that certain ideas attributed to the modern age are 
far from being “modern” in origin, at least in terms of their original “inven-
tors.” While present discussions of Western Modernity, as indicated above, 
focus almost exclusively on the secularization theorem, a focus that is partly 
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stimulated by post-colonial discourses and particularly a critique of what is 
perceived as Western, this volume takes a broader view that concentrates 
on four main themes. These themes (“Heresy and Reform,” “Transforming 
Ideas and Traditions,” “Cusa and Philosophy,” and “The Great Schism and 
the Conciliar Option”) taken together aim to reveal some of the com-
plexities associated with emergent Modernity. This picture cuts against the 
grain of the predominant Renaissance narrative that emphasizes the return 
to or rebirth of ancient Greece and Rome as the main stimulus in the pro-
cess of “overcoming” the previous age. Thus, to uncover the invention of 
Modernity, looking back to previously overlooked impacts is as relevant as 
looking forward. One name that reappears rather frequently throughout 
the volume is Nicholas Cusanus (aka Cusa). The emphasis on Cusanus is 
not only a result of his central place in Thomas M. Izbicki’s scholarship; it 
is also reflected in Blumenberg’s narrative that associates Cusanus with a 
“systematic relation of the metaphysical triangle of human, god, and world” 
that implies “the critical self-destruction of the Middle Ages.”19
Since the formation of Modernity is not the outcome of a linear pro-
cess, as we have suggested, the chapters in this volume are grouped themati-
cally rather than chronologically. The first part on “Heresy and Reform” 
explores three manifestations of transformative discourse. First, Louis B. 
Pascoe and Christopher M. Bellitto discuss Pierre d’Ailly’s insistence on the 
need for internal reform of the institutionalized church as a means of per-
sonal reform. While d’Ailly remains in a theological discourse that, at a first 
glance, seems to imply a discontent about developments in the institutional 
Catholic Church, his interplay between institutional and personal reform 
reveals a departure from the Catholic anthropology of human imperfection 
caused by original sin. In d’Ailly’s theology one may observe a transition 
from a theology that emphasizes human imperfection toward a theology 
that renders human self-perfection possible and sees humans increasingly in the 
context of imago Dei. While d’Ailly’s theology is certainly not secular in 
the sense of a rejection of the religious, it emphasizes the study of salva-
tional history that is in the world, in the saeculum. Rejecting the ahistoricity 
of theology applies a strategy for renewal and reform similar to, for instance, 
that of twentieth-century liberation theologian Ignacio Ellacuría.20
The stress on historicity and the explicit use of history as a means to 
critique the status quo also yields a new method to undermine and ques-
tion papal authority. As Thomas Turley notes in his chapter, “In the early 
thirteenth century, a new generation of canon lawyers—the Decretalists—
began to alter the interpretation of the status ecclesiae, ascribing broad 
discretionary powers to the pope that allowed them to circumvent the 
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normal rights and privileges of prelates and others in cases of necessity.” 
“Secular champions” challenged their reading by explicitly turning to the 
Scriptures, blended in their argument with history. While the turn to his-
tory as a means of antipapal polemics is well known in the works of Marsilius 
of Padua, Turley traces earlier examples of this technique back to John of 
Paris and John of Pouilly, among others. Despite heresy charges like those 
leveled against John of Pouilly, the technique of emphasizing the secularity 
of historicity resulted in an erosion of authority through a multiplicity of 
interpretations that jeopardized papal claims to nearly absolute power.
Taking on the theme of heresy, Thomas A. Fudge explores the tensions 
in the perception of the Bohemian priest Jan Hus, who “went to the stake 
as a condemned heretic” at Constance. As Fudge shows, the conviction of 
Hus has a prehistory that goes back as far as the Council of Tours of 1163. 
In Lateran IV’s (1215) perspective on heresy, the earlier caritas approach 
is replaced by potestas that relates heresy to treason as a crime against the 
church and against the community. Thus, Hus was not only charged as a sin-
ner, but also as a criminal. Consequently, “extra-ecclesiastical authorities are 
seconded into the prosecution of the offensive activity.” By invoking Dante, 
Fudge identifies common themes in Dante and Hus: “Patriotism, devotion 
to their culture, lonely deaths far from home, and the experience of exile.” 
While Hus illustrates the merging of ecclesiastical and political crime that 
secularized sinful actions, Fudge also traces the perception of Hus until the 
nineteenth century, echoing Dante’s themes of patriotism and (national) 
culture. As exemplified by Hus’s legacy, Fudge’s contribution demonstrates 
the emergence of nationalist thinking in the context of the secularization of 
heresy as a deed against the church and against the state.
In Part 2, “Transforming Ideas and Traditions,” illuminates the impact 
of the Roman tradition on republican thought that later became a marker of 
the modern rather than of the medieval period, the transformation of ideas 
from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, as well as the temporal abolition of 
medieval republican thought in the Reformation age. Thus, the section shows 
how the invention of Modernity can be seen as a dialectical “development” 
that first abolishes more progressive ideas to allow for their more forceful 
reemergence centuries later. For this purpose, Cary J. Nederman traces the 
origins of medieval “republican” theory in the writings of Ptolemy of Lucca 
and Marsilius of Padua to the grossly overlooked impact of “the role played 
by classical Latinate culture and Roman civilization in the development of 
political thought during the Middle Ages.” Focusing first on Ptolemy, who 
“praised republican institutions as ‘more suitable for producing a certain 
civility’,” Nederman shows that his reasons for limited terms for officials 
8  BETTINA KOCH AND CARY J. NEDERMAN 
and emphasis on the rule of law, as well as the idea that the republic “must 
struggle to gain and retain earthly security and welfare,” rest on Valerius 
Maximus, Sallust, and Cicero rather than on Aristotle. In a similar vein, 
Nederman traces how Roman, and especially Ciceronian, concepts and prac-
tices impacted the Paduan’s discourse about justice. Marsilius concludes that 
“society itself is impossible without the acknowledgment of [the] obligation 
arising from the Ciceronian principle of justice.” Following partially along 
the lines of Turley’s argument, Nederman also shows that it was primarily 
Roman “political doctrines and languages” that helped Marsilius to attain 
“his overarching purpose of challenging and undermining the papal agenda.”
Nancy Struever’s inquiry into Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla on “the 
centrality of imaginative powers in discovery” shows an alternative human-
ist tradition that moves away from Ciceronian elegance through advocating 
Quintilian rhetorical elegance. Thus, she uncovers a story of classic Roman 
reception that is often overlooked. By emphasizing both intellectuals’ inter-
est in language, Struever points to Valla’s loquendi libertas, the freedom of 
speaking, as “a felt obligation to intrude. Valla proposes and performs an 
interconnected range of genres with topical reverberations; yet he offers seri-
ous critique of a particular historical—but unhistorical, inaccurate—clerical 
misuse of the language of secular power.” While this is an indirect critique 
of Cusanus’s “creative reinterpretation,” it also demonstrates Humanism’s 
“function to enable inquiry to be strenuously, even meticulously revisionist, 
and, perhaps, to be engaged in generating the possibilities of reform.”
Challenging and undermining the papal agenda remains, certainly, 
one of the key issues in the Reformation era, particularly in the reception 
of Marsilius. In her discussion of a 1545 partial German translation of 
Marsilius’s Defensor pacis, Bettina Koch shows how and for what purposes 
Marsilian ideas were adapted during the Reformation. Here, it is ironic 
that, in this period, all of Marsilius’s republican leanings were eliminated 
in preference to the view that he advocated a territorial ruler possessed 
of almost absolute power over temporal and ecclesiastical affairs. Thus, 
the move toward modern democratic ideas, numerous of which are vis-
ible and foreshadowed in Marsilius’s original work, takes a detour by first 
abolishing them. While, at a first glance, the sixteenth-century reception 
of Marsilius appears to be rather a step back from emerging Modernity, in 
an odd way the use of Marsilius, as well as the historical reality in which 
it emerges, helps to chart a path toward secularity. By fulfilling Marsilius’s 
demand of keeping the Church’s activities under political control and 
eventually placing it under the emerging regional powers’ governance, the 
religious sphere bows to secular authority.
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In Part 3, “Cusa and Philosophy,” Donald F. Duclow stresses the 
importance of Cusanus’s Constantinople experience. By focusing on one 
of Cusanus’s lesser studied works, De venatione sapientiae (The Hunt for 
Wisdom), Duclow concentrates on a philosophical-theological theme that 
Pierre d’Ailly had tackled from a purely theological perspective: the ques-
tion of self-perfection discussed in the Aristotelian language of potential-
ity and possibility. Duclow highlights Cusanus’s emphasis on the differ-
ence between celestial beings and other beings, the other “creatures—like 
ourselves—are not all that they can become: these ‘are never constant, 
and perish ... They imitate perpetual things but will never attain them ... 
They are temporal, and are called earthly and perceptible things’.” Duclow’s 
chapter demonstrates how, though moving increasingly toward a worldly 
understanding, philosophy remains within the parameters of Christian 
theology; at the same time, he illustrates Cusanus’s creative use of the 
sources he hunted down in libraries and archives. One of the core questions 
Duclow seeks to answer is whether Cusanus ought to be characterized as 
medieval or (already) modern. Although Cusanus is clearly not modern in 
the sense of Descartes, Duclow suggests that he might been seen as “mod-
ern” in a Gadamerian hermeneutical sense because, as Gadamer notes, 
“[t]he horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists 
in the form of tradition, is always in motion. The surrounding horizon is 
not set in motion by historical consciousness. But it is in this motion [that 
it] becomes aware of itself.”21 In this fashion, Cusanus remains in the tradi-
tion but, at the same time, “he pays little attention to the tensions between 
the texts he reads and his own perspective on them,” which allows him to 
read his sources “in a new and idiosyncratic direction.”
Precisely this feature of Cusanus’s thought is illustrated in Constant 
Mews’s essay. Mews uncovers a less well-known and maybe even hidden 
reception history that also challenges the Renaissance master narrative 
defined “in terms of the rediscovery of classical authors” by stressing that 
“the intellectual renaissance of the fifteenth century was shaped (particu-
larly in northern Europe) by recovery of less well-known authors of the 
twelfth and thirteenth century, whose writings did not gain authority 
within a standard scholastic curriculum.” Mews traces some of these influ-
ences through Nicholas Cusanus’s library by emphasizing the writings 
of Peter Abelard and Anselm of Havelberg. Here the primary focus is on 
Abelard’s Theologia ‘Scholarium’, a work that Bernard of Clairvaux con-
demned because of its allegedly heretical content. Only five manuscripts of 
Abelard’s work survived. As a transmissional figure, Mews identifies Anselm 
of Havelberg, “whose fascination with accepting religious diversity” in some 
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ways resemble Cusanus’s position. Both Anselm and Abelard were rediscov-
ered in the fifteenth century. As Mews notes, “[i]n his Antikeimenon Anselm 
of Havelberg anticipates the concerns of Nicholas of Cusa about overcom-
ing diversity, but in the twelfth century, this was understood only through 
the divergences between different forms of Christian life.” In both cases, the 
interest in and the discovery of religious diversity was stimulated through 
their journeys to Constantinople. Mews concludes that, although Cusanus 
had been influenced by other medieval figures like Roman Lull and Meister 
Eckhart, the “originality of Nicholas is such that his ideas cannot be traced 
back to any single literary source.”
James Muldoon, by contrast, shifts attention away from the realm 
of philosophical speculation toward Cusanus’s vision of World Order and 
International Relations, “a topic that was of growing importance in the fif-
teenth century, culminating in the creation of the great European overseas 
empires.” Cusanus stresses a harmony that results from the “active partici-
pation of human beings, wise men working with the consent of their fel-
lows, to work out the specific details of the harmony.” This harmony, based 
on consent, is precisely what most readers today would identify as a “mod-
ern” feature, though it was precisely this train of thought that was put, at 
least partially, off the track in sixteenth-century thinking. Yet, because of 
the emerging significance of integrating peoples from distant lands into 
Cusanus’s speculative World Order, he faced the problem of how to fit the 
“other” into a harmonious system. Theoretically, for Cusanus, this assimi-
lation does not pose a significant problem, because “all men are by nature 
social and organized societies ‘to preserve unity and harmony’ and ‘estab-
lish guardians of all these laws with the power necessary to provide for the 
public good,’ just as European Christian rulers did.” Nonetheless, Cusanus 
invents a hierarchy among nations that rests on their relative proximity 
to Christian religion. According to his logic, Muslims would rank higher 
than Tatars because Muslims “venerate the laws of the Old Testament 
and certain of those of the New Testament.” As Muldoon notes, Cusanus 
did not concern himself much with the practicality of his suggestion and 
certainly could not anticipate the fact that “Islam was advancing in the 
east, seizing Constantinople in 1453 and advancing through the Balkans, 
reaching Vienna in 1683. A harmonious relationship did not appear 
likely.” Yet, as Muldoon stresses, even for Cusanus the harmonious World 
Order may not be realized “without the use of force in some cases.”
In Part 4, “The Great Schism and the Conciliar Option,” Joëlle 
Rollo-Koster opens the discussion with a case of a political situation in 
which harmony has little place by analyzing the circumstances that might 
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justify the act of tyrannicide. She places her narrative in the context of 
the murder of Louis of Orléans in 1407. As Rollo-Koster shows, this case 
is of particular relevance because it plays out in the context of the Great 
Schism, which raises the question of whether, if tyrannicide is permissible, 
papacide would be acceptable on similar grounds. The problem refers to a 
pressing political question during the Schism that concerns religious and 
secular authorities alike, namely, “the means of responding to illegitimacy: 
they could use violence, break away from all popes, or call a council to 
solve the issue.” Her case illustrates that the struggle toward the legaliza-
tion of responses to unjust or tyrannical rule requires in part a redefinition 
of usurper, opponent, and heretic. Even though the Council of Constance 
did not arrive at an univocal solution to the problem of a proper proce-
dure, it nonetheless, with reference to the condemnation of John Wyclif 
in 1377, declared that “the council as a whole is greater than the pope and 
the pope is a part of the council.” Even after the election of a pope, that is, 
the council still maintains its supreme power, which perhaps also reflects 
an embryonic version of checks and balances.
The idea of the pope’s limited authority that shines through 
the discussion at the Council of Constance is similarly relevant in Ian 
Christopher Levy’s analysis of John Wyclif ’s opposition to canon lawyers 
who claim that whatever the pope ordains is just since his letters may even 
“possess greater authority than Holy Scripture.” Thus, the “heretic” Wyclif 
is essentially concerned with a project similar to that of the conciliar 
movement: limiting papal power. The means of attempting to achieve this 
goal for Wyclif is through a discussion of a hierarchy in the authority of 
sources. Wyclif particularly criticizes the canonist’s “assumption that Holy 
Scripture and canon law might be placed on equal footing, as though the 
growth of the former justifies that of the latter.” One of the key issues in 
this conflict is the idea of papal dispensations that, at least in some cases, 
might undermine the accountability and authority of the priestly office, 
because, for Wyclif, “when a priest commits an act of fornication he must 
be deposed from the state of the priesthood. The only question is whether 
he can be reinstated following a suitable penance.”
In the case of Wyclif ’s idea of the accountability of officials of the 
church, it took at least until the Reformation for the general principle to 
be embraced and become part of political and judicial practice. For some 
ideas, it took far longer than just a couple of centuries for their relevance 
to be realized. As Francis Oakley shows in his chapter on the nineteenth-
century churchman Henri Louis Charles Maret, the ideas of Pierre d’Ailly, 
with whom our journey through medieval discourses began, gained 
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ultimate currency in the context of Vatican I, which aimed to address the 
challenges posed by rationalism, liberalism, and materialism. For Maret, 
“the government of the Church [...] had become ‘too exclusive, too abso-
lute, too Italian’.” Maret’s opposition, however, reached not merely to 
the too-absolute and too-Italian church, but also to his discontent with 
the ancienne régime’s “political Gallicanism” that was “alien to the liberal 
sympathies and (increasingly) democratic sensibilities that eventually 
led Maret to embrace a species of separation between church and state.” 
Yet, his distaste for the political Gallicanism of the time also brought 
Maret closer to traditional conciliar thinking. As Oakley notes, in the 
“combination of the strict conciliar theory with the (older) reforming 
strand in conciliar thinking, Maret stood somewhat closer in spirit to the 
great conciliarists of the fifteenth century than he did to his immediate 
Gallican forbearers.”
After our traveler from a distant land and culture who was intro-
duced at the beginning of this chapter has journeyed with us to the dif-
ferent places and engaged with different ideas discussed in the present 
volume, she might come to the conclusion that, while the meanings of 
representations of medieval Christianity still visible throughout Europe 
might have changed throughout the centuries, they also shaped and made 
possible what is presently perceived as Modernity. She might even con-
clude that some ideas she has associated with Modernity itself were as pre-
sent in medieval thought as they are today.
NOTES
1 Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, 75–76. Koch translation.
2 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 2, 4.
3 Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, 11. Here, post-modern 
discourses certainly contributed to the tendency to abandon secularization as an 
analytical tool because it contradicts a postmodern notion of recognizing multi-
ple spiritualties compared with the presently contested concept of “religion(s).” 
See Berry, “Postmodernism and Post-Religion,” 168–81.
4 Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, 76. Koch translation.
5 Taylor, A Secular Age, 11. In the book Taylor is, among other things, con-
cerned with the “conditions of belief in 1500 and 2000,” 25.
6 Krämer, “Secularity Contested,” 124–25, 135.
7 Casanova, “The Secular, Secularization, Secularism,” 59.
8 Thomas and Swaine Thomas, The Child in America, 572.
9 Casanova, “The Secular, Secularization, Secularism,” 56, 65.
10 Pirbhai, “Demons in Hindutva,” 27–53. For a useful approach to the 
concept “fundamentalism” as an analytical tool for belief systems outside the 
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Christian tradition from which it emerges, see Cook, Ancient Religions, Modern 
Politics, 371–75.
11 An especially clear statement of this position is afforded by Euben, Enemy 
in the Mirror.
12 Roy, Jihad and Death, 67.
13 In addition to the well-known arguments of the later Rawls and Habermas, 
see Barber, “The War of All against All,” 90 and Calhoun, “Secularism, Citizen-
ship, and the Public Sphere,” 80–81, who emphasizes the “religious roots of pub-
lic reason.”
14 Roy, Holy Ignorance, 2.
15 Ibid., 10.
16 Ibid., 8.
17 See, for instance, Muldoon, ed., Bridging the Medieval–Modern Divide; 
Koch, Patterns Legitimizing Political Violence; Koch, Zur Dis-/Kontinuität mitte-
lalterlichen politischen Denkens in der neuzeitlichen politischen Theorie; Nederman, 
Lineages of European Political Thought; Izbicki and Bellitto, Reform and Renewal 
in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
18 Ironically, scholars from Spain or Portugal barely interacted with their col-
leagues in Paris, Rome, Cologne, or Oxford and are at best side-figures in the dis-
courses that are relevant for the project under investigation.
19 Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, 559.
20 Ellacuría, Freedom Made Flesh, 3–19.
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 303.
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The Trinitarian Dynamics of  
Personal Reform and Renewal
Louis B. Pascoe, SJ† with Christopher M. Bellitto1
THERE IS A TENDENCY TO VIEW CHURCH REFORM in any historical period through a prism of attempts to reform and renew 
either the institution’s administrative head (pope, cardinals, bishops) or 
her local members (priests, monks and nuns, mendicant men and women, 
city or rural folk). This is a false dichotomy, however, since the operative 
phrase in the history of church reform is reformatio in capite et in membris: 
reform in head and members, not head or members. While historians and 
theologians may logically focus on efforts in one or the other, the reality is 
that most reformers—particularly represented by late medieval and early 
modern Catholic and Protestant voices—saw reform in terms of both 
head and members and not a binary either/or.2
This chapter offers a balancing look at one such reformer, Pierre 
d’Ailly (1351–1420), who is primarily known for his considerable achieve-
ments in high-level church statesmanship, which entailed the institu-
tional aspects of his writings and actions on church politics and theology. 
Our attempt is to expand the standard portrait of d’Ailly by means of an 
examination of the more contemplative aspect of his considerable body of 
writings on reform: the spiritual dimensions that must underlie all other 
attempts at structural reform, especially episcopal and papal reform, if 
they are to demonstrate authenticity, integrity, credibility, and, ultimately, 
long-term impact and success on the personal level. The present study will 
draw on d’Ailly’s generally overlooked writings on spirituality and will 
explore especially the personal initiatives necessary for inner renewal.
Personal reform and renewal—and therefore lasting institutional 
structural reforms—were simply impossible without the three precondi-
tions of grace (what d’Ailly referred to as the heart’s opening to the adven-
tus Christi) self-knowledge, and a loving response to God’s invitation. We 
find this triad of preconditions explicated in a series of writings from the 
first part of d’Ailly’s career (1372–1395), dating to his own arts studies at 
the Collège de Navarre, and then moving to his time as a theology professor 
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and university official, first as rector of his Collège (1384–1389) and then 
as University of Paris chancellor (1389–1395).3 He was named diocesan 
bishop in Le Puy (1395–1397), although he did not spend much time 
there; he was then transferred to the more prestigious diocese of Cambrai 
(1397–1411), where he took his episcopal duties more seriously.4 We will 
examine especially his Speculum considerationis, dating probably from 
the latter years of the Cambrai period, along with a few comments from 
other writings and sermons.5 It is likely that Speculum considerationis was 
directed toward his clergy in Cambrai and may be a more formal version 
of three long sermons delivered in the three synods that d’Ailly held as 
bishop there. In them, he encouraged his priests to live a life of virtue, 
especially charity in pastoral service, instead of vice—rhetorically to be 
apostles rather than apostates.6
The key to understanding d’Ailly’s notion of personal reform is to 
ground it, as he did, in Christian anthropology.7 D’Ailly’s perspective on 
personal reform was based on an optimistic and respectful stance toward 
the status and potential of the human person. Made in the image and like-
ness of God, each human being enjoyed the dignity and nobility of the cre-
ated state. All human creatures may be said to be vestigia Dei et Trinitatis. 
Only rational creatures can be created in God’s image and likeness; therein 
sits human dignity, nobility, and honor. In fact, the imago Dei is placed 
at the border of the two worlds of heaven and earth. This threshold sta-
tus meant that all humans had the potential in mind, intellect, and will 
to manifest truth, goodness, wisdom, love, mercy, and loftiness or mag-
nificentia (big-heartedness) that were close to but never quite reaching 
the divine levels of these attributes. Nevertheless, these virtues could be 
achieved via self-knowledge, good habit, reason, and a cultivated con-
science guided by the principle of synderesis to act in a morally responsible 
way for the good of others. D’Ailly envisioned a unified hierarchical view 
of the created universe not unlike that of his successor as University of 
Paris chancellor, Jean Gerson (1363–1429), who closely followed pseudo-
Dionysian models. D’Ailly’s theology was also in line with late medieval 
scholastic adoption and adaptation of Augustinian thought, especially on 
the Trinity, and owed a large debt to Aristotelian logic.8
This optimistic potential had been harmed by Adam’s fall, though 
Adam as a human creature was above all other corporeal creations while 
containing and surpassing their measure of perfection. Humanity’s four 
original virtues—mercy, truth, justice, and peace—had been obscured 
by vice because of the human inability to realize the original dignity. 
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This blindness occurred through disobedience and rebelliousness. As a 
result, humans lost their full imago et similitudo (image and likeness) to 
God and Trinity, although never the potential to recover them. Humans 
began to act sinfully, which in turn dulled the spiritual senses. Hence, 
d’Ailly described the state of humanity in the church on Earth as that of 
vestigia et similitudo creatorum.9 Affinity with the Trinity was replaced in 
exile from the heavenly home by a new unworthy trinity of impotentia, 
ignorantia et concupiscentia. Some of d’Ailly’s images for the now-pilgrim 
human being were a region of shadows, a besieged castle or tower, and 
the man beaten by thieves on the journey to Jericho from the parable of 
the Good Samaritan. That pilgrim path back to the spotless imago Dei et 
Trinitatis entailed the dynamics of personal reform and renewal.10
The human person is a microcosm of God, who is infused in all crea-
tion. As God creates, moves, and rules all creatures, so too the human soul 
freely moves the body and directs its physical and spiritual actions. God’s 
grace was necessary because of human fragility, which cannot achieve 
virtue without divine aid. Turning to God in meditation with a humble 
awareness of this need for grace strengthens the soul; penance leads to 
spiritual progress and a conversion away from carnal vices and sins. Love 
God sweetly, prudently, and boldly, d’Ailly advises, so that you may endure 
hardship.11 In tones that occasionally ring with exhortation but at other 
times clang like a tedious scholastic lecture, d’Ailly leads his reader (or 
more likely his priestly listener in synod at Cambrai) in Speculum consid-
erationis through a reflection on his vices and then, in contrast, a medita-
tion on his heavenly home with an emphasis on how he might progress 
from mortal reason to angelic participation. The arduous path of a vir-
tuous life includes a pragmatic recognition of humanity’s natural dignity 
sullied by sinful actions; however, that dignity can be revived by divine 
grace and hard human work that progresses toward God. Such progress is 
informed by philosophy that offers excellences (he is adopting Aristotle’s 
word here, which we usually take as “virtues”), but we are impeded by our 
carnal desires. The antidote is reliance on and hope of God’s goodness, 
truth, power, and love.12
In trinitarian fashion, d’Ailly delineated that redemption comes by 
divine potentia (power), sapientia (wisdom), and bonitas (goodness), all 
of which are fueled by grace and mercy that produce personal reforma-
tion and right action. Christ’s passion is seen as reflecting this triad. Grace 
reforms the soul, but only if the soul recognizes its dignity and is open to 
correction. For Christ’s part, patience is the order of the day: Christ offers 
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grace as a standing gift to be accepted in due time. What is required of the 
individual person seeking reform is an openness to the gift in prayer before 
the Trinity: the Father provides strength so the penitent might not weary, 
the Son will rule by wisdom so the penitent will not be seduced into error, 
and the Spirit would console with mercy.13
D’Ailly added self-knowledge, one of the Holy Spirit’s seven gifts, 
as another precondition for personal reform to grace and a heart open to 
the adventus Christi. We should not be surprised to find this theme in an 
Advent sermon where d’Ailly listed a four-fold opening to Christ. We first 
are open to the incarnated Christ who made his home among humanity 
when the Word became flesh. Next Christ takes root in the mind through 
spiritual influence, related again in trinitarian terms: the Father forms 
us with his power, the Son illuminates with wisdom, the Spirit inflames 
hearts with grace. Third, Christ comes to accompany us in our suffering 
as he carried us on his own cross. Fourth and finally, Christ leads us to our 
judgment at the end of time.14
It is necessary to turn within: only in self-recognition of sinfulness 
and defects as well as of impending divine judgment can the soul move 
from an inferior to a superior knowledge of God. In meditating on death, 
the mind contemplates eternal life with God and the angels in heaven: a 
life that surpasses the rational and mortal aspects of earthly life. The lack 
of such self-knowledge has a terrible price: the soul that does not know 
itself does not know the dignity of its nature as made in the imago Dei 
and therefore cannot know nor conform itself to God. The antidote is to 
seek to understand and desire as God understands and desires. In this way, 
the will deformed by sin may be reformed according to God’s love, power, 
wisdom, and mercy. The purgative path of humble meditation leads away 
from sin and to conversion that progresses toward heavenly life. The 
soul will thus be freed from both Original and lived sin through God’s 
patience and kindness as demonstrated by Christ’s suffering and crucifix-
ion. Led to the knowledge and love of God, the soul’s only response is 
an intense love (dulciter, prudenter, fortiter) for the God who provided 
redemption and salvation.15
Despite the ultimate reliance on divine grace, d’Ailly placed a great 
deal of emphasis on personal initiatives toward reform, beginning with an 
intentional and self-conscious effort to root out vices and cleanse oneself 
of sins, in particular of falling prey to the devil’s lures—the chains of con-
cupiscence of the flesh and eyes as well as arrogance and avarice—to be 
replaced by the cultivation of virtues, especially humility and obedience.16 
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We arrive at these virtues through hard work in our tasks and contempla-
tion of the divine majesty and heavenly light, which purge the heart of 
vice and begin the path toward wisdom. One must be intentionally aware 
of God’s gifts in this purgative path through an ascetical lifestyle and con-
templation. We again see the pseudo-Dionysian influence, in this case the 
reform path shared by Gerson’s notions of personal renewal: from purga-
tion through illumination to perfection.17
D’Ailly discussed the combined total of seven theological and car-
dinal virtues in his Speculum considerationis, which, as we’ve noted, was 
likely connected to three instructional and pastorally-oriented synods 
for his priests in Cambrai. He also addressed the topic in a sermon for 
Trinity Sunday on June 14, 1405. In common trinitarian terms—and we 
note that d’Ailly saw trinitarian reform applying to both personal and 
institutional reform—he described the theological virtues of faith, hope, 
and charity as the created Trinity, which are made in the image of the 
uncreated Trinity. These virtues he sees as interrelated in spiritual people 
who act in obedience to God’s potentia, veritas, et bonitas. He stressed 
that these virtues are themselves reformative within the individual soul: 
as they curb vice and convert the soul to act in faith, they cause that soul 
to rise upward to God. Thus reason is transformed into faith in the gos-
pel, anger into hope, and lust into charity. It is through the created Trinity 
of the theological virtues that fallen humanity reforms and returns to the 
uncreated Trinity from which it fell and was exiled. Through faith (rules 
and sacraments), we are guided toward the Trinity; through hope (for-
giveness by grace and glory), we are lifted up to the Trinity; and espe-
cially through charity (a pure heart and a good conscience), we are united 
with the Trinity.18
The cardinal virtues—prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iusti-
tia—are intertwined with God’s potentia, veritas, et bonitas. We hear the 
former university professor’s precise methodology at work as diocesan 
bishop. In good scholastic fashion, d’Ailly began by defining his terms 
for the four cardinal virtues. Prudence is presented as a rubric for other 
functions: discretion, memory, understanding , circumspection (per-
haps perspective is a better word), and caution. Temperance entails con-
stancy, modesty, abstinence, and chastity. He broadly defined fortitude 
as including magnanimity, trust, security, and patience. He also dwelled 
a bit here on magnificentia (which we have anachronistically translated 
as “big-heartedness”), indicating that it dispels three defects: rashness, 
weakness, and being faint-hearted, like plants tossed easily by the wind.
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The final cardinal virtue, justice, is accorded a greater level of 
inquiry. D’Ailly identified four theories of justice. First, justice can be seen 
as both severity and freedom, which in turn can produce a sense of piety, 
innocence, friendship, reverence, concord, and mercy. Second, justice fos-
ters obedience, discipline, equity, truth, and faithfulness. A third theory 
of justice is more basic to natural law: justice helps all and harms none. 
Fourth, justice must ensure that everyone is rendered what is naturally his, 
namely faith, hope, and love. He noted that justice may translate to inti-
mate connections such as the piety or honor due to parents, relatives, and 
even country.
We come now to the reformative role that d’Ailly assigned to these 
cardinal virtues, starting with their fundamental task in working against 
the defectus of Original Sin. To begin this fight against sin, d’Ailly pre-
scribed the petitionary aspects of the Pater Noster as a path to restore 
theological and cardinal virtues. He grandly described those virtues as 
precious stones like shining stars in the crown of Christ’s spouse, the 
ecclesia militans, and then assigned the virtues to parts of that crown. 
Prudence is the front part where understanding battles ignorance with 
good counsel by guarding against future evils. Temperance sits on the 
crown’s right side where it moderates against concupiscence and the 
dangers of prosperity, while fortitude pairs temperance on the left side 
where it provides support against succumbing to adversity or infirmity. 
D’Ailly placed a greater emphasis on fortitude a bit later in this sec-
tion of the Speculum considerationis, perhaps because he felt the need 
to support a diocesan clergy embattled and demoralized by the Schism 
and the French civil wars, both by then in their third decades. He com-
mended fortitude for expelling the soul’s weakness or sense of being 
enfeebled and replacing it with greatness. Fortitude specifically coun-
ters three debilities: fear with patience, timidity with knowledge, and 
instability with steadiness. Finally, justice is the crown’s back, correcting 
spite or an ill nature with uprightness.19 Earlier, in his academic career 
at Paris before taking on the pastoral role of a diocesan bishop, d’Ailly 
had already laid out in his Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali the 
reformative role of Christ’s power, wisdom, and goodness or mercy (he 
used both bonitas and clementia). Christ’s passion demonstrated that 
these divine attributes are offered to help humans transform themselves 
and to be reformed by divine aid. Christ has great patience in waiting 
for us to embrace self-reformation via penance for our sins and to allow 
Christ to lead our soul back to him.20
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Having weeded out vice and cultivated virtue, the reforming soul 
is next in a position to taste the fruits of its good work in the next life, 
although some may enjoy their sweetness partially on earth. This enjoyment 
brings us to d’Ailly’s consideration of contemplation, which, he noted to his 
priests in pastoral service in Cambrai, is easier to pursue in a monastic setting 
rather than in their active parish context. He recommended that his busy 
priests locate a place of quiet solitude for their reading, prayer, and medita-
tion so they may ascend in contemplation. They must not engage in fruitless 
work or be distracted. These thoughts on the stages of contemplation that 
d’Ailly recommended to his diocesan clergy in Speculum considerationis drew 
on another text with the affiliated thematic title, De quatuor gradibus scale 
spiritualis, dating back to his Parisian period, as well as on his sermons in 
Cambrai. He now adapted his earlier formal classroom treatment with an 
inspirational tone directed to the busy apostolic service of working priests. 
In the Parisian text he described in conventional terms the four stages of con-
templation: lectio, meditatio, oratio, et contemplatio. The first three combine 
to produce the fourth. Reading and meditation inform prayer, which then 
ascends to contemplation and returns in a renewed commitment to apos-
tolic service and virtuous deeds that would present a credible example to 
parishioners.21 As always, d’Ailly identified the combination of divine grace 
and human industry as indispensable to personal reform and renewal.22
Here we see d’Ailly presenting a dialectic among the spiritual pro-
gress of contemplation, the personal progress in the cardinal and theologi-
cal virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. He relates four of these 
gifts to intellectus (sapientia, intellectus, consilium et scientia) and three to 
affectus (fortitudo, pietas et timor Dei). Although he had stated that it is eas-
ier to achieve this personal progress in a monastic setting, d’Ailly reminded 
his working priests that the apostolic-oriented beatitudes were the natu-
ral effect of exercising the Holy Spirit’s gifts and fruits. While sapientia et 
intellectus pertained particularly to the contemplative life, the three gifts 
of timor Dei, pietas, et fortitudo would serve the clergy well in their par-
ish life. In this they will conform themselves to the image and likeness of 
God while they led their charges to do so too. They must, however, guard 
themselves from a sense of smugness: as they climb, they can easily fall off 
the ladder of contemplation. Self-knowledge demands that the spiritual 
pilgrim accuse himself of negligence and sin, vanity, and lust. Progress in 
the virtues does not preclude backsliding into vice. In particular, the gifts 
of sapientia and consilium (judgment) guide the soul to discern what helps 
and what hinders via contemplation.23
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The best way for the soul to make progress was not by following 
human doctrine but by seeking divine inspiration that is encountered 
especially through scripture, which d’Ailly offered as the way home to 
heaven. This is the reformative dimension—more precisely: function—of 
theology.24 Earthly knowledge and wisdom would not lead back to the 
Garden: fallen, sinful, poor, and expelled mankind would not be cor-
rected by philosophers, doctors, politicians, or lawyers. The ancient law 
of Moses must be pushed aside for the new law personified by Christ the 
doctor and master. Studying salvation history was the same as revealing 
Truth on Earth that had been lost by Adam’s disobedience. Scripture calls 
humanity’s originally pure but now sullied imago back to God and Trinity. 
Scripture study leads to an appreciation of God’s perfect precepts, increas-
ing belief and meritorious actions, and therefore heavenly reward, by grace 
and justice. Schooled in salvation history, the seeking soul that had been 
hampered by human defect is now mildly and helpfully corrected by God. 
The soul reforms by conforming itself to Christ’s law and divine will. 
Using medical imagery, d’Ailly comments that Christ’s new doctrine is the 
healing remedy that by grace restores human wholeness and health from 
its infirmity. Specifically, the sacraments are perfect medicine for all of the 
consequences of Original and later sins.25
For those who have persisted through d’Ailly’s many divisions and 
distinctions of contemplation, study, and meditation, there is great reward. 
Nearing the end of Speculum considerationis, d’Ailly turns lyrical, aban-
doning his professor’s mantle for his shepherd’s crook. When inflamed by 
the fire of celestial desire that exceeds human modes, d’Ailly promises his 
clergy, the soul will melt like wax. When illumined by divine light and 
then suspended in admiration of the highest beauty, it will be as if the 
soul is struck by lightning. When the soul is drunk with an abundance 
of heavenly and eternal sweetness, it will forget what it once was and will 
be elevated to a state of wonderful happiness that will be transformative 
in its ecstasy. The heart is now purified and can contemplate the depth 
and fervor of God’s love, which far surpasses human love. The more that 
contemplation becomes sublime, the greater the humility will be in the 
human soul. And then d’Ailly issued a caveat: once these heights have been 
achieved, the soul must still guard against excess, wandering thoughts, and 
losing the insights gained through introspection and discretion. The per-
fecting soul—which, being human, can de facto never be perfect—must at 
every hour of its pilgrimage continue to desire and to heed the full vision 
of the Godhead.26
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Although d’Ailly preached on personal reform during his time as a 
diocesan bishop in Cambrai, his thoughts never confined reform to indi-
viduals. He always had in mind the wider church, especially during the 
troubles of the Great Western Schism, thereby connecting individual to 
institutional reform, the latter of which has been the focus of prior schol-
arship on d’Ailly’s reform thought.27 As incentive and model of true per-
sonal reform, d’Ailly offered those who had achieved the beatific vision in 
his November 1, 1416 sermon on the Feast of All Saints, those who had 
eclipsed their errors by their faith. It is notable that he offered the saints 
as exemplars of how to seek truth and justice at the very moment that 
many members of the Council of Constance, working toward institutional 
reform, were locked in complex political battles deciding how best to 
depose Avignon’s Benedict XIII.28 Elsewhere he also returned Constance 
to the first principles of the church as a community. In a Pentecost sermon 
preached at Constance on May 30, 1417 (right in the midst of the tense 
resolution of the Schism), d’Ailly portrayed the ecclesia primitiva as having 
been endowed at first with the virtues of poverty, chastity, and humility, 
which were then driven out and replaced by the vices of avarice, luxury, 
vanity, and arrogance. The original community described in Acts of the 
Apostles as holding peace and unity in the normative phrase cor unum et 
anima una (Acts 4:32) had shattered. Like the individual soul fallen from 
original virtue to present-day vice, the current state of the church bore tes-
timony to the need for both personal and institutional reform. Without a 
cor unum, the contending factions at Constance bore testimony to the fact 
that the entire church herself suffered because she lacked peace.29 Given 
the readings for that Pentecost Sunday, d’Ailly predictably used the New 
Testament’s descending fire as an image for purgation and illumination. 
He was likely continuing the idea that the Holy Spirit itself ratified the 
council’s actions, which dated back two years to Jean Gerson’s Ambulate 
dum lucem habetis sermon of March 23 1415 and the subsequent decree of 
April 6 1415, Haec sancta synodus.30 In his sermon on the Trinity a decade 
before, d’Ailly had made clear just how the Holy Spirit would spare the 
church: Extirpa igitur vitia, planta virtutes, reforma in ecclesia iustitiam et 
scitate si vis in ea procurare concordiam unitatem et pacem.31
The reforming path to unity and peace may have been clear to the 
Holy Spirit, but it was not to those living through the longstanding Schism. 
No one knew how best to achieve unity and peace, though all agreed they 
were certainly the goals to be pursued. In practical terms and being fair to 
the historical players, we note that d’Ailly, like the others of his era, walked 
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a difficult line among three papacies. For French theologians and prelates 
the trouble was especially fraught because the most obstinate claimant, 
the Avignon line’s Benedict XIII, never accepted deposition. D’Ailly’s 
cautious personality had earned him enmity from his Parisian colleagues. 
They thought he was too soft toward Benedict XIII, who favored d’Ailly 
with a number of positions and endowed d’Ailly’s relatives with offices 
on the chancellor’s request. The issue came to a head when most Parisian 
scholars voted in February 1395 to force Benedict to abdicate through a 
withdrawal of spiritual obedience and financial support, a strategy that 
d’Ailly opposed. Benedict named d’Ailly bishop of Puy in April 1395; later 
that year, the University of Paris Arts faculty voted to censure their chan-
cellor. D’Ailly resigned that position in favor of Jean Gerson as successor 
when he was ordained bishop. The French church did withdraw obedience 
from Benedict for the period 1398–1403, but the move accomplished 
nothing except to solidify Benedict’s resolve not to step down.32
In his Trinity sermon from 1405, d’Ailly moved away from Benedict: 
he indicated the need for papal leadership in resolving the Schism, which 
d’Ailly said was caused by vice crowding out virtue. By the Council of Pisa 
in 1409, d’Ailly abandoned his former patron, who persistently resisted 
peace and union by refusing to step down. In a letter to Benedict XIII 
dated January 26 1408, d’Ailly wrote with a sense of dismay, sadness, and 
even exasperation that the Avignon pope was guilty of breaking Christ’s 
mystical body into fragments and dividing the church into two divisions, 
a state that was against divine and natural law. How, d’Ailly asked, could 
Benedict grant peace to the church if he did not have it—nor even wish to 
seek it?33 Of course, little could anyone have known that Pisa would move 
the church from two papacies to three. The supposedly unifying Pisan 
pope, Alexander V, died not long afterwards; his successor, John XXIII, 
named d’Ailly a cardinal in June 1411.
How could unity occur, according to Pierre d’Ailly? The three the-
ological virtues, once restored and flowing freely, would surely reform 
and renew the church from three papal obediences into its true single and 
unified corpus mysticum Christi. Church unity and personal virtue were 
combined in the mystical body of Christ, d’Ailly had preached in one 
of his sermons to the Cambrai clergy.34 His prize student Jean Gerson 
also embraced the imagery and ecclesiology of Christ’s mystical body. In 
his own writings on reform, Gerson noted that institutional reform led 
by the hierarchy, with theologians playing a central role, would result 
in personal reform in membris. As Louis B. Pascoe SJ concluded about 
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Gerson: “In brief, then, personal reform in Gerson is not simply the 
result of individual endeavor but takes place within the context of the 
church’s hierarchical structure. The result is not only personal reform 
and renewal but also the edification of the Church as Christ’s mysti-
cal body.”35 We may conclude that d’Ailly—despite his reputation as a 
church statesman of the highest order operating at dizzying levels in 
the church’s most dangerous moments of the Great Western Schism— 
similarly saw personal reform as the key to all church renewal. For Gerson 
and d’Ailly, personal and institutional reform could not be separated.
NOTES
1 This article was written by Christopher M. Bellitto based on notes entrusted 
to him by Louis Pascoe, SJ, shortly before Fr. Pascoe’s death in 2015. Among Fr. 
Pascoe’s publications was Church and Reform. He had been working on a second 
volume on d’Ailly, tentatively titled Pierre d’Ailly: Christian Anthropology, Asceti-
cal Theology, and Personal Reform and Renewal, although no manuscript exists. 
The most detailed notes were outlines for a chapter on Christian anthropology 
and another on personal reform and renewal. Fr. Pascoe was clearly moving along 
from a thought in the conclusion of the d’Ailly volume: “While the idea of per-
sonal reform, especially as applicable to the life of a bishop, has been touched upon 
in our study, the whole question of d’Ailly’s views on personal reform in general as 
well as the spirituality associated with it deserve much future attention,” Church 
and Reform, 280. Since these planned chapters’ structures, accompanying textual 
evidence, and implied conclusions were fairly advanced, this article serves as a 
vehicle for bringing to fruition main issues from Fr. Pascoe’s unfinished project. 
Moreover, publishing this article in this way and in this volume has a particular 
resonance: Thomas M. Izbicki and Bellitto co-edited a festschrift for Fr. Pascoe: 
Reform and Renewal in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Bellitto has received 
permission to publish this article using Fr. Pascoe’s materials from the Maryland 
Province of the Society of Jesus.
2 For a fuller discussion of medieval church reform in capite et in membris, 
especially in the late Middle Ages, see Bellitto, “The Reform Context,” 303–31.
3 The heritage of humanism at the Collège de Navarre had a profound influ-
ence on those who studied there. For an analysis of its educational culture, see 
Gorochov, Le Collège de Navarre. On late medieval developments in humanism, 
see especially Ouy, “Paris, l’un des principaux,” 71–98, and “Le collège de Nav-
arre,” 275–99; Cecchetti, “L’elogio delle arti liberali,” 1–14; and Ornato, “Les 
humanistes franҫais,” 1–45.
4 For a biographical narrative on d’Ailly, see Guenée, Between Church and 
State, 102–258. See also Salembier, Le Cardinal Pierre d’Ailly.
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5 For most of our source material, we turn to d’Ailly, Petrus de Ailliaco: Trac-
tatus et sermones, hereafter TS. On dating d’Ailly’s writings, see Salembier, Le Car-
dinal Pierre d’Ailly, 368–74, and Glorieux, “L’oeuvre littéraire,” 61–78. Glorieux 
places the Speculum considerationis after 1408: “L’oeuvre littéraire,” 68.
6 Pascoe, Church and Reform, 137–56, where he touched on three homilies 
that d’Ailly delivered to his Cambrai priests, found in TS, 301–15, although Pas-
coe’s greater concern was on the episcopacy in that monograph.
7 On these key points, see particularly d’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 
4–5, 13–14; Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali (1372–1395), TS, 164–
65; and Quaestio quarta primi libri sententiarum (composed very early in his 
career in 1375), in d’Ailly, Quaestiones super libros, 107–8.
8 Pascoe, Jean Gerson, 17–48; Pascoe, Church and Reform, 207–33.
9 D’Ailly had worked through a scholastic discussion of the issue Utrum 
creatura rationalis sit vestigium et imago increatae Trinitatis during his Parisian 
student days: Quaestio quarta primi libri Sententiarum, 106–9. He applied this 
analysis to his later episcopal career and specifically to his writings on personal 
reform and renewal.
10 D’Ailly repeatedly speaks of his priests walking singly, with other priests, 
and among their flocks along a path to personal improvement and therefore to 
better apostolic service and example in Sermo in Synodo Camaracensi I, TS, 302–5, 
and Homilia in Synodo Camaracensi, TS, 310.
11 D’Ailly, Sermo de quadruplice adventu Domini, TS, 216; Sermo de Nativi-
tate II (likely from the Parisian period), TS, 242; Sermo de Sancta Trinitate 
(1405), TS, 276, 278; Principium in Quartum Sententiarum, in Quaestiones super 
libros sententiarum, 34–35.
12 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 13–14. For the flavor of his exhorta-
tory tone indicating that the text was delivered to his clergy during one of the syn-
ods, see, for example, this representative passage from Speculum considerationis, 
TS, 5: “Quia vero ardua est via qua in deum tenditur et anime viribus inacces-
sibilis nisi divina virtute iuvetur. Ideo fides divine veritati, spes divine potestati, 
caritas divine bonitati penitus innititur. Per fidem deus sue veritatis lumine ani-
mam dirigit. Per spem sue potestatis iuvamen erigit. Per caritatem sue bonitatis 
dulcedine trahit. Trahendo suaviter allicit, alliciendo secum eam spiritualiter unit 
et tamquam virginem castam sibi desponsando coniungit. Virginitas enim mentis 
in hoc consistit ut fides sit integra, spes solida, caritas sincera.”
13 D’Ailly, Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali, TS, 164–65; Sermo de 
quadruplice adventu Domini, TS, 230; Speculum considerationis, TS, 11; Sermo de 
Sancta Trinitate, TS, 273–74, 276, where d’Ailly predictably cites Boethius as a 
source on the Trinity but unexpectedly credits the Carolingian scholar Alcuin’s 
work, too. D’Ailly is in accord with Gerson on the importance of a trinitarian 
model, Pascoe, Jean Gerson, 176–86, 223–24.
14 D’Ailly, Sermo de quadruplice adventu Domini, TS, 230–31.
15 D’Ailly, Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali, TS, 164–65; Speculum 
considerationis, TS, 4–5, 14.
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16 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 3–5. See also, from an earlier period 
in d’Ailly’s career, his De falsis prophetis II, in Joannis Gersonii opera omnia, I: 
541–42. Pascoe broadly dates the work to d’Ailly’s academic career before his 
episcopal appointment to Cambrai in 1397, Church and Reform, 20 n.25. Salem-
bier and Glorieux also place it in d’Ailly’s Parisian period: Glorieux to 1372–1388 
or perhaps 1394, “L’oeuvre littéraire,” 67, and Salembier to an imprecise window 
of 1372–1395, Le Cardinal Pierre d’Ailly, xv.
17 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 22. On human cooperation with 
divine aid, especially in resisting the devil’s false promises so as to be illumi-
nated by Christ’s virtues, see also an Easter sermon from d’Ailly’s Parisian period 
(1372–1395): Sermo in Die Resurrectionis, TS, 263–64. Dated more precisely to 
this period, about 1381, is d’Ailly’s satire, Epistola diaboli Leviathan, where d’Ailly 
adopts the devil’s voice to praise those who by their vices promote schism in its 
earliest years. The text is found in Tschackert, Peter von Ailli, 15–21; for a transla-
tion, see Raymond, “D’Ailly’s Epistola diaboli Leviathan,” 181–91.
18 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 5; Sermo de Sancta Trinitate, TS, 274, 
277–79. In this part of his Trinity sermon, d’Ailly identified as his source Bernard 
of Clairvaux in his Song of Songs commentary. There, Bernard had tied the Trinity 
to the soul’s three faculties of reason, will, and memory, Sermo 11.5. For a study 
of Bernard’s importance to d’Ailly, see Bellitto, “Per viam rationis,” 65–76. D’Ailly 
had turned to Bernard’s mid-twelfth century De consideratione to Pope Eugene III 
to criticize and encourage prelates as part of his work on episcopal reform, Pascoe, 
Church and Reform, 89, 134, 157. For comparison with Bernard’s more spiritu-
ally oriented influence on Gerson, see McGuire, “In Search of Bernard’s Legacy,” 
285–328, and “Gerson and Bernard: Languishing with Love,” 127–56.
19 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 5–6, 8–9.
20 D’Ailly, Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali, TS, 164–65.
21 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 10–11; De quatuor gradibus scale 
spiritualis, TS, 50–51; Homilia in Synodo Camaracensi, TS, 302, 310–13. For 
another voice on the personal reform of the parish clergy, see Pascoe, Jean Gerson, 
169–74.
22 On divine–human partnership as foundational, see, for example, d’Ailly, 
Speculum considerationis, TS, 11: “Quippe cum enim illa donum dei sit, fatuus 
esse probatur quia sine divinio auxilio sua industria ad eam pervenire presumit, 
dicente scriptura, qui indiget sapientia postulet eam a deo, licet tamen contem-
platio sapientiae principaliter procedit a divina gratia, iuvari ihilominus potest 
humana industria et ad hoc per meditationem id est intentam mentis considera-
tionem dirigimur.”
23 Ibid., 11–12, 14–16; d’Ailly, De quatuor gradibus scale spiritualis, TS, 
50–51; Sermo in die Pentecostes II, TS, 269.
24 See generally d’Ailly’s Principium in Primum et Secundum libros Senten-
tiarum from the Parisian years for a standard scholastic presentation of Scripture 
as the new, most perfect law and a new doctrine in Christ, the new Adam, restor-
ing the original and now lost imago Dei.
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25 D’Ailly, Principium in Quartum Sententiarum, in Quaestiones super libros 
sententiarum, 34–36. For reformative language and healing imagery, see for exam-
ple at 35: “Tibi queso videte carissimi circa remedium piae sanitatis quattuor 
suavius oppinari. Primum est divina benignitas quae habitavit in nobis scilicet per 
gratiam. Secundus est curata infirmitas quae erat in nobis scilicet per culpam. Ter-
tium est restaurata sanitas quia vidimus qui primo ceci eramus. Quartum est col-
lata felicitas quia vidimus gloriam eius quam desideramus.”
26 D’Ailly, Speculum considerationis, TS, 22–25; Quaestio quarta primi libri 
Sententiarum, 108.
27 D’Ailly, Sermo in Synodo Camaracensis II, TS, 309: “Iam quippe ut de spirit-
uali regno ecclesie quod nunc scismatica divisione desolabiliter laceratur, ut inquam 
de eius lachrymosa desolationene taceam. [Q]uia nobis etiam tacentibus res loqu-
untur. [I]am in eius termporali imperio et in omni fere Christianorum regno com-
motio sit guerrarum, preliorum sedio.” This ecclesiological dimension of d’Ailly’s 
reform thought was a major theme of Pascoe, Church and Reform, where he paid 
particular attention to the roles played by bishops, canon lawyers, and theologians 
in late medieval reform at the calamitous time of the Great Western Schism.
28 Sermo in die omnium sanctorum, in Tschackert, Peter von Ailli, 49. For con-
text, see Stump, “The Council of Constance,” 430–41.
29 D’Ailly, Sermo in die Pentecostes II, TS, 267. For the views of d’Ailly and 
his contemporaries on the ecclesia primitiva as model and reform goal, see Pascoe, 
Church and Reform, 105–6, 179–80; Pascoe, “Jean Gerson,” 379–409; and Bel-
litto, “Early Church in the Late Middle Ages,” 453–66.
30 D’Ailly, Sermo in die Pentecostes II, TS, 269.
31 D’Ailly, Sermo de Sancta Trinitate, TS, 277–79. On peace as a theme at 
Constance, see Bellitto, “Preaching Peace,” 1–16. Phillip H. Stump found that 
the phrase reformatio pacis was “exceedingly current” and frequently linked with 
reform discussions at Constance, Reforms of the Council of Constance, 207.
32 On d’Ailly’s Parisian steps through the quicksand of the Schism, see Bel-
litto, “Early Development of Pierre d’Ailly’s Conciliarism,” 217–32, particularly 
223–26, as well as Guenée, Between Church and State, 169–201, 222–24.
33 Epistola ad Benedictum XIII, in Kervyn de Lettenhove, Chroniques relatives 
à l’histoire de la Belgique, 140–43.
34 D’Ailly, Sermo in Synodo Camaracensis II, TS, 305–7.
35 Pascoe, Jean Gerson, 206. 
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ON JULY 6, 1415, THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE released Jan Hus to the secular authorities for execution of sentence following 
a protracted legal process predicated upon charges of heresy.1 A few days 
prior, the defendant wrote to members of Charles University in Prague, 
“Master Jan Hus in chains and in prison, now standing on the shore of the 
present life, awaiting a horrible death on the morrow.”2 With these words, 
Hus indicated his own awareness of standing at the intersection of time 
and eternity.
The battle for his memory and identity began immediately and 
yielded two contrasting images. An early sixteenth-century parody of the 
Te Deum by the Danish Carmelite Poul Helgesen (ca. 1485–ca. 1534) 
is representative: “In the beginning was an error and the error was with 
Luther and Luther was the error and the same was in the beginning with 
Luther … There was a man sent by the Devil whose name was Jan Hus. He 
came to bear witness, to testify concerning the darkness.”3 In distinction 
to that negative point of view we have the testimony of Charles University, 
Hus’s alma mater, written on May 23, 1416: “O incomparable man shin-
ing greater than all by the example of magnificent holiness. O humble man 
gleaming with the light of great piety ... he followed the footsteps of the 
apostles ... he surpassed all others, demonstrating in every way the works 
of love, pure faith, and consistent truth ... in everything he became the 
incomparable master of life.”4
The Hus of history is both heretical and holy. Two hundred years 
before Hus, Lateran IV marked a turning point in the definition and pros-
ecution of heresy. One hundred years later, Dante Alighieri placed here-
tics into the sixth circle of hell while betrayers were consigned to the ninth 
circle. Jan Hus qualified for both. The final chapter in the Hus trial during 
the Council of Constance settled nothing around these entrenched con-
victions, but those dramatic events in Germany established a foundation 
for his memory. What emerged from the ashes of the heretics’ stake in 
History, Heresy, and Hell
Lateran IV and Dante in the Battle for Jan Hus
Thomas A. Fudge
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1415 has been a sustained 600-year-long battle for the memory of a man 
who was controversial before he died. Should he be regarded as an icon or 
noted as a pariah? There have been powerful voices advocating one or the 
other. I want to examine the historical and historiographical debate over 
one of medieval history’s most misunderstood and politicized personali-
ties, a battle that began in the fifteenth century and persists to the present.
Who is Jan Hus? The answer must be nuanced, as it is a compli-
cated matter that must take into account a varied landscape both medieval 
and modern. He is the hero of a dozen faces: Communist, rebel, Roman 
Catholic, nationalist, reformer, social revolutionary, Wyclifite, Protestant, 
heretic, saint, evangelical Christian, national hero, and a myriad of other 
alternatives.5 One must be wary of constructing an act of homage, invent-
ing a portrait in our own image, rather than discovering the historical fig-
ure. There is a dangerous myopia associated with focusing on the life of 
an individual that can obscure the historical context in which that person 
lived. In the quest for the historical Hus, it is important to reveal aspects 
of the medieval man while simultaneously opening up a wider view of his 
place during the time he lived. There is, further, the danger of emotional 
identification, which may cloud the scholar’s objectivity or limit his or 
her perspective.
It is true that a text without a context is a pretext for a prooftext. 
To ground this consideration of Hus in the context of history and in the 
context of the Middle Ages, let us remind ourselves of three seemingly 
disparate events. Six hundred years ago the Bohemian priest Jan Hus went 
to the stake as a condemned heretic. Seven hundred years ago, the Italian 
poet Dante Alighieri was working on his masterpiece. Eight hundred years 
ago, delegates were gathering in Rome for a major conference convened in 
the basilica of the Lateran Palace. These three chapters of European his-
tory, separated by two centuries, have more in common than meets the 
eye. They bring together considerations of history and heresy and their 
relation to time and eternity.
Killing Hus Lawfully: The Role of Lateran IV
The fourth Lateran Council was announced by the bull Vineam Domini 
Sabaoth in April 1213 and was scheduled to commence on November 1, 
1215. There were three sessions, and the council was concluded within 
the month. More than 400 bishops and more than 800 abbots and pri-
ors attended. As many as eighteen bishops from Bohemia, Poland, and 
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Hungary attended Lateran IV.6 One of the prelates, the elderly Matteo 
Capuano, archbishop of Amalfi, was suffocated in the crush of the crowd 
pressing to hear the pope’s opening sermon.7 The synod convened with 
two main goals: church reform and crusade. On the first point the pur-
pose of the council was explicit in its desire to “eradicate vices, plant vir-
tues, correct faults, reform morals, remove heresies, and strengthen faith.”8
The convocation bull opened with a compelling image: “Many 
kinds of beasts have tried to destroy the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts. 
Their efforts have been successful to the extent that in a not insubstantial 
area, thorns have sprung up rather than vines. With regret, we report that 
the vines are to greater and lesser degrees infected and diseased. Instead of 
grapes, they produce wild grapes.”9 The harvest of wrath and the hatred 
of heresy manifested at Constance had antecedents. For example, canon 7 
of the Council of Tours (1163) drew attention to a damnable heresy, viru-
lent like cancer, creeping stealthily like a serpent, which had infected many 
people and caused damage to the Lord’s vineyard.10 The wild grapes noted 
at Lateran IV in consequence might be regarded as poisonous.
The fourth Lateran Council issued seventy-one canons. One of 
them is especially relevant here. Canon 3 is devoted to the concern around 
heresy and it is essential to point out that heresy was not simply a topos 
in the European Middle Ages.11 Excommunicamus (canon 3) provides a 
succinct summary of the Church’s perspective on heresy. This led to exten-
sive discussions among canon lawyers leading to a discernible shift in the 
perception of heretics. Two things emerge. Heresy becomes a well-defined 
crime and juridical aspects like contumacy become more prominent, and 
procedures leading to condemnation are ever more carefully defined and 
articulated. Prior to Lateran IV, it cannot be said that law was manageable, 
succinct, or even consistent. Then came Gratian. Following Lateran IV, 
the earlier caritas principle began to yield to a potestas approach. Coercion 
replaced persuasion. We might argue that this shift had both papal and 
canonical (legal) stimulation. Canon 3 led to a more streamlined con-
sistent policy on heresy. In addition, canon 3 sanctioned the procedural 
rule per inquisitionem as normative and this had the commensurate result 
in a general condemnation (codified in canon 3) that legalized sweeping 
canonical measures against heretics and their defenders.12 Without the 
canonical development, the prosecution of heresy would have remained 
less systematic, prone to arbitrariness, and selectively applied.
Canon 3, of course, was not entirely new in content. It is evident 
that the statute integrated parts of earlier legislation. For example, we 
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find synergies with Ad abolendam and Vergentis in senium wherein her-
esy is equated with treason.13 The latter was a landmark in the Church’s 
campaign against heresy and it governed the law on heresy for centuries 
thereafter. The language characterizing heresy is unambiguous. Examples 
include haeretica foeditate (filth of heresy) and haereticae pravitatis fer-
mento (yeast of heretical depravity). Both ideas would later emerge in the 
case against Jan Hus.
The introduction to canon 3 excommunicates and anathematises 
omnen haeresim ... quibuscumque nominibus censeantur, terminology taken 
from Ad abolendam, along with facies quidem habentes diversas, sed cau-
das adinvicem colligatas, quia de vanitate conveniunt in idipsum which has 
been derived from Vergentis.14 The canonical literature links these ideas 
to notions of incorrigibility and its nomenclature including the broad 
thrust of language such as contumacia, contempserit, obstinatione, crescente, 
pertinaciter, persistant, and so on. The textual dependence of canon 3 on 
these earlier anti-heresy statutes is easily established. We find the language 
of crime, criminal behaviour and heresy interwoven.15 An emerging and 
evolving concern with contumacy and incorrigibility as determining and 
defining elements of heresy, which will become central and critical in the 
Hus trial, is evident in canon 3.
In consequence, the defining elements in heresy cases from the thir-
teenth century onwards became contumax and incorrigibilis, which appear 
to have been applied to all, and not just to circumscribed groups. What 
becomes manifestly clear is that heresy is both criminal and sin. It is not 
just one (peccatum) or the other (crimen) but both. Jan Hus is found to be 
a sinner and a criminal and the two offenses are codified in the later medi-
eval understanding of heresy.
Canon 3 does not spell out procedural technicalities but it yielded 
a result wherein the use of force was increasingly recognized by canon 
lawyers and the harvest of Lateran IV includes a shift from a defensive 
posture to one more overtly aggressive. Heresy was also secularized by 
Lateran IV, meaning it involved society and therefore required secular 
aid in combatting it. The prosecution of heresy became politicized.16 It 
is important to note that lawyers in the Middle Ages held two assump-
tions about law. First, that it had to be just and, second, that it had to 
be reasonable.17 By the time of the Council of Constance, there is little 
evidence to suggest that there were serious reservations among lawyers 
and prelates involved in the Hus case around considerations of justice and 
reasonableness with respect to anti-heresy legislation and its prosecution 
and implementation. The decision of the English Parliament in 1401, in 
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response to the Lollards, to define heresy as a crime punishable by the state 
(2Hen.IV c.15), combined with the supplementary parliamentary ordi-
nance of 1406 that enabled ecclesiastical and secular authorities to pursue 
and arrest Lollards everywhere, indicates the domestication of the church 
by the state at the end of the Middle Ages.18
Using Lateran IV doctrine, especially as codified in canon 3, we 
discover a specific focus on heresy as a phenomenon, but not on specific 
manifestations. To wit, every heresy (omnem haeresim) and all heretics 
(universos haereticos) are condemned. Earlier legislation, Ad abolendam 
for example, provided a list of offenders. Canon 3 leaves heresy as an unde-
fined category as it relates to elaborating a dossier of suspects. What is 
manifestly evident in an examination of canon 3, related decretals, legal 
commentary and glosses illustrates that the undefined category widened.
As noted above, Vergentis (1199) characterized heresy as treason. A 
related and evolving body of authority, the Ordinary Gloss, between the 
1230s and 1266, tended to develop a notional concept of heresy as a pub-
lic crime. The jurists clearly understood heresy as an offense against the 
church but heresy is also a transgression against the community. From this 
point of view, a public sinner was guilty not merely of an offence against 
God, to whom the offender owed repentance, but also of an injury to the 
Christian community, to which the offender owed compensation. With 
this amalgamation we see a move from peccatum to crimen. The former 
requires penance, the latter demands punishment and judicial procedure. 
Heresy emerges as an exceptional crime.19 Hus is only one of those who 
found themselves sideways with the Latin Church in the post-Lateran era.
While heresy was an offense against both church and community, it 
was often viewed as one of the three principal crimes against the church. 
In addition to heresy, this included simony and the murder of a religious.20 
It is noteworthy that Hus stridently denounced simony as a heresy.21 In 
contrast, Jean Gerson, who would later be numbered among Hus’s legal 
prosecutors, affirmed that, while simony was indeed an offense and hardly 
salutary, it was definitely not heretical and Gerson preferred to minimize 
it by referring to it as the “simonian slip,” giving it the sense of being an 
error of omission or an inadvertent mistake perpetrated by otherwise 
decent and conscientious churchmen.22
In specific terms, canon 3 identifies heresy as contempt of church 
and church authority. The outcome of this offense was spelled out judi-
cially as animadversione debita puniendi. Within fifteen years of Lateran 
IV, the term had become established as a synonym for the death penalty. A 
close examination of the medieval doctrine of excommunication implied 
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that the convict was expelled from the church and delivered to Satan.23 We 
may also find within the text of canon 3 an elaboration of the problem, 
the procedure, the prevention, and the punishment of heresy. Canon law 
nominated the bishop as the authority to assess “juxta considerationem sus-
picionis qualitatemque personae” along with the “suspicion and character” 
of the person, with the outcome that the greater the fault, the greater the 
punishment, enumerated as “maior est culpa, gravior exerceatur vindicta.”24 
Looking at the Excommunicamus of Gregory IX (1231), it is clear that the 
legal ramifications of canon 3 may be delineated thus: heresy is a crime, 
procedural steps are in place to deal with it, and the matter is public, there-
fore extra-ecclesiastical authorities are seconded into the prosecution of the 
offensive activity. This papal bull eventually found its way into canon law.25
All of this indicates evidence of a clear line of development which 
includes, but is not restricted to, Ad abolendam, Vergentis in senium, canon 
3, decretals such as X 5.20.7, X 2.1.10, X 2.1.4, glosses and the Ordinary 
Gloss that, taken together, reveals and reflects the Church’s official and 
legal position on heresy. The Liber extra places heresy between Jews and 
Saracens on one hand and schismatics on the other.26 This makes it quite 
clear that heretics are on the list of the Church’s most serious enemies.27 
Modern and medieval thinkers and writers alike have always disagreed 
on the question of heresy in Hus. However, it might be worth bearing 
in mind, as a third-century jurist observed, that not everything that is 
permitted, or legal, is honest or right (“Non omne quod licet honestum 
est”).28 The law is not always concerned with morality or ethics.
Eight hundred years after Lateran IV, the synod continues to stand 
as the high-water mark of the medieval papacy. Its political and ecclesiasti-
cal decisions endured until the sixteenth century when another significant 
convocation occurred (Council of Trent). Modern historiography broadly 
recognizes Lateran IV as among the most significant assemblies of the 
Middle Ages.29 Its decisions on the matter of heresy, combined with other 
trends and developments, allowed the Latin Church to try Jan Hus, con-
vict him of heresy, and, in consequence, to legally ask the secular authori-
ties to carry out the sentence. This was the result of dogmatic theology on 
one hand and silent assent on the other.
Heresy and Betrayal in Dante
Law and legal procedure established, the eternal fate of the damned may 
also be considered. Virtually every person in the Western world knows 
the name Dante Alighieri; comparatively few know anything substantial 
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about Jan Hus. Though a national hero, few Czechs today share or encour-
age Hus’s religious faith. This is especially true of the ruling powers 
(including the Communist ancien régime) but they could not and cannot 
abandon Hus.
Dante (1265–1321) belongs to the Middle Ages. The theology of 
the Divine Comedy is medieval. Hus belongs to that medieval world. This 
is the time of the “Babylonian captivity” of the church. It is the time of 
Wyclif, the time of corruption, confusion, and creativity, an age of her-
esy and reform. Dante was acutely interested in church renewal and one 
should not read De monarchia only as a treatise on secular politics.30 
Dante worked on the Comedy for a number of years in the period between 
1308 and 1320. It is firmly fixed among the great literary monuments of 
European history.31 There are more than 600 extant fourteenth-century 
copies of the Comedy alone and we know of at least a dozen commentar-
ies prepared by the year 1400. A famous depiction of Dante holding up 
his magnum opus by Domenico di Michelino in 1465 shows the Comedy 
opened to its first lines which read: “Halfway through life, I awoke to find 
myself in a dark wood. The right road completely lost and gone.”32 There 
has been a persistent willingness to read and consider the first part of this 
great work, which has a clear focus on hell, singly or in isolation from the 
rest of Dante’s great oeuvre. In August 1944, Dorothy Sayers wrote to 
Charles Williams noting that she had inherited a three-volume edition of 
the Comedy and had made a trenchant observation. “I observed a sinister 
thing about it: the Inferno is slightly loose at the joints; the Purgatorio 
in excellent condition; the Paradiso practically ‘as new’.”33 Though I am 
sobered by the sage observation which Sayers made and keenly aware of 
its meaning, I am, nevertheless, interested only in Part One, “The Inferno,” 
which was completed in 1314.
Taking into account the situation in the Inferno, the reader discovers 
that the damned in Dante’s hell are consigned there because of the disorder 
of their souls, which is reflected in the Inferno as a comprehensive condi-
tion affecting body, mind, language, landscape, and weather. But it is essen-
tial to observe that Dante’s heretics are not the same as those of Lateran 
IV. There are, famously, nine circles in Dante’s vision of hell: limbo, lust, 
gluttony, greed, anger, heresy, violence, fraud, treachery. The ninth circle 
of hell is reserved for the worst sinners: the betrayers. Hus betrayed God, 
the Church, and the faith. The ninth circle is frozen. Surprisingly, there is 
not a lot of fire in Dante’s hell. The only sinners who are wrapped in flames 
are the heretics in the sixth circle and the false councillors in the eighth 
circle.34 Canto 9 reveals the “great heresiarchs” lying in grim tombs of iron 
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that have grown white-hot from the fierce flames. The heretics, like all the 
other transgressors, remain in hell, fixed within their particular evil, out-
side of time for all eternity. There are no accidental heretics in hell. They 
were all hereticated by choice. In Dante, heresy is contumacy and intellec-
tual stubbornness. Here we see connections between canon 3 of Lateran 
IV and the received assumptions of the conciliar fathers at Constance. 
Dante also reflects an Augustinian perspective (though Augustine is vir-
tually absent or cleverly concealed in the Comedy) wherein sin interferes 
with divine grace and human conversion to salvation. Heretics are sinners 
sent to hell and now beyond the possibility of grace and salvation. It is in 
Canto 3 of the Inferno where we encounter the oft-mentioned hopeless-
ness of the Comedy: “Abandon hope, all who enter.”35 In hell, where there 
is no redemption, the body of the heretic becomes a corpse in which the 
image of God is destroyed and the soul is deformed. While Augustine is 
not prominent in the Comedy, he is referenced in the Paradiso (10.120) 
and is included among the Comedy’s glorified saints (32.35).
Where in hell might Dante have placed Jan Hus? Notably, heretics 
in Dante’s hell are fairly high and there can be little doubt that his betray-
ers (Sigismund and some of the prelates) would be placed well below Hus. 
If the heretics occupy circle six, betrayers are consigned to circle nine. Hus 
would certainly appear among the sarcophagi of the damned in the sixth 
circle but he might also have the necessary qualifications for inclusion in 
the ninth circle. Cantos 9–11 of the Inferno leave little room for doubt 
that heresy was abhorrent, and offenders were sentenced to eternal pun-
ishment. At the end of the Comedy, which is an eschatological adventure 
through Hell (Inferno), Purgatory (Purgatorio), and Heaven (Paradiso), the 
pilgrim meets God. There is therefore the important distinction between 
“hell” and a “vision of hell.” The former is permanent with no redemptive 
value while the latter is temporary and potential. Unlike Lateran IV and 
its third canon, Dante is poetry.
What is common between Hus and Dante? It is possible to identify 
patriotism, devotion to their culture, lonely deaths far from home, and the 
experience of exile. Both were pioneers of the vernacular, both were keenly 
interested in religion, both appear deeply concerned with issues of moral-
ity, both were opposed to abuses within the church, both gave their lives 
for their work (one literally, the other metaphorically), and both remained 
committed to notional concepts of truth. We have no way of knowing if 
Hus had any awareness of Dante. At Constance, Robert Hallam (bishop 
of Salisbury) and Nicholas Bubwith (bishop of Bath and Wells) had an 
Italian bishop (Giovanni da Serravalle) provide them with a paraphrase 
LATERAN IV AND DANTE IN THE BATTLE FOR JAN HUS  41
of Dante’s Commedia.36 The appearance of Dante at Constance raises a 
query that has been fiercely debated. Did Dante veer into heresy him-
self ? The query is controversial. Dante displays tendencies that some have 
suggested bring him close to heresy. He condemns some absolved by the 
church and absolves others condemned by the church. He consigns to the 
pit a pope canonized by the church (Celestine V). There are contradictory 
judgements, and a variety of viewpoints have existed among scholars for a 
long time. But was he deficient on the scale of orthodoxy? Some interpret-
ers have issued a resounding no.37 Others have argued for merit in deter-
mining that perhaps the poet who so vividly sketched a vision of hell and 
heresy could be numbered among those of the damned whom the church 
determined were deviant.38 These are not simply disagreements amongst 
modern thinkers, and it should be pointed out that there were debates 
along these lines in the fourteenth century. Is the fact that a debate existed 
important? The question is worth pondering. I shall not essay a judgment 
on Dante on this point, but on Hus there can be no doubt.
Battle for the Memory of Jan Hus
Almost every relevant Czech thinker has participated to some extent in 
the battle for Hus or has had to deal with the Hus phenomenon. This 
includes František Palacký, the father of modern Czech historiography. It 
includes the founder of independent Czechoslovakia, Tomáš G. Masaryk, 
whose interpretation of the Hussite Movement laid the foundation of the 
First Czechoslovak Republic’s official ideology after 1918. Jan Patočka 
(1907–1977), the philosopher and main spokesmen for Charter 77, a 
1977 human rights movement in the former Czechoslovakia, also opined 
on the topic. Hus’s importance has also been confirmed in current politics, 
with President Miloš Zeman calling Hus the cornerstone of Czech his-
tory. The powers that be in the historic Czech lands over the past seventy-
five years, German, Russian, and Czech, do not share nor do they desire to 
encourage the religious faith and ideas of Hus, but they cannot afford to 
simply abandon him. There continues to be a strange relationship between 
the memory of Hus and his actual influence. For more than fifty years 
Czech scholars have endeavored to produce a critical edition of his works 
but the Czech government has never regarded Hus as sufficiently impor-
tant to fund the production of that critical edition. Almost 450 years ago 
we find an indictment: “The Czechs should be ashamed of having slack-
ened in this matter so horribly.”39 This was written in 1571 in reference to 
the production of a Czech Bible.
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If we return to the time of Hus we find, even within his lifetime, evi-
dence of a battle for Hus which may be examined briefly. This can be best 
achieved by selecting contemporary individuals who disagreed about Hus. 
Michael de Causis and Jan Chlum were men on the ground, participants 
in, and eye witnesses to, the trial. Michael de Causis was a lawyer attached 
to the papal curia. He developed clear antagonism towards Hus and char-
acterized him as “a son of iniquity,” “a heretic,” and “that devil Jan Hus.”40 
As for the imperial knight Jan Chlum, it is not what he said, but what he 
did. A chronicler records an extraordinary encounter during the public 
hearings in June 1415 at Constance. “The bishop of Riga took charge of 
Master Hus and escorted him to the prison. As they passed near Lord Jan 
Chlum, he greeted him and reached out his hand to comfort him. Hus 
was extremely glad that Lord Jan was not ashamed and was not reluc-
tant to greet him, though he was essentially rejected, ridiculed, and con-
sidered a heretic by practically everyone.”41 Petr Mladoňovic and Ulrich 
Richental were chroniclers who not only were present at the later stages 
of the Hus trial but who left behind valuable accounts of the proceedings. 
Mladoňovic concluded his Relatio with the assertion that he had provided 
testimony to the events at Constance in order that the memory of Jan Hus, 
the “most steadfast champion of truth,” would remain green in the future 
and throughout time.42 In contrast, Richental portrayed Hus as wicked, 
cowardly, and deceitful.43 These opinions, developed and defended, served 
as foundations for evolving traditions in the lives of the posthumous Hus.
By the sixteenth century the myth-makers were hard at work, and 
Hus emerges as a central figure in the European Reformations.44 Luther 
championed Hus, and in many respects he was lionized across the spec-
trum of the Protestant landscape.45 He was not regarded in the same man-
ner by defenders of the official church. The battlefield for the memory of 
Hus is illuminated in the works of John Foxe and Johannes Cochlaeus. 
The English-Protestant martyrologist John Foxe regarded Hus as a “most 
holy man and excellent doctor of the evangelical truth ... the godly serv-
ant and martyr of Christ.”46 The German-Catholic theologian Johannes 
Cochlaeus said the “wicked Jan Hus” deserved eternal punishment, for he 
was worse than an infidel, even worse than the men of Sodom, still worse 
than frightful murderers from the annals of history, ultimately worse than 
cannibals. With Lateran doctrine in mind, Cochlaeus declared that her-
esy “was a monstrous crime” worse than all other offenses and exceeded 
every other crime for its unspeakable enormity, impiety, shamefulness and 
impurity, surpassing all evil before God.47 These polar views were repeated 
over and over throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the 
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texts replaced history. What happened at Constance was forgotten, and 
the past yielded to the words that were written down. These words and 
characterizations, rather than the events, were remembered, and the nar-
ratives formed the memory of the events that faded in the onslaught of 
history. By the nineteenth century, when scientific-based research began 
to excavate the Hus of history, these narratives and characterizations were 
rediscovered, interrogated, and subjected to broader analyses, and the bat-
tle for Jan Hus was renewed.
In the intellectually bellicose nineteenth-century Prague world, 
nationalism intruded into considerations of Hus. Konstantin von Höfler’s 
work declared that the Hussite movement was really more about an 
embedded anti-German sentiment than a concern for ecclesiastical and 
social reform, and that Jan Hus was a racial bigot who allowed his hatred 
of Germans to grow until it destroyed the university in Prague.48 Höfler 
believed Hussitism was a destructive period in history. Hus was not only 
a heretic but a criminal who deserved the stake.49 The polar view was 
advanced by František Palacký who suggested that a new religious epoch 
began with Hus whose followers were the first Protestants.50 Hus and the 
Hussites were, for Palacký, the bedrock of national identity. Proper Czech 
scholarship on Hus began with Palacký after the strictures were lifted in 
1848. Palacký’s ten-volume History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and 
Moravia laid down a paradigm followed by so many ever since. While 
his ethnicism inspired many Czechs, it also crippled subsequent genera-
tions of historians who were either unwilling or unable to find alterna-
tive interpretations of the process by which a Czech nation appeared in 
Europe. Palacký sought to minimize if not eliminate Hus’s theological 
issues and thus presented Hus as a Czech struggling within a national 
context against Germans and the Church. Thus began in earnest a posi-
tivist taxonomy that continues to prevail. This perspective was succinctly 
expressed from a Czech point of view in English by Albert Wratislaw: “It 
will always remain the greatest distinction of the Bohemian nation that 
it was the first in the national development of European culture—as a 
whole people—to rise against Rome, and such a national movement can-
not be explained as the effect of learned Latin tracts.”51 Some of these 
considerations continued to influence the manner in which Hus was 
represented well into the twentieth century.
Perhaps the most important debate amongst the scholars was under-
taken by Johann Loserth who was answered by Matthew Spinka. Loserth 
concluded that “Hus’ writings [are] the exclusive property of Wiclif, 
and there is no ground for speaking of a Hussite system of doctrine.”52 
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Loserth did not alter his basic view between his published review in 1884 
and a second edition in 1925. More than twenty-five years later Spinka 
assailed the Loserth thesis arguing that Hus was a man of probity, a bea-
con of integrity, and a towering figure in the later medieval world with 
influence to the present. He argued that Hus was not a mere disciple of 
Wyclif and that he held ideas unique from those of the Oxford scholar, 
derived independently from a preceding native Czech reform tradition.53 
Though implacably opposed to the Loserth school of thought, which was 
adopted by able scholars like Robert Kalivoda and Howard Kaminsky, 
Spinka was, at the same time, never able to rid himself entirely of bias 
against Marxist and Catholic scholars. Thus he held Václav Flajšhans, Jan 
Sedlák, and Paul de Vooght at arm’s length while bluntly declaring that the 
Marxist-dominated work of Kalivoda, Josef Macek, and Milan Machovec 
did not “qualify as genuine and unbiased research.”54
The battle for Jan Hus is now reflected more acutely in the schol-
arly and historiographical differences between modern Czech approaches 
and so-called Anglo-Saxon methods. The former has been described as 
descriptive while the latter is more intentionally evaluative.55 Scholarship 
and methodology is rather like the stock market, fluctuating with the 
stimulation of buyer enthusiasm or consumer angst. What will the next 
skirmish in the battle for Jan Hus look like?56
Perverse Readings
Eschewing the constraints of Lateran doctrine on heresy, the visions of 
Dante Alighieri, and the limits of historical categories, it seems salutary 
to engage in perverse readings of Jan Hus. This means to ignore shame-
lessly the established orthodoxies set down by De Causis, Richental, 
Cochlaeus, Höfler, and Loserth on one hand and those developed by 
Chlum, Mladoňovic, Foxe, Palacký, and Spinka on the other. It also solic-
its a refusal to conform to the well-worn historiographical paths. And it 
suggests that thinkers in the twenty-first century should not be arguing 
towards pre-determined conclusions. Instead, perverse readings of Hus 
should be encouraged. The word perversus means to turn aside wrongly 
or inappropriately or to be askew. In The Confessions, Augustine spoke of 
sin as defined in terms of the soul’s motion relative to God and went on 
to elaborate three possibilities. Here we encounter perversus wherein the 
soul has deviated or is wrongly positioned, aversus which indicates that 
the soul has turned from God, and adversus with the implication that the 
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soul has turned away from divine truth and goodness.57 From a soterio-
logical point of view all three postures are serious impediments for the pil-
grim. But, with respect to historiography, the idea of perverse readings is 
useful, indeed salutary. Assumptions around ideas of deviant or erroneous 
interpretations are often unnecessary shackles limiting more imaginative 
research and curtailing our understanding of an altogether compelling 
chapter in Europe’s past. With this in mind, Hus needs to be removed 
from the pantheon of the sacred cow collection, but too often we do not 
have the courage to confront our own icons; the scholar must ask why.
Conclusion
Lateran IV was a magnificent assembly, a veritable display of ecclesiastical 
power and authority. On matters taken up by canon 3, the delegates deter-
mined that the many beasts of heresy had to be removed. The Divine Comedy 
of Dante Alighieri is a textual feast of imagination, a medieval vision of the 
universe, reflecting past, present, and future, drawing on Aristotelian cos-
mology, Thomist philosophy, classical culture, and Christian religious doc-
trine. We must keep in mind that above all else, Hus was a priest, and his 
life and work were dominated by theology. Importantly, that theology was 
developed and understood in and through medieval categories. Adopting 
Protestant doctrines as a means of understanding Hus tends to obfuscate 
rather than illuminate and runs the risk of anachronism. The same should 
be said for nationalism and craven subservience to particular schools of 
thought and political considerations that often reveal a deeper interest in 
ideas about history than in history itself.
Recognizing that Hus’s intellectual world was dominated by theology, 
broadly conceived and understood, it is necessary to try and penetrate that 
world as the first order of significance in the battle for his memory. In 
seeking to comprehend the synergies between time and eternity we can 
turn to one of Hus’s earliest academic endeavors, his commentary on 
the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In Hus’s thought, the world is a spectacu-
lum, a theatre in which the unity of God as trinity and God as creator 
is revealed.58 There is a distinction between time and eternity in Hus. 
There are two main categories. First, eternity is used in speaking about 
God who transcends time. Second, there are also fragments of eternity that 
have their origin in time. Goodness, holiness, and virtues are eternal 
though the lives of those who exemplify these attributes are finite.59 
In this way, eternity is not entirely divorced from time. Thus, Hus holds that 
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humankind is truly great and noble because God created humanity with 
immortality forever (eternity).60
At the same time, for others, he is the perpetual pariah who can-
not be liberated from his opprobrium, fixed as he is in a fiery tomb of 
iron in the sixth circle of hell and frozen steadfast in the ninth circle of 
hell as imagined by Dante Alighieri, mandated by canon 3 at the Fourth 
Lateran Council, and subsequently ratified by Latin Christendom. As we 
have seen, by the time the conciliar fathers gathered at Constance, her-
esy was well-defined and understood as treason, deviance, and crime. In 
the aftermath, Hus became frozen at the intersection of time and eternity, 
suspended between heaven and hell while the battle for his meaning, iden-
tity, and memory rages on.
In considerations of time and eternity, history, heresy, and hell, an 
important query remains: Who will guard the guards?61 This was a ques-
tion occupying the mind of Hus. To some extent, Hus believed that he was 
qualified to do just that. Others disagreed. In preaching the sermo generalis 
against Hus on July 6, 1415, the Bishop of Lodi asserted that no greater 
fornication than that practiced by Hus had ever been perpetrated against 
the Church. This constituted a betrayal of God and faith.62 History is tem-
poral, but hell is eternal. In reply, the Council declared it had the author-
ity to commit Hus’s soul to eternal damnation. This presented Hus with a 
serious dilemma, one that was juxtaposed between obedience and author-
ity and situated between notions of truth and loyalty to institutions. 
There are limits to human knowledge.63 Lateran IV, Dante Alighieri, and 
Jan Hus recognized this, but all three behaved as though it did not apply 
to them. Each acted as though they were exceptions to the rule.
As noted earlier, Petr Mladoňovic concluded his Relatio with the 
assertion that he had provided testimony to the events at Constance in 
order that the memory of Jan Hus, the immoveable defender of truth, 
would be preserved forever. Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II) 
said the “perfidious lunacy” of the Hussites began with Hus who was a 
heresiarch and would, in consequence, perish eternally in hell.64 We are 
back with the contested image of a man destroyed by the Church for 
the blasphemy of the “unforgiveable sin,” the crime of heresy. We appear 
to be left with a contested figure on the boundaries of intersecting and 
diverse cultural, political, and religious worlds. The battle for Jan Hus 
has been waged and won between time and eternity, fought and lost on 
the killing fields of heresy within visions of heaven and hell both medieval 
and modern.65
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1 See Kejř, Husův proces; Fudge, Trial of Jan Hus.
2 Letter to members of Charles University in Prague, June 27, 1415, in Novo-
tný, M. Jana Husi Korespondence, 323.
3 Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliothek, fols. 22r–24v at fol. 22v.
4 Jan Hus, Historia et monumenta, 1:103.
5 Fudge, “Quest,” 3–22.
6 Foreville, Latran I, II, III, 391–95 for the full list.
7 Noted in Deansley, History of the Medieval Church, 147.
8 Innocent in Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 216, col. 824.
9 Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 216, cols. 823–25.
10 Text in Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, vol. 21, col. 1177. The text might use-
fully be compared with the convocation bull for Lateran IV.
11 Text of canon 3 (Latin and English) in Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils, 1:233–35.
12 Kuttner and García, “New Eyewitness Account,” 115–78, especially 155.
13 Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum, vol. 22, cols. 476–78; Migne, Patrologia 
Latina, vol. 201, cols. 1297–1300, vol. 214, cols. 537–39.
14 Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, X 5.7.9 and X 5.7.10, cols. 780–82 and 
782–83.
15 Peters, “Prosecution of Heresy,” 25–42.
16 Fudge, “Jan Hus in the Medieval Ecclesiastical Courts,” 113–33.
17 Pennington, Pope and Bishops, 7.
18 Forrest, The Detection of Heresy in Late Medieval England, 28–59.
19 Peters, “Crimen exceptum,” 137–94.
20 Johannes Teutonicus on ad 3 Comp. 5.4.1, filiorum; Johannes Teutonicus, 
Apparatus glossatorum, ad 3 Comp. 3.33.55. Filiorum is cited in the commentary 
on Vergentis.
21 Jan Hus, Magistri Iohannis, 187–270.
22 De simonia, in Glorieux, ed., Jean Gerson Oeuvres Complètes, 6:169–73. 
This treatise was written during the proceedings of the Council of Constance.
23 C.11 q.3 c.32, “unde illos quos tunc Apostolus sathane esse traditos predi-
cat, excommunicatos a se esse demonstrate.”
24 Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, X 5.7.9, vol. 2, col. 781.
25 As X 5.7.15 in Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, vol. 2, col. 789.
26 Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici, vol. 2, cols. 778–90.
27 Sackville, Heresy and Heretics, 107.
28 Dig 50.17.144 (Paulus), in Mommsen, Digesta Iustiniani Augusti, 2:965.
29 The definitive and standard source on the Lateran councils is Foreville, 
Latran I, II, III.
30 Pelikan, “Otherworldly World,” 165.
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31 Dante Alighieri, Divine Comedy.
32 The fresco (2.32m x 2.9m) is on the west wall of the nave in the church of 
Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence.
33 The letter of August 16/17 is in Sayers, Letters, 45–49 at 47.
34 Boitani, “Shadows of Heterodoxy,” 60.
35 Hawkins, “Divide and Conquer,” 471–82.
36 Noted in Caesar, Dante: The Critical Heritage, 19.
37 See Barański, “Temptations of a Heterodox Dante,” 164–96, and in more 
detail Barański, “(Un)Orthodox Dante,” 253–330.
38 See Adams, “Against the Contrapasso,” 5–19.
39 Blahoslav, Grammatika česká, 342.
40 Palacký, Documenta Mag. Joannis Hus, 457–61, Mansi, Sacrorum concili-
orum, vol. 27, col. 628.
41 Mladoňovic, Relatio, in Fontes rerum bohemicarum, 109 and Fudge, Jan 
Hus between Time and Eternity, 117–40.
42 Mladoňovic, Fontes rerum bohemicarum, 120.
43 Buck, Chronik des Konstanzer Konzils.
44 Haberkern, Patron Saint and Prophet.
45 Fudge, “‘Shouting Hus,’” 197–231.
46 Foxe, Acts and Monuments, 1570, book 5, pp. 762, 862. See Fudge, “Jan 
Hus as the Apocalyptic Witness,” 136–68.
47 Cochlaeus, Historia Hussitarum libri duodecim, 98.
48 His important works include Geschichtsschreiber der husitischen Bewegung 
in Böhmen, 3 vols., Concilia Pragensia, 1353–1413, and Magister Johannes Hus 
und der Abzug der deutschen Professoren und Studenten aus Prag, 1409.
49 Zacek, Palacký, 69.
50 Palacký, Geschichte des Hussitenthums, 66.
51 Quoted in Naughton, “Reception in Nineteenth-Century England,” 102.
52 Loserth, Wiclif and Hus, xxx.
53 Spinka, John Hus and the Czech Reform.
54 Spinka, John Hus at the Council of Constance, xi.
55 Fudge, “Whose Hus?”, 265–90.
56 Fudge, “Jan Hus in English Language Historiography,” 90–138.
57 Augustine of Hippo, Saint Augustine Confessions, book 2, pp. 24–27.
58 Super IV Sententiarum, II, inceptio I, 1–5 in Jan Hus, Mag. Jo. Hus, 2:189–92.
59 Super IV Sententiarum, I, d. 19.4 in ibid., 2:114–15.
60 Super IV Sententiarum, II, inceptio I, 5 in ibid., 2:191–92.
61 “Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies.” Juvenal, Satires 6 in 341–48; Braund, 
Juvenal and Persius, 266–68.
62 Sermon text in Mladoňovic, Fontes rerum bohemicarum, 489–93; analysis 
in Fudge, Jan Hus between Time and Eternity, 99–116.
63 Boyde, Human Vices and Human Worth, 231–72.
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64 Aeneas Sylvius, Historia bohemica, 4, 88–100.
65 This essay was first delivered as a keynote address at the Southeastern 
Medieval Association conference in Little Rock, Arkansas, and subsequently as 
a public lecture at the University of New Brunswick in Fredericton (Canada) in 
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MARSILIUS OF PADUA’S ATTACK ON THE HIERARCHICAL CHURCH in Dictio II of his Defensor pacis was a stunning use of 
history to attack legitimacy. His deft manipulation of traditional texts and 
doctrinal emblems and his deployment of historical and contextual argu-
ments to create novel and disruptive readings of the Scriptures and can-
ons allowed him to create a new narrative for the church that threw into 
question almost every papal claim to ecclesial authority.1 The result was a 
coherent and plausible revision of church history that suppressed or dis-
credited inconvenient sources, coopted others, and abandoned traditional 
scriptural exegesis.2 The novelty of Marsilius’s method has led to consider-
able speculation as to his inspiration. Much has focused on other oppo-
nents of the papacy in the years preceding the composition of the Defensor 
pacis, notably the dissident Franciscans of the late 1310s and early 1320s. 
But these may not have been his only influence.3 It is evident that some 
papalists were familiar with historical argument before they encountered 
Marsilius’s work. In 1327, as Pope John XXII prepared to condemn the 
Defensor pacis, several prominent theologians, who had been sent a very 
brief list of the Paduan’s errors, were able to compose deft and relatively 
elaborate responses around historical sources.4 Their quick recognition of 
the nature of the arguments that underlay Marsilius’s conclusions—they 
were given no details on these and never saw the Defensor—as well as their 
comfort in responding, point to earlier encounters with similar material. 
It is of course possible that these encounters were with the assertions of the 
dissident Franciscans, but there is an alternative. Almost a decade before 
the Defensor pacis was reviewed by the Roman curia, three prominent 
members of the Dominican order, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, and 
William Peter Godin, engaged the theologian John of Pouilly and other 
secular masters on the origins of episcopal rights in substantial tracts that 
explored the extent of papal authority. Each had to deal with the kind of 
historical sources Marsilius later employed in constructing his narrative 
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of legitimacy. Examination of these works reveals the important position 
the church’s past occupied in the papalist discourse of this era, the influ-
ence episcopalist assertions had in drawing some papalists to attend seri-
ously to ecclesial history, the gradual mooting of traditional authorities 
during these debates, and the similarity of some of the methods employed 
by these papalists to those used by Marsilius a decade later.
Episcopal Rights and History
One of the great achievements of the canon lawyers of the twelfth century 
was the construction of a working ecclesiology from the jumble of seem-
ingly contradictory canons they found in Gratian’s Decretum. Within this 
vast collection of documents, the record of more than a millennium of 
church history, these Decretists derived a complex web of precedents that 
they considered the foundation of ecclesial order. This delicately balanced 
set of rights and privileges, the status ecclesiae, its authority based on an 
assumption of the continuity of church order throughout the church’s his-
tory, mapped the powers and limits of all the prelates within the church, 
including the pope.
In the early thirteenth century a new generation of canon lawyers—
the Decretalists—began to alter the Decretists’ interpretation of the sta-
tus ecclesiae. They ascribed broad discretionary powers to the popes that 
allowed them to circumvent the normal rights and privileges of prelates 
and others in cases of necessity. This new interpretation of papal author-
ity suggested that historical precedent was no certain gauge of ecclesial 
right. It provoked serious conflict in the middle of the thirteenth century 
when popes applied it broadly, granting mendicant friars special privileges 
to preach and hear confessions without the permission of the bishops in 
whose dioceses they were operating. Secular masters at the University of 
Paris, seeing this as a preemption of one of the ancient rights of bishops, 
produced a series of works protesting the papal action. They argued that 
Christ had given authority to Peter and the apostles—the first pope and 
bishops—together and directly, and that consequently bishops had their 
rights and privileges from Christ, not the pope.5 No pope could abrogate 
or alter what Christ himself had granted. In addition to scriptural passages 
demonstrating Christ’s conferral of authority on all the apostles, these 
episcopalists cited canons that seemed to document the existence of rights 
and privileges that bishops and the curates who served their dioceses had 
enjoyed from the beginning of the church—clear proof, it seemed, that 
these prelates alone were the indispensable and permanent ministers of 
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the church.6 The episcopalists’ argument blended Scripture and history. 
They saw the canons they cited much as the Decretists had, as markers 
witnessing a continuous observance of episcopal rights throughout the 
church’s existence. For them, history confirmed legitimacy.
Mendicants responded immediately, but chose to shift the basis 
of the debate away from the canons and history toward a few scriptural 
texts—notably Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17—that they insisted were 
proof that Christ had granted all jurisdictional power in the church to 
Peter alone. Peter, they claimed, had then distributed jurisdiction to the 
other apostles, retaining the authority to reapportion it any way he saw 
fit as the church developed. His successors had the same authority. The 
jurisdiction of bishops and curates was therefore held at the pleasure of 
the pope; it could be expanded, curtailed, or shifted to new ecclesiastical 
authorities at any time. All ensuing developments in the church had to be 
understood in light of this central fact.
The mendicant argument, developed primarily by Franciscan theo-
logians, turned the debate away from law and history toward theology, 
effectively pushing historical precedent to the sidelines. Mendicants con-
tinued to defend and elaborate this “derivational” theory of jurisdiction 
in debates with episcopalists into the fourteenth century—although some 
Dominicans followed Thomas Aquinas in adopting a more moderate posi-
tion soon after the conflict began in the 1250s.7 Episcopalists, for their 
part, continued to rely on historical precedents.8 Each side had created a 
substantial literature by the turn of the fourteenth century.
The Conflict Between Boniface VIII and  
the French Monarchy
When the struggle between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair of 
France erupted in 1301, the mendicant theologians Giles of Rome and 
James of Viterbo, both Augustinians, constructed defenses of the pope’s 
supreme position in Christian society—the first tracts De potestate 
papae—that approached the problem much as earlier mendicants had 
approached the issue of papal jurisdiction. Earlier discussions of church–
state relations had relied on complex precedents found in Scripture, 
the canons, and history to establish legitimacy; Giles and James based 
their works in philosophical analyses of government that effectively pre-
ceded and contextualized the scriptural, patristic, and canonistic sources 
they eventually discussed.9 Much as earlier mendicant theologians had 
directed focus from the complex history of rights and privileges found in 
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the canons to the seeming simplicity of Christ’s conferral of jurisdiction 
in the Gospels, Giles and James directed focus from the equally complex 
history of church–state relations to the apparent certainty of philosoph-
ical reasoning.10 James rooted his argument in a blend of Aristotelian 
and Augustinian notions regarding government and community; Giles 
relied on these and hierarchical metaphysical concepts found in Pseudo-
Dionysius.11 Like earlier champions of the derivational theory of juris-
diction, both authors kept the canons and history at the periphery of 
their arguments.12
The novelty of Giles and James’s methods did not divert their oppo-
nents from reliance on traditional ecclesiological evidence. Though most 
of the Augustinians’ respondents did gesture at discussions of the nature of 
government in their works, their arguments rested primarily on Scripture, 
the fathers, and the canons, the sources long employed in church–state 
debates. So, for example, the anonymous author of the Rex pacificus, a 
brief tract asserting the independence of the French monarch, relied 
almost exclusively on the canons.13 He arranged them within the context 
of a somatic analogy—the church as head, the state as heart, working in 
tandem for the good of the body.14 The author of the Quaestio in utramque 
partem, another brief royalist tract, used a similar approach, fitting his his-
torical references into a dualist framework that presented state and church 
as different genera exercising distinct powers.15 Both writers treated the 
canons and Scripture they cited as evidence of an enduring ecclesial order 
very much like that presented in traditional canonistic exegesis—though 
their assumptions about continuity led them to pluck their evidence topi-
cally from a history without much dimension or context.
The Dominican John of Paris, the most original opponent of 
extreme papalism in this exchange, used the testimony of the past with 
much greater sophistication. His De regia potestate et papali defended both 
the independence of the secular power and the rights of prelates, apply-
ing history differently in each case to limit papal authority. John began 
his work much as Giles and James had, with a sophisticated philosophical 
examination of the nature of government. His early chapters made only 
casual use of the past, presenting analyses of the origin of natural govern-
ment based in Aristotle and Aquinas and of the priesthood and church 
hierarchy based mainly in Scripture.16 John’s purpose here seems to have 
been to establish ecclesiological constants. He made no reference to eccle-
sial evolution, but instead proclaimed the consistent agreement of philos-
ophers, Scripture, and the fathers on the dualistic relationship of church 
and state.17
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Once John began discussion of prelates’ temporal lordship and juris-
diction, he turned to the past in earnest. He drew heavily on Scripture, the 
fathers, and whatever canons he could count as witnesses to history.18 Like 
most of the theologians engaged in ecclesiological polemics in his era, he 
had no training in canon law, but this did not deter him from interpreting 
the texts to his advantage.19 He read them without the elaborate context 
professional canonists saw, and so was able to make a straightforward and 
compelling argument for episcopal rights that stepped beyond the circum-
spect opinions of the lawyers.20
In the later chapters of his work, which dealt with papal claims to 
authority over the secular monarchies, John continued to mine the can-
ons for their historical content. History was a major issue here; some 
papalists relied heavily on historical precedents such as the Donation 
of Constantine and the coronations of Pepin and Constantine to verify 
their claims to papal authority over temporal monarchs.21 John rewrote 
these narratives, simplifying readings, emphasizing or suppressing texts 
to serve his polemical purposes, and blending the canons with other his-
torical materials. He treated the histories he used—standard works such 
as Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum historiale and Martin of Troppau’s 
Chronicon pontificum et imperatorum—much as he did the canons, editing 
and reinterpreting as required.22
While John of Paris bent problematic canons and extra-scriptural 
histories to his purpose, Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo avoided 
them. Giles skillfully employed scriptural and patristic exegesis and bibli-
cal history to build his argument, but took only passing notice of post-
biblical church history.23 Many of the canons he introduced were the basis 
of objections to his argument that he could not ignore. Giles dealt with 
the majority in the last part of his work, where he adroitly and sometimes 
ingeniously reconciled them to his positions.24 James of Viterbo included 
very few direct references to the canons: the Decretum twice—D.79 c.7 
and D.96 c.10—and a cluster of decretals on papal authority that he 
apparently borrowed from Giles of Rome.25
By the end of the Franco–papal debates in 1303, a clear pattern had 
emerged among the disputants in their approaches to ecclesial and secu-
lar history. The extreme papalists avoided discussion as much as possible, 
while their opponents embraced historical evidence with varying degrees 
of sophistication. And both groups found it necessary to manipulate 
whatever texts from the Scriptures, canons, and fathers they used—selecting, 
suppressing, and reinterpreting—to draw them into full agreement with 
their arguments.
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John of Pouilly and the Dominican Response
As the royal–papal controversy subsided, episcopalists continued to 
assert their traditional rights, pushing ecclesiastical history back toward 
the center of ecclesiological discourse. When Pope Clement V triggered 
another open debate between episcopalists and mendicants in 1312 by 
restricting a very favorable privilege that had been granted to the men-
dicants just a few years before, the theologian John of Pouilly emerged 
as the new champion of episcopal rights.26 John pressed his case aggres-
sively over the next several years—so aggressively that he eventually 
blundered into statements that were called heretical. In 1318 he was 
summoned to the curia to answer those charges.27 Around the time 
Pouilly was called to Avignon—perhaps just before—three well-known 
Dominican theologians composed works De potestate papae in reply 
to the episcopalist assertions: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, and 
William Peter Godin. Each was obliged to engage the arguments from 
history posed by Pouilly and the other defenders of episcopal rights, and 
each dealt with them differently.
Hervaeus’s De potestate papae was his second response to secular 
claims. The first, a tract De iurisdictione published in 1312, was a rather 
blunt assertion of the derivational theory of jurisdiction that clearly illus-
trates the Dominican’s preferred approach to the problem.28 In this brief 
work Hervaeus avoids historical argument completely, relying instead on 
a philosophical analysis of government to inform his exegesis of Christ’s 
conferral of jurisdiction in Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17. He poses 
an Aristotelian argument to demonstrate the natural need for a single 
head and a single source of jurisdictional authority in government, then 
argues that this arrangement is in fact the governmental structure Christ 
intended for his church when he conferred power on Peter. His other 
conclusions rest primarily on logical deduction. As Christ gave jurisdic-
tion only to Peter, all the apostles and all the bishops who succeeded them 
must derive their jurisdiction entirely from the pope. There are therefore 
no limits to papal authority over them. Bishops are like a secular king’s 
bailiffs, appointed servants who owe absolute obedience and have no 
right to their positions.29 For this reason, the episcopate cannot be con-
sidered an essential part of the church’s order. In fact, popes are not even 
required to give local ecclesial jurisdictions to bishops; they can, if they 
choose, bestow those powers on whomever they think suitable.30 In dem-
onstrating this radical reduction of traditional ecclesiology, Hervaeus 
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cites no scriptural texts other than Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17. He 
does include a brief refutation of the scriptural arguments of the seculars, 
but makes no reference to the canons or ecclesial history.31
Hervaeus was forced to alter his approach in the De potestate papae. 
By the time he composed it, his opponents had marshalled a significant 
body of proof texts, primarily from the canons, that had to be answered.32 
His response was to structure his work along the lines of Giles of Rome’s 
De ecclesiastica potestate, presenting a philosophical framework first, then 
addressing scriptural and legal evidence within that context. He begins 
with analyses of the kinds of justice, the type and extent of papal power, 
the way that ecclesial power was instituted, the church as a republic, and 
so on. Scriptural texts are inserted where necessary, but not frequently, 
with Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17 cited most. In proving the pope’s 
divine authority, he limits himself to relatively few sources: Matthew 
16:18, John 21:17, and Luke 22:32; Hilarius, Origen, and Chrysostom 
on Peter as the foundation of the church; and D.21 c.3, Quamvis uni-
versae, and D.22 c.1, Omnes sive patriarchae, on the origin of the Roman 
Church’s authority.33 He devotes the latter portion of his work to refut-
ing secular interpretations of Scripture, canons, and fathers, but does so 
primarily with arguments from causality that allow him to ignore almost 
completely the historical difficulties these texts introduced.34 Obliged to 
acknowledge the arguments of his opponents, Hervaeus refused to debate 
on the same plane.35 As in his De iurisdictione, he excluded the church’s 
history from the argument. The words of Christ were sufficient; all later 
evidence was extraneous.
Peter of Palude responded to the secular arguments very differ-
ently. Trained as a lawyer as well as a theologian, he was very aware of the 
canonistic doctrine of precedent and the network of rights and privileges 
that canonists believed prelates possessed. He was also aware of the can-
onistic teaching that some of these had evolved later, to accommodate the 
church’s growth. He would use this notion to considerable effect against 
the episcopalists.36 Like Hervaeus, Palude addressed episcopalist argu-
ments in the years before he composed his De potestate papae, and his dis-
tinctive approach to ecclesiological discussion is as evident in that earlier 
work, a quodlibetal question delivered in the fall of 1314, as Hervaeus’s is 
in the De iurisdictione. The issue addressed in the quodlibetal question was 
whether a person’s “own priest” had to hear his confession, as the Fourth 
Lateran Council had apparently decreed (X 5.38.12, Omnis utriusque 
sexus). A much-discussed aspect of mendicant privileges, the council’s 
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decree was read literally by episcopalists as a simple affirmation of curates’ 
(and bishops’) rights. They cited it to condemn any interference by mendi-
cants in the relationship between priest and penitent and contended that 
this arrangement had existed since the time of the primitive church.
Palude begins his response by reminding his audience that church 
history is as important as the model of the primitive church in understand-
ing the structure of the ecclesial order, and that the development of the 
church over the thirteen hundred years since its founding demonstrates 
that God intended ecclesial evolution. He lists deacons, hermits, monks, 
secular canons, and theological masters as examples of new ecclesial offices 
created since the time of the primitive church; all were willed by God and 
of great value to the church. Practices have also been altered by God’s will, 
including the relationship of penitent and priest. The council’s decree rec-
ognizes this, though the narrow reading of the episcopalists obscures its 
proper meaning. Citing the authority of the great canonist Hostiensis, 
Palude asserts that the decree actually permits any superior of a parish 
priest—that is, the pope or the priest’s bishop—to hear the confessions 
of the priest’s flock himself or to delegate someone else to hear them for 
him.37 He supports this interpretation with several examples from history 
and current practice. No one, he says, questions the propriety of papal 
penitentiaries—clerics authorized by popes to hear the confessions of per-
sons only popes can absolve. The mendicants authorized by the popes are 
similar. That the mendicants received a general dispensation from the con-
trol of bishops is analogous to existing practice regarding other religious 
orders and secular colleges. The only difference in the case under consid-
eration is that the decision to go to a mendicant for confession is left up to 
the parishioner—a right that Palude defends as consonant with Christian 
liberty and Roman law.38
This is only the first of several arguments Palude put forward in the 
quodlibetal question, but it illustrates clearly his preferences in ecclesio-
logical debate. He relied on evidence from ecclesiastical history and the 
evolving circumstances of the church’s practice rather than theory. He 
avoided entirely the reductive methods of many other mendicants. His 
approach was very much that of a canonist, reconciling contradictions in 
law and history to find order. This gave him a powerful edge in debat-
ing the episcopalists; he was addressing their arguments symmetrically, 
employing the same sources and the methods to establish legitimacy.
Palude used a similar approach in his De potestate papae. He divided 
this much larger work into two parts, one on the nature of papal authority 
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and its origin, the other on the power of the papacy over temporal goods.39 
This permitted him to discuss a wide range of recent issues, from Christ’s 
direct conferral of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on Peter to papal author-
ity over the French monarchy. As in the quodlibetal question, Palude 
ignores philosophical analysis in the De potestate papae, turning instead 
to Scripture, the canons, the fathers, and, occasionally, to Aristotle and 
Roman law.40 He develops his discussions at considerable length, as a 
canonist would, reviewing many alternatives and sometimes avoiding a 
conclusion. Although he agrees with Hervaeus on several key issues, par-
ticularly the error of John of Pouilly’s assertion that popes are bound by 
conciliar decrees (other than the doctrinal truths these might affirm), he 
moderates many others. So, for example, he allows, with Huguccio and 
common canonistic opinion, that councils can depose heretical popes 
once they are revealed—an issue Hervaeus ignored.41 He also temporizes 
on Christ’s direct conferral of all ecclesial jurisdiction on the popes alone, 
stating somewhat ambiguously that the jurisdiction of popes, bishops, and 
priests all derive from Christ—in apparent agreement with the Decretists 
and Thomas Aquinas rather than mendicant extremists.42
Palude’s reliance on canonistic sources, current ecclesial prac-
tice, and church history is particularly evident in his discussion of papal 
authority over temporal kingdoms. Again, he approaches this question 
much like a canonist, surveying the many historical negotiations between 
the church and state as he edges toward a complex conclusion. Like John 
of Paris, Palude dedicates the last portion of his work to this problem, 
focusing particularly on the temporal power of the pope in the kingdom 
of France. His conclusions are quite similar to John’s: the pope holds 
only enough temporal power over France and most other secular states to 
maintain his spiritual authority, but he does hold temporal and spiritual 
power over the Holy Roman Empire, which in its turn holds no authority 
over France. And, like John, Palude deftly manipulates Scripture, canons 
and history to create a narrative that becomes part of his evidence, con-
cluding that most papal temporal authority is the product of historical 
circumstance rather than intrinsic to the pope’s office. While Palude’s 
analysis is not as tightly constructed as that of John of Paris, it deploys 
history just as powerfully. Notable is his complex review of the evidence, 
which usually probes numerous possible answers before arriving at a solu-
tion.43 This predilection for thoroughness had its merits; Palude’s seem-
ingly exhaustive examination of the sources and alternative interpretations 
could be quite persuasive.
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Not long after the appearance of Palude’s De potestate papae , 
William Peter Godin produced his De causa immediata ecclesiastice potes-
tatis.44 In composing it, William made an interesting choice: he defended 
the same extreme position on papal jurisdiction asserted by Hervaeus 
Natalis, but employed the mode of argument adopted by Peter of Palude. 
To accomplish this, he borrowed sizeable portions of Peter’s work, reinter-
preting them to support his position. The result is surprisingly effective. 
William limits his discussion to the key issues surrounding Christ’s gift of 
jurisdiction to Peter: the nature of the power Peter received from Christ; 
the moment when it was granted; the power Christ gave to the apostles, 
the disciples, and their successors; and the consequences of Christ’s action 
for the papal office. His reorganization of the rich materials drawn from 
Palude’s work allows him to attach new conclusions to Palude’s digressive 
discussions, alter interpretations of texts, and clothe his interpretation in 
the authority of complex analyses of the fathers and canons. Gone, how-
ever, are Palude’s examination of papal authority over temporals and his 
constant reliance on historical evolution to demonstrate legitimacy.45 
William keeps his focus on the first years of the church, intent on meet-
ing the episcopalists on their own ground and proving that the exegesis 
from which they derive their image of the primitive church’s order is false. 
This approach allows William to suggest that the moment of the church’s 
formation is the only point in history relevant to the question of papal 
power. If Christ bestowed all jurisdiction on Peter at that moment, consid-
eration of other aspects of the church’s history is irrelevant to ecclesiologi-
cal debate. Apparently impressed with the force of Palude’s method, Godin 
modified its conclusions to provide adherents of the derivational theory 
of ecclesial jurisdiction with a symmetrical response to the episcopalists’ 
appeal to tradition.46
Conclusion
The works De potestate papae of Hervaeus, Palude, and Godin illustrate 
the division among contemporary papalists on the value of historical evi-
dence in ecclesiological discussion. Hervaeus, with most extreme papal-
ists, preferred to ignore it, and when forced to confront it by Pouilly and 
other seculars, insisted on subordinating its interpretation to a philosoph-
ical or theological framework that suppressed any potential ambiguity or 
contradiction in the sources. Peter of Palude, a trained lawyer and mod-
erate papalist, embraced historical evidence enthusiastically and used it 
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very effectively. William Peter Godin, another extreme papalist, chose to 
temporize, exploiting the power of Palude’s appeal to history but limit-
ing the scope of the discussion to avoid dealing with ecclesial evolution. 
His work coopted Palude’s reliance on historical materials while reading a 
much more extreme version of papal authority into its texts.
These works also make clear that papalists were debating ecclesi-
ology in historical terms before the 1320s. Not every disputant had the 
training of Peter of Palude, but a number demonstrated significant skills. 
Most of these were moderate papalists. During the struggle between 
Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII, we can count John of Paris among those 
moderates. Although he leveled his arguments against what he consid-
ered the overreach of Pope Boniface, the ecclesiology John outlined was 
rooted in the thought of the Decretists, and perhaps the episcopalists. He 
viewed the order of the church to be the product of evolution, and the 
church’s relation with the state to have been historically constructed. Peter 
of Palude held similar views, though he allowed for more radical change 
in the church than John did. And the two theologians who responded so 
effectively to Marsilius’s errors in 1327—the Carmelite theologians Guido 
Terreni and Sibert of Beek—also held moderate views on papal power.47 
William Peter Godin was no moderate, but seems to have understood 
the polemical potential in a work like Palude’s and the value of history in 
establishing legitimacy. He adapted it skillfully for his own purpose.
Finally, these three works point to a danger lurking in all the ecclesi-
ological debates of this era. Despite the advantages perceived by Palude 
and Godin, reliance on history to prove legitimacy also had a serious 
weakness—one that had led mendicant theologians to turn away from it 
when the debate over jurisdiction began in the 1250s. The sources were 
many and difficult to reconcile, and the interpretative tradition surround-
ing them was complex and sometimes contradictory. As the controversial-
ists of the early fourteenth century struggled to bring them into agree-
ment with their positions, selecting, excluding, and reinterpreting for 
their polemical ends, the variety of ecclesiological possibilities they pro-
posed, often based on the same evidence, had an unintended consequence. 
The multiplicity of interpretations they produced eroded the authority 
and stability of the sources, and, with it, the certainty of the history they 
reflected. The works of Hervaeus, Palude, and Godin are excellent exam-
ples. The conflicting readings they generated could have suggested to a 
contemporary that every interpretation of the church’s past was moot. A 
sympathetic but critical reader might have recommended a constructive 
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remedy: correction and revision of the current fonts of tradition, along 
with their commentaries. A reader hostile to papal claims might well have 
perceived a weakness ripe for exploitation. Marsilius’s casual manipulation 
of the ecclesiological sources to delegitimize the papacy comes to mind.
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Part 2
Transforming Ideas and Traditions

COMPARED WITH DISCUSSIONS OF GREEK (ESPECIALLY ARISTOTELIAN) AND ARABIC SOURCES, the study of the 
role played by ancient Roman texts and ideas in the transformation of 
medieval European political thought has been relatively muted. Yet medi-
eval political theorists wrote their treatises primarily in Latin, looked to 
Roman authors (Christian as well as pagan) for many of their precedents, 
and acquired their familiarity with Greek and Arabic thinkers through 
Latin translations. Thus, very compelling reasons exist to take seriously 
classical Latinate culture and Roman civilization in the development of 
political thought during the Middle Ages. The present chapter contrib-
utes to redressing this lacuna by investigating the use of Latin sources 
and doctrines from antiquity in the teachings of two of the most prom-
inent scholastic political authors of the late thirteenth and early four-
teenth centuries: Ptolemy of Lucca and Marsilius of Padua. In light of the 
Italian heritage of both thinkers, there seem to be especially compelling 
reasons to redirect our attention to the ways in which they appropriated 
and adapted ancient Roman sources (both republican and imperial) in 
order to articulate their theoretical frameworks. This does not mean that 
either Ptolemy or Marsilius may be regarded as an unabashed and unal-
loyed adherent to Romanitas, but rather that we do a disservice to the 
unique characteristics of their theories if we refrain from acknowledging 
the significant ways in which their thought was shaped by features of the 
classical Roman traditions that they inherited.
Ptolemy of Lucca
Written circa 1300, Ptolemy of Lucca’s De regimine principum has gener-
ally been treated as one of the most powerful medieval defenses of repub-
licanism, and of republican Rome in particular.1 Originally attributed in 
toto to Thomas Aquinas, who may be the author of Book 1 and the opening 
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chapters of Book 2 (known as De regno),2 the section of the treatise now 
known to be written by Ptolemy praised republican institutions as “more 
suitable for producing a certain civility”3 and argued that God rewarded 
the ancient Romans for their civic virtue and just system of laws.4 In spite 
of this veneration for Rome, scholars have generally asserted that the fun-
damental principles undergirding Ptolemy’s political theory stem from 
his devotion to Aristotelian scholasticism. Charles T. Davis proposes that 
the repeated references to Aristotle in De regimine principum signal that 
“Ptolemy was ... attracted (and this is reflected in his political theory) by 
the positive analysis of popular government in Aristotle’s Politics.”5 This 
basic view of the text’s dependence on Aristotle has been magnified by 
James Blythe, the leading contemporary scholar of Ptolemy:
For his general approach to politics, his criteria for judging the 
worth of government, and his basic political principles, Ptolemy is 
greatly and increasingly indebted to Aristotle’s Politics … In these 
areas Ptolemy usually understands Aristotle correctly, and the 
“twisting” of Aristotelian texts that does occur results from flawed 
understanding, not conscious deception. Moreover, in De regimine 
principum Ptolemy cites Aristotle, not merely to make a point, but 
for close analysis, constantly using Aristotelian terminology and 
concepts even when not discussing Aristotle directly.6
In sum, Ptolemy’s political theory, while “novel,” may still “reasonably be 
called Aristotelian,” according to Blythe.7 On the whole, scholars seem 
satisfied to embrace the conclusion that Ptolemy’s Aristotelianism forms 
the theoretical core of his republicanism, and that his gestures toward the 
Roman Republic are mere window dressing, lacking in intellectual value 
or substance.8
Yet, when we examine De regimine principum closely, we find that 
Ptolemy’s arguments rest very heavily indeed on his impressive (for its 
time) knowledge of Roman political institutions, leading figures, and 
history.9 Indeed, it would not be too great a stretch to assert that, in com-
parison with other prominent political thinkers of the late thirteenth 
and early fourteenth centuries, the level of knowledge on display in De 
regimine principum about Rome in the republican period is virtually 
without parallel. In addition to standard Latin sources for the history 
of the Republic, such as Cicero, Sallust, Vegetius, and Valerius Maximus, 
Ptolemy mined authorities less commonly cited in his day, such as Livy 
and Eutropius. Moreover, he found ways to transform sacred texts into 
key witnesses to secular history. Thus, as Davis has pointed out, Ptolemy 
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provides an ingenious rereading of Augustine’s City of God 5.18, which 
strips out the Saint’s moral condemnation of republican rapaciousness 
and vice, replacing it with a positive valuation of the motives behind and 
accomplishments of Roman patriots.10 Likewise, the books of Maccabees 
are looted as a treasure trove of historical information about the politi-
cal, social, and physical characteristics of Rome, often employed side-by-
side with pagan sources as a confirmation or supplement.11 Judged from 
the preponderance of the citations in Ptolemy’s portion of De regimine 
principum, one might conclude that the Latin accounts of the organiza-
tion of the Republic and the conduct of its leaders, instead of Aristotle’s 
analysis of politeia (that is, the mixed constitution), formed the central 
reference point for his argument. The superiority of the Roman Republic 
posited by Ptolemy provided the salient frame through which he filtered 
the reading of ancient texts—sacred as well as profane, philosophical as 
well as historical.
In particular, Rome is regarded by Ptolemy as constituting the quin-
tessential example of what he calls “political lordship” (his terminology 
for republican government)—in contradistinction to “regal lordship”—
and which is his preferred system of governance, on account of the “mild-
ness” of its organization. In support of this view, Ptolemy gives reasons 
such as the limited terms of officials, the system of payment, the nature 
of the subjects, and the constraints placed on the ruler’s judgment by 
the laws. Ptolemy relies on Roman sources, including Valerius Maximus, 
Sallust, and Cicero, rather than on Aristotle, to uphold such claims. In 
almost every instance where a positive example is provided, it is from the 
ancient Roman Republic.12 For example, Ptolemy’s initial definition of 
political rule is followed immediately by a reference to Roman governance: 
“Political rule exists when a region, province, city or town is governed by 
one or many according to its own statutes, as happens in regions of Italy 
and especially in Rome, which for the most part has been governed by 
senators and consuls ever since the city was founded.”13 Ptolemy’s defense 
of republicanism is essentially a defense of its Roman form. Likewise, 
Ptolemy’s discussion of political rulers concentrates on the Romans as 
providing the supreme examples: “Ancient Roman leaders, such as Marcus 
Curius, Fabricius, and many others, as Valerius Maximus writes, took care 
of the Republic with their own riches, which made them more bold and 
more solicitous for the care of the polity, as if their whole intention and 
inner disposition were directed to that. This verifies Cato’s opinion, which 
Sallust relates in The War with Catiline: ‘The Republic, which had once 
been small, was made great because they displayed industry at home, just 
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command abroad, a free spirit in counseling, and were addicted neither 
to lust nor to transgressions’.”14 Thus, Ptolemy relies primarily on Roman 
sources and argues in favor of a specifically Roman notion of political rule.
Ptolemy’s interpretation of Roman development coincides with and 
reinforces his Christian providential account of history, dependent on his 
interpretation of Augustine. According to this view, the path of Roman 
governance, like that of all earthly regimes, was directed by the hand of 
God toward a definite end. One cannot escape this linear and teleological 
notion of history in Ptolemy’s thought: “We can conclude ... that some-
thing participates in divine action to the degree that it is ordained to an 
excellent end. This describes a kingdom or any community or an associa-
tion, whether it is regal, a polity, or of some other condition.”15 Ptolemy 
elsewhere makes it clear that all rulers serve at the discretion of the divine 
will, stating that “it is clear that the kingdom does not exist on account 
of the king but rather the king on account of the kingdom, because it is 
for this that God provided for kings to govern and to exercise govern-
ance over their kingdoms and to preserve everyone according to their 
own right, and this is the end of government.”16 Throughout Ptolemy’s 
account of the rise and spread of republican/imperial Rome, divine inter-
vention (or at least divine acquiescence) plays a prominent role. Ptolemy 
even cites Augustine as supporting the idea that God rewarded Roman 
virtue with an empire: “Because the kings and rulers of the Roman world 
were more solicitous than any others for these things, God inspired them 
to govern well, and for this they deserved an empire.”17 The success of the 
Romans was not caused directly by their political/military skills and their 
civic self-sacrifice, but rather by the will of God, who was pleased by the 
Romans’ method of governing.
Nevertheless, Ptolemy also admits that not all those who come to 
great power are just or benevolent rulers. Ptolemy allows that God may 
make use of tyrants as well in his divine plan:
They [Cain, Nimrod, Belus, etc.] had lordship because tyrants are 
instruments of divine justice for punishing human transgression, as 
was the king of the Assyrians over the Israelite people, and Totila, 
king of the Goths, over Italy, as the histories relate ... And the 
prophet Isaiah showed how the king of the Assyrians was destined 
to punish the transgressions of God’s own people … We can 
conclude, therefore, that tyrants are instruments of God ... whose 
power the Sacred Doctors hold to be just, even though their will is 
always iniquitous.18
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Thus, the success or failure of any regime depends ultimately on the will 
of God; both good and bad constitutions may be utilized as part of the 
divine plan. With regard to Rome, Ptolemy sees the progress from king-
ship to republic to empire as part of providential history, commencing 
with the birth of Israel and culminating in the life of Jesus and the spread 
of Christianity.19 The development is strictly linear and serves the purpose 
of preparing the way for Christ’s kingdom. Rome’s role in the prolifera-
tion of Christianity is highlighted in Ptolemy’s discussion of Constantine 
and the conversion of the Roman Empire: “When the appropriate time 
came for the kingdom of Christ ... to manifest itself in the world, the force 
of our ruler Jesus Christ caused distress to Constantine, the ruler of the 
world, by striking him with leprosy and then curing him … When he had 
proof of this, Constantine yielded his lordship to the blessed Sylvester, 
the vicar of Christ, to whom the lordship belonged by right.”20 The tem-
poral supremacy of the Roman Empire allowed for the dissemination of 
the Christian religion. Therefore, the whole history of Rome up to that 
point could be seen as instrumental to God’s plan for the redemption of 
humanity. This, for Ptolemy, does not entail denying that the excellence of 
the Roman constitution and the virtue of the Romans themselves played 
key roles in Rome’s success; rather, divine inspiration caused the invention 
of the republican institutions that permitted the conquest of the world.21
There is also a naturalistic component to the defense of the Roman 
Republic in De regimine principum. Ptolemy proposes that government 
arises primarily from the material needs of mankind and the relative vul-
nerability of human beings in nature. Though citing Aristotle on the polit-
ical nature of man, Ptolemy places far more emphasis on biological and 
material necessity than the Philosopher ever would:
The necessity of establishing a city comes first from a consideration 
of human need, which compels a person to live in society ... Nature 
provides hereditary ornaments and defenses for other animals. 
They avoid harmful things and love suitable ones by using their 
natural virtue of estimating, without having to resort to any 
previous direction … This is not true for human beings, who, on 
the contrary, lack an instructor for choosing what is proportionate 
to their nature.22
Ptolemy goes on to illustrate how plants and animals have no need of 
clothing or of fortifications, while humans are quite vulnerable without 
them. Likewise, when struck by disease, humans require the aid of those 
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educated in the medical arts.23 Ptolemy ends this discussion with the 
remark that “for all these reasons I conclude that the city is a necessity for 
human beings, and that it is constituted on behalf of the community of 
the multitude, without which humans cannot live decently. To the extent 
that a city is greater than a town or village, there will be more arts and 
artisans present there to ensure the sufficiency of human life.”24 He thereby 
sets a clear naturalistic standard for the evaluation of various regimes.
In turn, the Roman Republic was for Ptolemy distinctively suited to 
redress the failings of the human condition in its natural state, namely, that 
human beings are a frail and always endangered species, lacking the natu-
ral resources to survive enjoyed by other creatures, so that they must strug-
gle to gain and retain earthly security and welfare.25 Ptolemy articulates 
the foundation of all systems of government succinctly: “The reason is at 
hand to show what one could demand for the good of the republic, for the 
defense of the kingdom, or for any other cause that rationally pertains to 
the common good of one’s lordship. Since we have supposed that human 
society is natural ... all things necessary for the preservation of human 
society are done by natural right.”26 This is, of course, a Ciceronian doc-
trine (perhaps most famously stated in De officiis, which Ptolemy knew). 
Indeed, in the following paragraph, Cicero is cited directly in connection 
with the “art” of politics necessary to provide for human welfare. The pri-
mary “natural” duty of government is to assure that those whose preserva-
tion is threatened are served and hence that the bonds of human society 
are maintained and strengthened.27 The Romans excelled in this regard, 
according to Ptolemy. Thus, they particularly merited their lordship. He 
identifies three elements of the superlative virtue of Romans: “One reason 
comes from love of their fatherland, another from their zeal for justice, 
and a third from the virtue of [civil] benevolence.”28 He illustrates these 
three principles copiously, citing Cicero, Sallust, Valerius Maximus, and 
Vergil, as well as his unique interpretation of Augustine.29 Ptolemy aims 
to demonstrate a convergence between the qualities of Roman character 
nourished in the Republic and the requirements of righteous govern-
ance. As he concludes, “Considering the merits of the virtues among the 
Romans, divine goodness itself seems to concur in their rule.”30 God and 
Rome converge.
The latter remark reveals how Ptolemy’s characterization of the 
naturalness of human community relates to his defense of the special 
divine “calling” of the Roman Republic. In his view, the three main virtues 
embraced by the Republic naturally and in the absence of Revelation were 
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identical to the end for which “the rule of Christ” was initiated: to pro-
mote sacrifice for the good of all and love of one’s fellows rather than the 
pursuit of personal self-glorification or private advantage. Ptolemy states 
this quite openly: Christ “founded his lordship in humility and poverty. 
Sallust and Valerius Maximus relate the opinion of Cato that proves the 
same thing—that the Roman Republic increased not through haughti-
ness or public displays of pride, but in adversities, labors, and hardships.”31 
Before the birth of Jesus, the Roman Republic was performing God’s work 
by fostering precisely those virtues of patriotism, civil benevolence, and 
justice that prefigure the rule of Christ. And such virtues were important 
precisely because humanity’s natural circumstances are so precarious and 
difficult. Of course, Christ’s rule adds the ultimate good of salvation to the 
republican virtues, but it does not disparage or deny the value of the latter.
Intriguingly, this twin-pronged naturalistic and providential defense 
of republican Rome directly reinforces Ptolemy’s papalist proclivities by 
providing an account of the continuing legitimacy of Roman imperium 
that places the authority for the appointment of the latter-day emperor in 
the hands of the vicar of Christ. Thus, Ptolemy introduces a version of the 
translatio imperii historiography that was widespread in the Middle Ages 
as a means of justifying the right of the German emperor to claim domin-
ium over all the world and/or the right of the pope to select and crown 
that ruler. The body of literature on this topic is sizeable enough that there 
is no need to recapitulate the outlines of the translation imperii theme at 
the moment.32 In current circumstances, two observations seem germane. 
First, Ptolemy’s republicanism is of a sufficiently flexible character that he 
does not reject out of hand the need at times for kingship as a valid form 
of lordship, nor does he equate all royal dominium with tyranny as would 
later republicans.33 The Roman Empire and other forms of monarchy can 
be considered worthy of obedience so long as they do not devolve into the 
despotism to which one-man rule is always inclined.34 Second, however, 
Ptolemy derives an interesting republican lesson from the historical con-
fluence of the transformation of the Roman Republic into the Empire and 
the emergence of the rule of Christ. As long as the Republic and its lead-
ers persisted in the pursuit of the three main virtues Ptolemy ascribed to 
Rome, government served the purposes of God, inasmuch as it placed the 
common good above private ends. But once the Republic became corrupt, 
and especially in the time of Julius Caesar (whom Ptolemy expressly iden-
tifies as a “usurper of imperium”) and his nephew, Octavian, a new rule 
became necessary—signified foremost by the birth and life of Jesus, and, 
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to a lesser degree, by the institution of the Empire.35 Ptolemy connects 
the decline in the virtue of the Roman Republic with the need for a new 
system of lordship—one ordained directly by God through his Son, rather 
than circumspectly through republican values. The former is obviously 
greater and more divine than the latter (hence, the pope as Christ’s vicar 
stands immeasurably above any earthly ruler), but God’s intervention in a 
sense became necessary precisely because the ancient Roman Republic had 
abdicated its responsibility to serve humanity.
Ptolemy’s admiration for the Roman Republic is thus intimately tied 
to his Christian understanding of human history. In Ptolemy’s view, the 
character of the Romans and of the Roman Republic was such that they 
could spread righteous rule across the globe in preparation for Christ’s 
coming. In addition to the practical advantages of the pax Romana for 
the spread of the Christian religion, Roman civic virtue and love of jus-
tice promoted a benevolent and self-sacrificing spirit that prefigured the 
kingdom of Christ. The historical success of Roman government was, for 
Ptolemy, in no way a matter of blind natural forces or chance, but instead 
reflected a providential plan directing the course of human events toward 
a preordained goal.
Marsilius of Padua
Ironically, the other figure I investigate in this chapter, Marsilius (also 
known as Marsiglio) of Padua, stood entirely opposed to Ptolemy’s 
Roman-inflected providentialism and the support it leant to papal pre-
tensions to earthly power.36 His major work, the Defensor pacis, com-
pleted in 1324, is indeed one of the main statements of medieval anti-
papalism in its most extreme form. Composed of two major sections—a 
first discourse on the foundations of temporal government and a much 
longer Dictio II on ecclesiology—the Defensor pacis has, like Ptolemy’s 
De regimine principum, been generally viewed as a quintessential work 
of scholastic Aristotelianism. Already, in the sixteenth century, Albertus 
Pighius had quipped that Marsilius was “homo magis aristotelicus quam 
christianus,”37 and most recent scholars have looked upon the texts of 
Aristotle as central to understanding the foundations of the Paduan’s 
political ideas.38 Certainly, the Defensor pacis is replete with numerous 
quotations from and references to the Aristotelian corpus: the Politics and 
Nicomachean Ethics most obviously, but also the Rhetoric and (pseudo-
Aristotelian) Economics, as well as the Metaphysics and various works on 
natural philosophy.
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Yet the plethora of his citations of Aristotle ought not to blind us to 
the fact that Marsilius is, in addition, deeply indebted to the Roman tradi-
tion (Christian as well as pagan).39 He evinces awareness of the work of 
Cicero and Sallust, as well as of several major Fathers of the Latin church, 
such as Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine. This Latin impact upon Marsilius 
has been acknowledged in varying degrees, although it still tends to be 
overlooked in scholarship on the Defensor pacis. While Marsilius does not 
depend as heavily upon classical Roman philosophers, theologians, and 
historians as does Ptolemy, it would be an error to overlook entirely his 
debts to Latin authorities, especially Cicero and Augustine. Rather, atten-
tion to Marsilius’s reliance upon Roman sources—the texts that he cites as 
well as some possible influences of a less overt nature—helps us to identify 
and comprehend some of the leading features of his political theory.
Among pagan Roman writers,  Cicero looms the largest in 
the Defensor pacis . Cicero was the only major political thinker of 
pre-Christian antiquity whose ideas continued to be accessible to the West 
following the collapse of the Empire. While Cicero’s two major political 
treatises, De re publica and De legibus, were only known through second-
ary sources in partial and fragmentary form, his work on political ethics, 
De officiis, circulated widely throughout the Middle Ages. Moreover, his 
rhetorical writings, which contain substantial discussions of key topics of 
social and political theory, in particular De inventione, were broadly stud-
ied and adapted in medieval Europe. Evidence of Marsilius’s knowledge of 
Cicero’s teachings may be found in both main discourses of the Defensor 
pacis; De officiis is quoted, by my count, on eight separate and discrete 
occasions—five times in Dictio I and three times in Dictio II—making 
Cicero the pagan author cited most often by Marsilius, save only Aristotle. 
Marsilius seems especially drawn to Cicero’s teaching that membership in 
human society necessarily entails duties toward other men, inasmuch as 
no community whatsoever is possible where a regard for one’s fellows is 
lacking. Social cohesion specifically requires a natural duty to be just in 
one’s conduct toward others: the very precondition for a communal exist-
ence is the recognition of a fixed principle of justice.
These assertions play a central role in Marsilius’s political theory, 
elucidating the basis on which he seeks to rally opposition to the tempo-
ral intrusions by papal monarchy and simultaneously revealing much of 
the framework within which he constructs his normative proposals for the 
arrangement of the secular political community. In particular, in order to 
defend a universal duty to reject papal infringement upon earthly jurisdic-
tion, Marsilius invokes a Ciceronian account of society. In the introductory 
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remarks to the first discourse, the Defensor pacis posits that “individual 
brethren, and in even greater degree groups and communities, are obliged 
to help one another ... from the bond or law of human society.”40 In sup-
port of this view, Marsilius quotes at length from De officiis to the effect 
that human beings exist, according to their natures, in order to serve their 
fellows rather than merely to satisfy themselves. Nature instills in man 
the duty to act for the public benefit above all else: “Whoever desires to 
and is capable of discerning the common utility is obliged to give … his 
vigilant care and diligent efforts” to whatever threatens earthly commu-
nities.41 Human sociability forms a universal bond, not confined to one’s 
own community but extending beyond fixed political units to all civilized 
peoples. Thus, Marsilius attributes to Cicero his basic account of the natu-
ralistic foundations of a generalized human responsibility to discover and 
to stamp out anti-social beliefs and practices wherever they occur.
This doctrine of natural duty is developed to a far greater degree in 
the conclusion to Dictio I. Marsilius again employs Cicero to authorize a 
broadly based, purely temporal obligation on the part of men to oppose 
interference with human “peace and happiness.” The resistance advocated 
in the Defensor pacis is of two sorts. First, one must repel enemies of earthly 
tranquility by revealing their identities to all who will listen. Instruction can 
be a powerful tool in the war against those who seek to disturb the social 
order. Second, one must move beyond education to direct action: whoever 
takes up the banner of discord and temporal misery must be halted by any 
means available to informed antagonists. Marsilius insists that “every man 
is obligated to do this for another by a certain quasi-natural law, the duty 
of friendship and human society.”42 Man is subject to the natural require-
ment to seek the good of his fellows without regard for his personal wel-
fare. Marsilius indicates that any other mode of conduct would be unjust, a 
position for which he cites explicitly Ciceronian grounds:
To these [namely, the tasks of identifying and fighting the enemies 
of human happiness] all are obligated who have the knowledge 
and ability to take action; and those who neglect or omit them on 
whatever grounds are unjust, as Tully testified in De officiis, Book I, 
Chapter V, when he said, “There are two kinds of injustice: one, of 
those men who inflict it; the other, of those who do not drive away 
the injury from those upon whom it is inflicted, if they can.” See, 
then, according to this notable statement of Tully, that not only 
those are unjust who inflict injury on others, but also those who 
have the knowledge and ability to prevent injury being inflicted on 
others, yet do not prevent it.43
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Marsilius’s argument suggests that a necessary corollary of the natural 
bond of human association is a duty to perform justice in both its aspects: 
not only to refrain from doing injury, but also to protect others from harm 
when it is imminent. The clear implication is that society itself is impos-
sible without the acknowledgement of this obligation arising from the 
Ciceronian principle of justice.
Beyond this broad conception of universal human duties, Marsilius also 
finds warrant in Cicero for the formation of specific political communities. 
Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes that the primary purpose of the polis is “liv-
ing well,” by which he understands the life of virtuous citizenship, Marsilius 
focuses almost exclusively on material and biological existence (what he calls 
a “sufficient life”) as the aim of communal order. Human beings in their natu-
ral condition are described as physically weak and vulnerable to the elements, 
and thus require mutual assistance in order to survive.44 Sociopolitical organi-
zation and institutions hence provide to mankind the protection and succor 
necessary for the continued existence of the species, so that “the purpose for 
the sake of which the state was established, and which necessitates all the 
things which exist in the state and are done by the association of men in it,” 
stems from “a principle naturally held, believed and freely granted by all: that 
all men not deformed or otherwise impeded naturally desire a sufficient life 
and avoid and flee what is harmful thereto.”45 Marsilius then quotes from De 
officiis I.3, which employs almost identical language, in support of this funda-
mental desire for self-preservation as the basis for community.
The principle of the sufficient life is recurrently associated with 
Cicero’s teachings throughout in the Defensor pacis. In Dictio II, for 
instance, the natural disposition to associate communally is explained as 
an implicit feature of human nature, realized only when men have been 
exposed to reasoned persuasion about the advantages that accrue from 
gathering into civil, legal and political order.
When men originally came together to establish the civil community 
and civil law, the weightier part of them agreeing on matters pertaining 
to sufficiency of life, they were summoned not by the coercive 
authority of one or many persons, but rather by the persuasion 
and exhortation of prudent and able men. The latter, exceptionally 
endowed by nature with an inclination for this task, later through 
their own efforts made progress in their various pursuits and guided 
others either successively or simultaneously to the formation of a 
perfected community, to which men are naturally inclined so that 
they readily complied with this persuasion, as we have shown ... from 
the Politics [of Aristotle].46
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The reference to Aristotle is a feint. In fact, this passage reproduces almost 
verbatim Cicero’s recounting of the emergence of human communities in 
De inventione I.2, according to which the realization of man’s natural but 
implicit social sentiments depended on the guidance of a wise and eloquent 
person, by whose instruction others discovered and improved their own 
rational and discursive capabilities. Through the persuasion of this wise 
orator, his fellow men exchanged their solitary existence for a social one. 
At his behest, says Cicero, they learned useful and honorable occupations, 
assembled into cities, obeyed voluntarily the commands of duly authorized 
rulers, and observed laws, in sum, all of the features of human association 
necessary for the attainment of the Marsilian goal of the sufficient life.
In turn, Marsilius insists that the attempt to sever members of the 
political community from their duties to leaders and to one another, such 
as occurs when the pope seeks to absolve citizens from obedience to politi-
cal superiors, violates the very natural purpose for which communal order 
exists. Should an external authority succeed in separating a ruler from his 
people, the result would be
to allow the root of all governments to be cut up, and the bond and 
nexus of every city and state to be destroyed. For I hold such root 
and nexus to be nothing other than the mutual allegiance and faith 
of subjects and rulers. For this faith, as Cicero says in his treatise 
On Duties, Book I [23], “is the foundation of justice,” and he who 
strives to destroy it between rulers and subjects harbors no other 
design than to acquire for himself the ability to overthrow at his 
own pleasure the power of all governments, and hence to cast them 
into slavery to himself. And this also means that such a person 
disturbs the peace or tranquility of all men who lead a civil life and 
hence deprives them of the sufficient life in the present world.47
In proposing this argument, Marsilius brings together the broad Ciceronian 
view that all forms of human association and cooperation naturally rest on 
justice with the more specific claim that political and legal authority rests 
upon the application of just principles to regulate interactions among mem-
bers of the community in order to achieve a sufficient life for all. Anyone 
who attempts to undermine the “nexus” of social and political relationships 
governed by justice is an enemy of communal order and indeed of nature 
itself. Marsilius thus invokes fundamental elements of Cicero’s thought 
in order to pursue his primary polemical and philosophical agenda in the 
Defensor pacis of demonstrating the dangerous and disruptive effects of the 
papacy’s efforts to impose its power over purely temporal affairs.
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Ancient Roman sources beyond Cicero also play significant parts in 
shaping the main contours of Marsilius’s framework. Sallust, for example, is 
cited only twice, both times in Dictio I. In the first instance, he is quoted 
to illustrate the damage caused by public discord to “the Italian natives … 
deprived of the sufficient life, undergoing the gravest hardships instead 
of the quiet they seek, and the harsh yoke of tyrants instead of liberty.”48 
In the second case, Sallust’s report of the suppression of the conspiracy of 
Catiline and his accomplices is mentioned in order to praise Cicero’s con-
duct, while Consul, as a “prudent” statesman who elected to punish the 
plotters by extra-legal execution rather than to risk the likelihood that “civil 
wars destructive of the polity” would have arisen “because of the sedition 
which these conspirators incited among the people against the consul and 
the other rulers.”49 By contrast, the Latin Fathers are much more com-
monly referred to, albeit nearly always in Dictio II. Ambrose and Jerome 
are central sources of information about the governance of the church and 
commentary on scripture; others, such as Origen, Gregory the Great, and 
Hilary, are mentioned, although less frequently. The extent of Marsilius’s 
direct familiarity with their writings is difficult to ascertain. The vast major-
ity of his quotations from and references to them derive from intermediate 
sources, including the Glossa ordinaria, Peter Lombard’s Collectanea, and 
Thomas Aquinas’s Catena aurea, although, at least in the case of Ambrose, 
Marsilius seems at times to be drawing directly from letters and sermons.
Although Augustine, too, is often cited only indirectly, there is 
greater evidence to suggest Marsilius’s direct knowledge of his treatises 
and other writings, including the City of God, On the Trinity, and the 
Retractations. Indeed, Augustine is the only Father who merits even a sin-
gle reference in Dictio I. Augustine’s importance for the development of 
Marsilian ideas has in fact been the subject of significant previous scholarly 
discussion. In his germinal 1951 study, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval 
Political Philosophy, Alan Gewirth contended that central elements of the 
argument of the Defensor pacis depend on Augustinian premises.50 Gewirth 
pointed to Marsilius’s view that the chief purpose of political community, 
and thus the goal of government, is peace, a position that coincides directly 
with Augustine’s in The City of God. For Marsilius, as for Augustine, the 
maintenance of public peace or tranquility requires a government able to 
enforce civil order upon a fallen mankind that is always threatened with 
self-destruction as the result of conflicting interests and selfish desires.
The Augustinianism ascribed to Marsilius by Gewirth is said to sup-
port two important features of Dictio I. First, Augustine is imputed to be 
the source for Marsilius’s “biological” conception of the ends of earthly 
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communal life, in the sense that the physical well-being of citizens, rather 
than their moral and spiritual improvement, constitutes the main reason 
that temporal society and government come into existence. Unable to 
fend for themselves in the wake of the Fall, human beings must rely upon 
one another in order to survive individually and as a species. This desire 
for corporeal subsistence compels them to form communities and share 
with each other the various “arts and sciences” necessary for existence. 
Unlike Aristotle and most medieval Aristotelians, temporal rulership 
for Marsilius has little purchase on the souls of human beings, either in 
matters of earthly virtue or eternal salvation. Second, on Gewirth’s inter-
pretation, Marsilius’s Augustinian proclivities lead him to endorse a form 
of legal positivism, in the sense that he supposedly evinces no interest in 
whether human laws accord with some “higher order” (natural or divine) 
principle of justice. Rather, Marsilius advocates the view that the prom-
ulgation of law by the appropriate temporal authority (whom he calls the 
legislator humanus, or human legislator) is sufficient unto itself to render 
a statute binding and enforceable. Since law is necessary for the mainte-
nance of the civil peace, and the members of the community naturally 
desire to achieve and maintain that peace above all else, the establishment 
of enforceable statute is of greater importance than whether its dictates 
accord with a rational or supernatural conception of justice.
Gewirth’s understanding of Marsilius’s Augustinian proclivities 
has not gone unchallenged. Daniel G. Mulcahy argued that Marsilius in 
fact deploys Augustinian sources in a far different way from that claimed 
by Gewirth.51 Pointing out that Augustine is barely ever cited in the 
first discourse of the Defensor pacis (which is the section of the text on 
which Gewirth concentrates), Mulcahy insists instead that Marsilius’s 
Augustinianism, to the extent it exists at all, arises from the two authors’ 
theological/ecclesiological convergence on issues about the power and 
status of priests, the fallibility of human writings, and the justification 
of religious poverty. In Mulcahy’s view, however, even these references to 
Augustine’s views are relatively trivial and tangential, such that no genu-
ine Augustinian influence may properly be identified in the Defensor pacis. 
In a similar vein, Conal Condren has claimed that Augustine should be 
treated not even as a potential “source,” but simply as an “authority,” for 
Marsilius, such that the entire question of “influence” itself must be dis-
missed.52 Another scholar, Joanna V. Scott, defended some of the merits 
of Gewirth’s assertion of an Augustinian strain in the Defensor pacis.53 
While she argued that there are certainly important divergences between 
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the Augustinian and Marsilian conceptions of the earthly community, she 
also demonstrated that Marsilius’s position by no means stands in conflict 
with that of Augustine, illustrated especially by their common concern to 
advance the legitimacy of earthly political power in relation to divine ordi-
nation. The influence of Augustine upon his late medieval successor is less 
an issue than their shared commitment to an idea of the proper role and 
sphere of secular civic life in the overall Christian conception of human 
ends and goods.
What are we to make of these competing interpretations of the role 
played by Augustine in the argument of the Defensor pacis? Each position 
has certain merits. Mulcahy is correct to point out that the vast prepon-
derance of references to Augustine is contained in the second discourse 
and concerns matters of ecclesiology and scriptural hermeneutics; and 
Condren is right that these citations (as in the case of Marsilius’s use of 
other Latin Fathers) tend to constitute appeals to authority rather than 
developed theoretical arguments. Moreover, Gewirth seems to stretch cre-
dulity by claiming that Augustine afforded the inspiration for Marsilius’s 
alleged legal positivism: as scholars have argued, it is far from clear that 
the Defensor pacis endorses such a doctrine.54 Marsilius’s reliance on 
Cicero’s conception of justice, discussed above, supports this conclusion. 
Yet Scott’s chastened defense of Gewirth also finds support in the text of 
the Defensor pacis. The City of God is cited by Marsilius in the context of 
his discussion of the “causes” of government, that is, how temporal rule 
is authorized. He distinguishes between “demonstrable” and “indemon-
strable” modes of causation. The latter denotes the claim that the “divine 
will” or another supernatural force was the immediate source of an office 
or institution, while the former connotes a “method of establishing gov-
ernments which proceeds immediately from the human mind, although 
perhaps remotely from God as remote cause, who grants all earthly ruler-
ship.”55 It is at this juncture that Marsilius refers to City of God 5.21 as 
the basis for the view that all temporal power may be traced back to God, 
however distantly and indirectly. While he wishes to concentrate on forms 
of government that arise from the human mind and will and thus are 
susceptible to certain demonstration, he also declines to adopt a strictly 
naturalistic position (such as that associated with pagan philosophers like 
Aristotle and Cicero) that would deny any measure of divine ordination 
to political institutions and authority. The Augustinian position permits 
him to adopt a middle ground between extreme naturalism and a more 
theocentric view: Although all political dominion derives from God in 
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the final analysis, many (probably most) earthly governments directly 
and immediately result from human intellect and volition, and thus their 
causes may be demonstrated by reason and experience.
Perhaps the more difficult question concerning Marsilius’s relation 
to Augustine is why he did not explicitly invoke the famous doctrine of 
the City of God that the purpose of earthly government is to establish and 
maintain the peace, given the apparent agreement between the two think-
ers concerning this central claim. While ultimately one can only specu-
late, the answer may have much to do with the very different character 
of their respective conceptions of what constitutes peace itself. Temporal 
peace for Augustine is a modus vivendi in which government imposes 
order upon the potentially conflicting inhabitants of the two cities, those 
who live according to libido dominandi (the City of Man) and those who 
have been accorded divine grace (the City of God). Thus, peace is cru-
cially connected to Augustine’s overarching providential scheme of his-
tory. By contrast, Marsilian peace represents a wholly naturalistic goal 
resulting from the emergence of the diverse functions necessary for the 
“perfected” human community. In order for the members of this commu-
nity to live together in relative harmony and order, it became necessary 
for a separate and distinct system of justice to be introduced in the course 
of social development. Marsilius explains that “because between men so 
congregated there occur contentions and quarrels which, not regulated 
by the norm of justice, would cause fights and the separation of men and 
so at length the decay of the city, it is required in this relationship that 
a standard of justice be established and custodians or makers [of it].”56 
Indeed, the embodiment of this standard of justice in the law constitutes 
the salient achievement of the “perfected community.” No community 
is complete without “standards of civil justice and benefit established by 
human authority, such as customs, statutes, plebiscites, decretals and simi-
lar rules.”57 The Defensor pacis insists that the existence of peace in a fully 
developed human community is necessarily and inescapably coextensive 
with submission to the conditions imposed by justice. Such a position 
stands at considerable remove from Augustine, for whom true justice is 
possible only in heaven among God’s chosen and therefore is different in 
kind from earthly peace and order.
Despite Marsilius’s evident debts to ancient Roman writers, 
especially Cicero and Augustine, it should be clear from the foregoing 
that his political thought is no more fully assimilable to one or more 
Latin traditions than to Aristotelianism or any other school of thought. 
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The Defensor pacis is too sui generis to be reduced to rigid categorization. 
On the other hand, Latin ideas did quite demonstrably exercise some 
intellectual impact upon Marsilius, a fact that we ignore at our own peril. 
In particular, attentiveness to the classical Roman background helps us 
to understand how Marsilius adapted and blended a variety of political 
doctrines and languages in order to pursue his overarching purpose of 
challenging and undermining the papalist agenda. Seen in this light, the 
original and innovative features of the Defensor pacis may be identified and 
analyzed with greater precision.
Conclusion
At first glance, there may not appear to be many features shared in com-
mon by the appropriations of ancient Roman civilization found in Ptolemy 
of Lucca’s De regimine principum and Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis. 
Ptolemy focuses on the history of Rome, with special attention to the 
republican phase, in order both to support a normative claim about the 
superiority of republics and to bolster his providentialist account of 
human events. Marsilius, although he has sometimes been characterized as 
a theorist of republicanism,58 tends to concentrate on philosophical argu-
ments and principles derived from Roman sources in order to articulate 
his “generic” naturalistic conception of human community.59 But a couple 
more general observations about the role that classical Latin sources play 
in their respective works seem in order to me by way of conclusion.
First, despite the close association of their authors with the Arts 
Faculty at the University of Paris, not to mention the sizeable number of 
references to and quotations from Aristotle’s corpus, the appeals in both 
De regimine principum and the Defensor pacis to Roman antiquity chal-
lenge decisively the easy assumption that Ptolemy and Marsilius were 
fundamentally devoted to and dependent upon Aristotelian premises. 
Their ideas are far too eclectic and their sources were far too diverse to 
warrant reduction to the simple label of “Aristotelianism.” Indeed, when 
Aristotle’s thought conflicted with relevant Roman ideas, it was often the 
former that was forced to conform to the latter, either overtly or by impli-
cation. Second, however attractive the authority of Aristotle might have 
been to Ptolemy and Marsilius, neither of them seems entirely comfort-
able with the world of the Greek polis, whereas the Latin culture of the 
Roman Republic and Empire clearly falls (and feels) closer to their experi-
ences and intellectual sensibilities. Some of this affinity may be attributed 
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to personal factors. When Marsilius described himself at the beginning 
of the Defensor pacis as a “son of Antenor”—the legendary founder of 
Padua—he self-identifies with traditional Roman myth.60 Likewise, as we 
have seen, Ptolemy clearly equates the Italian self-governing urban com-
munes of his own day with the Roman republican past rather than with, 
say, Athenian democracy or even Spartan oligarchy.
Yet I am inclined to think that more is at stake here than simple 
proto-nationalist pride that these ethnic Italians might have harbored for 
the Roman heritage. For a plethora of civilizational reasons—including 
but not limited to continuities of language, legal system, recognizable 
political institutions (empire and republic), and literature—I postulate 
that Rome and its culture struck a chord with Ptolemy and Marsilius (and 
I daresay many other medieval scholastic political authors) in a way that 
Aristotle’s Greek polis and its constitutional orders did not resonate. Nor 
did the situation necessarily change with the Renaissance and its superior 
command of the Attic Greek language and access to a far larger body of 
Greek (especially Athenian) philosophical, literary, political, and histori-
cal writings. One need only recall Machiavelli’s deep devotion to the clas-
sical Romans, and his relative lack of interest in the ancient Greek poleis, 
to realize that Romanitas carried great intellectual power and historical 
weight well into early modern times, no less than during the Middle Ages. 
Having put on the toga, numerous European political thinkers were loathe 
to exchange it for other garb.61
NOTES
1 Most recently by Straumann, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 248–55. For 
a powerful recent critique of the republican interpretation, however, see Yun, 
“Ptolemy of Lucca,” 417–39.
2 The authorship of the first portion of De regimine principum remains vexed; 
see Blythe’s introduction to Government of Rulers, 3–7.
3 Ptolemy of Lucca, Government of Rulers, 2.8.1. The Latin text is found in 
Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula Omnia. On rare occasions, I have modified Blythe’s 
rendering in accordance with this text.
4 Ptolemy, Government of Rulers, 3.5–6. References will be to the book, chap-
ter, and section number of the text.
5 Davis, Dante’s Italy, 278, 231 note 21.
6 Blythe, “Aristotle’s Politics,” 135.
7 Ibid., 135. Blythe, “‘Civic Humanism’,” 32; La Salle and Blythe, “Was 
Ptolemy of Lucca a Civic Humanist?” 236–65; Blythe, Worldview and Thought. 
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Interestingly, Blythe’s earlier discussion of Ptolemy’s relation to Aristotle is con-
siderably more nuanced; see Blythe, Ideal Government, 92–117.
8 E.g., Canning, History, 148–49.
9 Of course, he did not know directly many important sources of Roman 
political theory (such as Book 6 of Polybius’s Histories or Cicero’s De res publica 
or De legibus), which were transmitted only partially during later centuries. See 
Nederman and Sullivan, “The Polybian Moment”; and Nederman, “Polybius as 
Monarchist?”
10 Davis, Dante’s Italy, 57–60.
11 Ptolemy, Government of Rulers, 2.8.4, 3.6.3, 3.12.5, 3.20.3, 4.1.4, 4.7.4.
12 The only exceptions to this are Ptolemy’s references to Israel and contem-
porary Italy.



















32 Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. 1; Nederman, “Empire.”
33 Ptolemy, Government of Rulers, 3.11.9, 3.11.12.
34 Ibid., 3.11.1–6.
35 Ibid., 3.12.5, 3.13.
36 One recent scholar has, however, attempted to make a case for Marsilian 
providentialism: Garnett, “The Truth of History,” whose position has been quite 
thoroughly eviscerated in my review of the book as well as that by Shogimen.
37 Pighius, Hierarchiae ecclesiasticae assertio, Book 5.
38 The best recent scholarship may be found in Moreno-Riaño, World and 
Moreno-Riaño and Nederman, Companion.
39 Among recent scholars, Marsilius’s eclectic use of sources—including 
Roman Latin texts—has been well captured by Syros, Marsilius.
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51 Mulcahy, “Hands of Augustine,” 456–66; Mulcahy, “Marsilius,” 180–90.
52 Condren, “Interpreting Marsilius’ Use,” 217–22.
53 Scott, “Influence or Manipulation?” 59–79.
54 Lewis, “‘Positivism’ of Marsiglio,” 541–82; Nederman, Community and 
Consent, 79–83.
55 Marsilius, Defensor pacis, 1.9.2.
56 Ibid., 1.4.4 (translation slightly altered).
57 Ibid., 1.10.6.
58 Skinner, Foundations, vol. 1, 60–65; Gewirth, “Republicanism and Abso-
lutism,” 23–48.
59 Nederman, Community and Consent, 19–24.
60 Marsilius, Defensor pacis, I.1.6.
61 This chapter was originally prepared for presentation as a keynote lec-
ture at a symposium on “The Transformation of European Political Thought, 
ca.1250–ca.1350,” Universidade Sao Judas Tadeu, Sao Paulo, Brazil, June 2012. A 
later version of it was delivered at the International Congress of Medieval Studies, 
Kalamazoo, MI, May 2014.
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“The humane disciplines are history and criticism.”1
Intellectual history is reflective, reflexive: devoted to the history of 
inquiry. That is, to a commitment, not so much to a history of religion 
in the seventeenth century, as to a history of seventeenth-century inves-
tigations of religion. Here a radical philosophical revisionism of the early 
1920s may illumine the enduring informal events of Humanist inquiry as 
strongly revisionary, critical: two unwitting colleagues, Martin Heidegger 
and R. G. Collingwood, may shed light on two unwitting Renaissance 
colleagues, Nicholas Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla. Heidegger, in the lec-
tures prior to the publication of Being and Time in 1927 (and the col-
lapse of the Being and Time project), and Colling wood in the early 
tracts, “Libellus de Generatione” (1920), Speculum mentis (1924), and 
Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (1925), seemingly entirely unaware of each 
other, react strongly against conventional philosophy: Robert Pippin 
laments Heidegger’s “blistering criticism of rationalism and metaphys-
ics;” Collingwood describes the philosophical Realism of his Oxford col-
leagues as “building card-houses out of a pack of lies.”2
This Modernist program claimed that the first useful topic of 
inquiry is mental activity as primordial “ursprünglich.” Both Heidegger 
and Collingwood deal with what Theodore Kisiel, in his Genesis of Being 
and Time, calls a “pre-theoretical attitudinal complex,” that is, with pri-
mordial mental activities as generative matrix: in Being and Time this is 
“thinking” as Care, Sorge, with its Concerns, Besorgen, sorted in Being 
and Time as Understanding , Verstehen, Disposition, Befindlichkeit, 
Locatedness, Verfallen.3 Both address, to be sure, not the primordial of 
early hominid societies but our primordial of “thinking” plain: before 
“theory,” before metaphysics, before systemic ambitions; it is inquiry with 
a concern for historical concreteness, for activities not yet thematized, for 
unrealized possibilities: for “firstness.”
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This disestablishmentarian revisionism could suggest a Renaissance 
Humanism that functions, not so much as a discipline, or, particularly, as 
a failed philosophical discipline, but as a “frame” for inquiry, as a set of 
dispositions to understand “Heideggerean” understandings and disposi-
tions: it is a mapping of pre-theoretical activity, and of the pre-theoretical 
persevering in theory. Thus Rocco Rubini describes Petrarchan “familiar-
ity” as both disposition (investigative filter) as attitude—vivid, perceptive, 
expressive—and understanding as competence—exploratory, diffuse.4 
Katharine Eden relates the Humanists’ discovery of “intimacy” as a dispo-
sition using informality as access to classical texts.5 Both familiarity and 
intimacy invest work that assumes inquirer’s experience necessarily cor-
rects, extends knowledge. Rubini claims Petrarch’s discovery of the Letters 
to Atticus in 1345 was seminal: that is, Humanism as frame sustains the 
practice of using Cicero’s letters to interpret Ciceronian treatises. Inquiry 
makes deliberate resourceful calls on phenomenological evidence—our 
reactions to appearances—as modifications, improvements of doctrine, 
theory: saving appearances, against theoretical self-concern. Familiarity, 
intimacy also define a responsibility for response, engagement with 
exchange, a sense of correctness, error as owned. It counters philosophical 
solipsism with its focus on its own academic accomplishments, its faith in 
systemic authenticity, authority. Humanists exchange dispositions: famili-
arity discerned, intimacy felt, understandings offered. It is investigation, 
in short, in movement, with a desire, an obligation for its responses to 
achieve effective responses. In short, the inquiry form, result, is criticism. 
And, perhaps, Williams’s “un-disciplines.”
Certainly we may remark on the Renaissance Humanists as “antici-
pators” of modern Humanist research scholarship, clever in Classical 
philology; but Humanists are, as well, avatars of ambitious modern crit-
ics—Empson, Kermode, Barthes, Benjamin. That is, engaged in making 
specific, artful, reflective demands on the practice of inquiry. They are 
ambitious for their own perceptive response, active in the definitions of a 
wider discussion. They make revisions, at times provocatively eclectic, in 
selecting sources and choosing applications: they can be almost antidis-
ciplinarian in dissolving boundaries. They are obliged to take account of 
historical dispositions, understandings that have fostered boundaries, the-
oretical limitations. And, at best, they assume basic efforts in inquiry revi-
sion should be linked to consequences, to history, to episodes of possible 
“civil” reform. Nicolaus Cusanus (1401–1464) and Lorenzo Valla (1406–
1457) are exactly contemporaneous inquirers, and they shared, for a short 
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time, the intellectual liveliness of a domain, the papal court of Nicholas V. 
I shall argue that Cusanus and Valla are paradigmatic Humanist revis-
ers and inventive Humanist reformers. Cusa’s response to a painting , 
and Valla’s to the Aesopian fable, are parallel paradigmatic instances of a 
Humanistic responsibility of response to art as the Collingwoodian “first 
form of experience.”
Criticism as Collegiality
Cusanus: De visione Dei
So, by his brother’s showing he will come to know that the picture’s 
face keepeth in sight all as they go on their way though it be in 
contrary directions; and thus he will prove that the countenance, 
though motionless, is turned to the east in the same way that it is 
simultaneously turned to the west, and in the same way to north 
and to south, and alike to one particular place and to all objects at 
once, whereby it regardeth a single movement even as it regardeth 
all together. And while he observeth how that gaze never quitteth 
any, he seeth that it taketh such diligent care of each one who 
findeth himself observed as though it cared only for him.6
The history of ideas requires the history of inquiry practices. Here is a 
remarkable practice: the argument of Cusanus’s “mystical” tract turns on 
the edification, the instruction provided by a painting given to the monas-
tic community: named the “Omnivoyant Icon,” its function is the rep-
resentation of the divine visage, the divine possible gaze. Now consider 
Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art: he assumes, first, art has access 
to primordial understandings, dispositions, locatednesses; second, art can 
make the primordial cares, concerns intelligible. Thus, Heidegger’s famous 
reading of Van Gogh’s painting, Pair of Shoes (1886).7 It is “in the picture, 
and only in the picture” that we confront primordial “working” equip-
mentality.8 The shape of the peasant boots offers a profound sense of use-
fulness, Dienlichkeit, reliability; the figure gives us the “world” of the peas-
ant: toilsomeness, tenacity, loneliness, anxiety.9 “The painting spoke,” and 
“suddenly we were someplace else.” 10
Cusanus’s use of the visual language: gaze, gesture, pose—as activi-
ties of portrait subject and beholder, claims the interlocutory capacity of 
paint. “The painting speaks,” to use Heidegger’s expression: and it asks 
for the monastic viewer’s response, which can be, should be, discovery, 
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a text interpreted: here, divine omnivoyance as the viewer’s lived expe-
rience. For the preface describes discovery taking place in the church as 
a communal practice: each monk must recognize his confreres’ experi-
ences, wherever located in the church; the gaze must be acknowledged as 
directed to each. Each monk may move and see the gaze follows him; each 
monk must recognize his confreres’ movements, assume their belief that 
the gaze follows them. Omnivoyance: the gaze generates their experience 
of shared edification, meaning is delivered at the points of reception; it 
is an obligation to understand an experience as common, a community 
practice of interpretive discovery.
Collingwood, Heidegger’s unwitting colleague, makes stronger 
claims in his account of art as “primordial:” art is “the original soil out of 
which all other activities grow,” “the first form of experience;”11 and, art 
“worked,” is strengthened, revised by reflection, by the artist who is “also 
historian and critic;” for “aesthetic [as in aesthesis (sense)] activity is the 
necessary basis for any sound historical or critical work.”12 Certainly Cusa 
claims the unity of thinking and seeing powers: of “vis intellectiva” with 
“virtuti animali visiva.”13 And, we can locate this premise in our own his-
torical discussion: thus Joseph Koerner’s account of German Reformation, 
Enlightenment art, where “the private experience of art and nature replaces 
organized religion as the site of spiritual transcendence.”14 But, the Cusan 
experience in the De visione Dei is not, strictly, private; indeed, a great deal 
of the meaning hinges on the experience as acknowledging the simulta-
neity of diverse experiences of diverse persons, sharing a space, but not, 
possibly, a single point of view: difference, exchange marks this peculiar 
episode of edification.
This, the “community” experience, raises an issue of current impor-
tance in aesthetic theory: that is, the contention that an art experience 
is a strong instance of “shared” intelligibility, “embodied, intersubjective 
intelligibility,” in Robert Pippin’s gloss.15 But Pippin, Hegelian enthusi-
ast, chooses to emphasize the gain in “thinking” intelligibility. His very 
strong focus is on art as furnishing a remarkable and idiosyncratic source 
of “shared intelligibility:” “art works, by existing at all … embody the pos-
sibility of shared meaning.”16 Sharedness defines the basic gestures, acts 
of painting experience—to begin with, of course, it is not of nature, of a 
person, but “an experience of an experience.” The experience of the painter 
comes first, we come late; thus, Koerner’s explanation of C. D. Friedrich’s 
Rückenfigur: in the painting the beholder views—from behind!—this 
bold previous gaze, reminding us of our lateness.17 But the sharedness is 
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not simply between artist and beholder, but in the exchanges between 
responders, in the meeting of their glances, or in the historical succession 
of possible viewings, in museum behavior. The painting’s shareability, of 
course, as sensual, as physical, is “necessary,” necessarily shareable; but, the 
individual beholder’s sharednesses, his acts, only possible, possibly isolate, 
mutant, “contingent:” we may or may not “get the picture.” Humanism as 
frame abets the use of image in inquiry.
Cusa’s mystical tract, with its prefatory aesthetic act, is a forced 
march into intimacy, an experience of an experience of the divine. The text 
is part and parcel of Cusanus’s developing critique of the contemporane-
ous Western philosophy: scholastic discourse is inadequate to originate 
or complete an experience of religious discovery. And, Chapter 22 of the 
De visione Dei argues against the capacity of discursive reason: “discurrere 
et quaerere”—running, seeking is the activity of a dog ; basic, but surely, 
impertinent, random.18 Certainly the pictorial experience imposes sensual 
demands, unavoidable, investing his “mystical”—devotional—response. 
But, as well, the rewarding possibilities of our “shared intelligibility” may 
describe a motive for Cusanus’s heavy usage—throughout his texts—of 
verbal and mathematical image and metaphor. The motive is, of course, 
the figurative resolution of shared doctrinal difficulties. The painting expe-
rience interprets the religious experience: “Thou dost offer thyself to him 
that beholdeth, as though thou receiveth being from him.”19 “In thee God 
being created is one with creating—coincidit in te deus, creari con creare—
since the image which seemeth to be created by me is the truth that cre-
ated me.”20 And the indefinitely shareable experience models “infinity:” “I 
behold in the face of the picture a picture of infinity ... for its gaze is not 
limited ... and is infinite—visus interminatus ... et ita infinitus.”21 Perhaps a 
phenomenological hermeneutic.
Heidegger, in his Introduction to Phenomenological Research, insists 
that if we wish to connect aesthesis with noesis, we need phantasia, imagi-
nation, the capacity to present the non-present.22 Cusanus observes the 
human (faulty) intellect, if it is to find expression in action, requires 
images, appearances, phantasmata, which need sense, and sense requires 
body; “phantasmata, sine sensibus haberi nequeunt et sensus sine corpore 
non subsistent.”23 The imagination supplies images, “intuited” in sensi-
ble experience,24 for the image requires color, color quantified, “quia non 
potuit facies sine colore nec colore sine quantitate exsistit.”25 The image, 
of course, must figure truth? And the truth is in our activity, in intuition, 
experience—“quod propterea non capit mea imaginatio”—“I cannot, by 
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any imagining whatever, disprove the image’s effect” 26—thus, the central-
ity of imaginative powers in discovery—or not. But note the ontological 
distinction: Cusa recalls one of Augustine’s definitions of imagination in 
the De Genesi ad litteram, which deals with its “similitudes” of unknown, 
not present bodies, “non ita sunt ille, sed ut occurrit, intuemur.” We know, 
use our similitudes, imaginations not as “things that are,” but as they, the 
imaginations, occur to us, “happen.”27 We notice the force of the distinc-
tion: it describes the opposition between the competences of “philo-
sophical” knowledge and art’s intelligibility. This recalls Klaus Dockhorn’s 
appeal to Quintilian on the peculiar necessity of an appeal to the imagina-
tion, not imitation, for making present whatever is non-present, gone—
say, past affect.28 Cusanus also insists that the image does not perfect, but 
initiates our inquiry with an exemplar of truth, “sicut imago non perficit, 
licet excitet ad inquirendum veritatem exemplaris.”29 Still, recall Chapter 
22: “the image which seems created by me, is the truth, which creates me”: 
“similitude enim, quae videtur creari a me, est veritas, quae creat me.” The 
image is a check, constraint on my speculation.
Still, sharedness is a basic value of aesthetic activity; it is a double 
creation of artist and beholder, a “witting” sharing, and, as such, develops 
civil truth: for, the image is present, presents itself, appears to all and to 
one simultaneously.30 The lesson of the image is grasped, should be grasped 
as imposing equality, equally. Sharedness is precisely the normative value 
delivered by the art to the viewer, reader. And, again, necessarily delivered. 
Either by paint or by stone, sensation asserts both necessity (as basic pri-
mordial activity) and, at once, possibility—our reception, or not—thus 
autonomy of gesture, with contingency of reception: freedom, freedom 
offered or received, by art. And perhaps, the autonomy, the depth, the 
depth of effect of the shared experience can be specific, peculiar to the 
picture, to the “subtle skill” of the painter.31 Art is an aesthetic activity 
that funds sharedness; sharedness is the emotional, dispositional weight of 
“civil” in Humanist inquiry.
To put it another way: what Cusanus describes in the De visione Dei is 
an exemplary instance of the rhetorical figure apostrophe. The painter makes 
material, sensual direct address by the image to the beholder, or, he offers 
the possibility that the beholder can achieve a state of being addressed. The 
rhetorical assumption is that an available figure is not solipsist, subjective. 
Rather, the “Humanist” essence of the reciprocal gaze is that it is a public act, 
generally accessible; both artist and beholder assume it is available to each and 
all. Thus the image works as an “event;” it “occurs,” as Augustine explained. 
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The “event” nature of the aesthetic activity secures the experience as 
intrusive, instructive. The truly seminal study of Cusan engagement with 
Humanist inquiry is, of course, Ernst Cassirer’s Individuum und Kosmos in 
der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927). Cassirer’s first chapter engages the 
De visione Dei: he claims that “in these sentences” (of Cusa’s Chapter 6) 
“we are at the focal point of his speculation.” But he asserts more: “here 
we can see most clearly the connection of this speculation with the funda-
mental intellectual forces of the epoch,” which Cassirer names as Northern 
mysticism, Heidelbergian scholasticism, and Quattrocento retrievals of the 
accomplishments of antiquity.32 The Cusan text has a double pertinence: 
to Humanistic inquiry strategies and to revisiting Cassirer’s concern for 
possible interrelations of “Northern” and “Southern” inquiry modes. But 
Edward Cranz’s articles counter Cassirer’s claim that there is no innovation 
in Humanistic thought, only in Humanist style, here by making the case 
that aesthetic form may constitute insight: the De visione Dei is remarkable 
for its account of the experience of art, the phenomenology of paint. Cranz 
notes as well the gradual estrangement of Cusa from scholasticism.33 The 
text furnishes “the most fundamental context for his second main principle, 
the coincidence of opposites … Christ is within the wall of paradox, the 
wall of the laws of contradiction. Christ’s intellect is both truth and at the 
same time image. Christ is both the way to truth, and He is truth itself.”34 
In the very early manuscript Libellus de generatione Collingwood, citing 
Cusanus, claims: “coincidence of opposites ... this is where Realism dies by 
its own hand.”35
Very few “mystics” have Cusa’s epistemological ambitions; very few 
philosophers would tolerate his aesthetic argument as epistemologically 
sound. Michel De Certeau has noted the constraints of Cusa’s career: he 
regarded himself as a (barbaric) German speaking Latin. He did not claim to 
be a mystic, while writing “mystical” tracts. De Certeau and others have noted 
the stark contrast of the fragility of his theory in diffusion, the many suc-
cesses of his ecclesiastical career. Still, De Certeau restates the Heideggerean 
argument for art’s accessibility to the primordial: Cusa’s aesthetic intrusion 
“gives a language for what is already there. It offers words for knowledge the 
addressee already held somewhere.”36 But perhaps the current dishevelled 
discussion of the merits, flaws of Renaissance Humanism needs the gen-
erosity of Cusanus as a counter pressure to our disciplinary resistances to 
the poetry and pictures of intelligibility: Humanism enhanced, reinforced. 
Recall Cusa, Chapter 22: “For you draw us to you by every possible means of 
attraction,” “trahis enim nos ad te omni possibili trahendi modo.”
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Valla’s Quintilianesque Critique
Revisionism is a crucial element in Camporeale’s entanglements of 
Renaissance and Reformation moments. And, specifically in his reading of 
Valla. In his monograph on Valla’s oratio or declamatio on the “Donation 
of Constantine,” his fundamental aim is to account for the “radical lib-
erty” of Valla’s inquiry; the “libertà radicale nel ripensamento del passato e 
nella riflessione etica del presente:” mining Antiquity’s richness, but not a 
work of Classical piety.37 Certainly Camporeale offers a thick, meticulous 
summary of doctrinal issues; but he treats Valla’s radical liberty as an “atti-
tudinal complex,” defining the investigator’s role.
Radicality is inflected as Valla’s concern for the originary religious 
experience, and motivates his work to restore the concreteness of the evan-
gelical narrative, not yet colonized by theological abstractness. Camporeale 
claims the evangelical logos incarnato as paradigmatic human discursive 
capacity for Valla, thus a concern for Humanistic philology as serious 
practice. The embodied authenticity is to be retrieved in Valla’s inquiry 
by rhetorical strategies of reading New Testament practices, by, therefore, 
applying Quintilian’s types of usage—example, observation, custom. The 
elements of quotidian Christian experience are embedded in, and available 
to be experienced in, the scriptural text. Just so, Klaus Dockhorn describes 
Luther as recapturing, imagining, the hidden past evangelical affect in his 
“present day” German.38 Valla’s reading assumes “la continua rivedibilità,” 
the easy accessibility of scripture: the imperative “look again,” claims re-
readability; and, like revisionist Collingwoodian history, it is “re-enactment,” 
our sheer gain, time gained in performance for a scriptural “now” as authen-
tic, all ours.39 Recall Collingwood’s insistence that abstractness is the flaw 
of both Idealism and Realism, that “theology is the negation of religion;” 
for Valla, philosophical discourse is “the fount of all heresies.”40
Camporeale’s Repastinatio article, the most programmatic of 
Camporeale’s articles on Valla, cites Wittgenstein (a great annoyance to 
historians of philosophy) on the supplanting of metaphysical motives by 
the quotidian, and proceeds to describe Valla’s shift of interest from verità 
ontologica to verità logica.41 Valla’s logic, of course, is not formalist exercise, 
but an account of the structure of language. And thus Valla’s anti-technical 
moment: his reduction of the Aristotelian logical categories, predicaments 
speaks directly to his sense of the tactics of proper inquiry; we are left with 
thing, quality, action—res, qualitas, actio—and here Camporeale points 
out that for Valla “bonità ha luogo soltanto in action,” goodness has place 
only in action: a strenuous tactic of dereification.42 Camporeale’s account in 
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Umanesimo e teologia of Valla’s retrieval of Quintilianesimo, of the program 
as well as techniques of Quintilian’s work—is a narrative of rhetoric under-
stood as the continual return of the continuously theoretically repressed:
We ... have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have 
frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly 
uneducated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and 
unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them 
by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an 
appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims 
of truth and justice.43
Camporeale embarks on a careful account of Valla’s use in the Dialectical 
Disputations of Quintilian’s Book 5; this is the great book of transition: 
here the vital context for Quintilian’s criticism, his critical reformulations, 
is the loss, the absence of politics in imperial Rome: possible civil activity 
is only legal; the time for philosophy is primarily retirement, as appropri-
ate for “learned men seeking for truth among other learned men.”44 This 
passage setting the goal of vindicating the claims of truth and justice imme-
diately follows the text that sets the inquiry parameters: the tasks of topikē 
(invention) and kritikē (judgment). For Book 5 must shift emphasis from 
the domain of necessity, and apodeictic argument, to the domain of the 
credible, the probable, the possible, the verisimilar—here most definitely 
requiring the full armament of aesthetic enticement, emotional appeal, 
philological care, of inductive arguments from example, of (incomplete) 
rhetorical enthymeme; it becomes a realist, pessimistic working with dubi-
ous transactions; the edge to his account is his sense of political loss as 
the strong motive for critical gain, awareness. Camporeale corrects earlier 
scholarship, pointing out that Valla inserts whole chunks of Book 5 in his 
text of Dialectical Disputations: Quintilian’s chapters 8–10 in Valla’s Book 
2; chapters 11–14 in Book 3; from Book 2, 20 to the end it is all Quintilian; 
the whole of Book 3,15 is from Quintilian 10. The splendid footnotes of 
Copenhaver and Nauta’s edition, translation, of the Dialectical Disputations 
list the numerous references to Quintilian scattered throughout.
Grammar as Reorientation
“Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority, and usage ... Usage, 
however, is the surest pilot in speaking, and we should treat language as 
currency minted with the public stamp. But in all these cases we have need 
of a critical judgment.”45
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Thus Camporeale: “grammar is the point of reference for Valla’s 
critical work.”46 Quintilian may have spoken of grammar as scientia of 
speaking , writing , or enarratio (interpretation) of poetry, but he also 
claims that the task of judicium (criticism) invests them all.47 One’s com-
petence is gained through refined sensitivity to diverse patterns of use; 
Camporeale calls this “critical-philological method.”48 Valla, in short, 
encapsulates disciplines within a simple critical obligation; here the gram-
marian/philologue’s customary “familiar” disposition corrects depend-
ence on flawed “technical” disciplinary practice.
For, of the canons mentioned by Quintilian, consuetudo (custom) 
dominates. That is, the custom of “dei colti e delle personi commune” of 
“parlare commune;” “one must not stray from the most customary,” as 
betraying the “natura loquendi.”49 Valla contrasts its pertinence to inter-
pretation from the impertinence of the language of the “sophists,” who 
create an autonomous, coherent linguistic system that is inappropriate, 
useless, for civil activity. Just so, eggs. Aristotle claimed one is not a num-
ber, but an abstraction, concept, a beginning of number; but, women who 
sell eggs know “one egg” when they see it.50 The women employ words for 
usum (use); the philosophers for lusum (display). Or they, theory-laden, 
are protective of their constructs: “like merchants who refuse daylight on 
their goods.”51
Nauta, historian of philosophy, fine translator of Valla, notes (com-
plains?) Valla has “put Aristotle on a diet.” On the contrary, Camporeale 
argues that Valla’s program attempts to expand Aristotle’s hermeneu-
tic possibilities exponentially: Humanists initiate a wider discussion by 
removing disciplinary obstacles. Consider Valla’s reduction of the tran-
scendentals to one, “res,” “thing.”52 Camporeale claims Valla argues only 
“res” possesses intrinsically that “universal occasion” which constitutes 
transcendence.53 “Universal” should be a judgment assigned by an inquirer 
on a “thinking occasion;” criticism is a task with rigidly defined inquiry 
responsibilities. Valla had warned that “transcendentals” had been deemed 
“kings, emperors:” they arbitrarily rule.54 Valla questions tactics of reifi-
cation, turning adjectives into substantives; and, “being ,” he notes, is 
only a participle. To call “unum, bonum, verum” values, goals, offers only 
nominal goals; abstractions are not substantives, things; you may speak of 
“verità logica,” but not of veritas: adjectives aren’t nouns.55 In sum, Valla’s 
grammar reorients serious inquiry to target life’s dispositions, understand-
ings that Heidegger described in Being and Time as proper philosophical 
task, and that Cusanus located in a domain especially accessible to art and 
its illuminations.
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Valla’s work is de-ontologizing ; he contends the contemporary 
“sophists” and their raising the epistemological stakes by dialectical fiat: by 
speculative, not historical rules. Valla proposes introducing history, that is, 
philology [as simply “reception history”?], into philosophy.56 Valla expands 
the domain of inquiry by eliminating arbitrary disciplinary constraints: 
enlarging investigative competence, thus widening possible responsible 
participation. Camporeale notes that Valla’s rhetoric is not merely formal, 
or legal, or casuistic calling, but that it claims to deal with “all of historical 
reality that can be expressed in human language.”57 Recall that Heidegger 
claimed his was a program of “Destruction,” the elimination of the durable 
terms and arguments of conventional philosophy: you use the terms, you 
buy the arguments: you become entangled in a tissue of begged questions.
“Philosophy Can Be Simulated, Eloquence Not”58
Barbara Cassin uses Quintilian’s aphorism to explain rhetorical unique-
ness: Cassin is a student of Hellenic inquiry; she makes a case for early 
“non-Socratic” philosophy, for the Sophistic inquiry activity, engaged with 
politics; she repeats Heidegger’s claim that early Greek rhetoric functions 
only, always in politics in contrast with Platonic philosophy’s taste for 
transcendence. Cassin argues that for Quintilian’s eloquence, only “effect,” 
(not “style”), is index sui.59 Eloquence is effective, or not; success cannot be 
simulated. Cassin defines not only rhetorical capacity, but philosophical 
incapacity. Valla initiates a wider Humanist discussion; the width is for 
effect, pertinence. And, for Quintilian, philosophical discourse does not 
necessarily deliver a philosopher’s “way of life;” there may be a simulation, 
a disjunction between generating foundational recipes, and practicing a 
moral life. For Valla, eloquential effect simply wins, or not.
But here we have two contestatory modern accounts of Valla’s 
Quintilianesque critique: we have Camporeale’s careful, diffuse account 
of Valla’s criticism, energizing his strenuous inquiry practice, supporting 
civil interventions, interferences, and we have Copenhaver and Nauta’s 
introductory remarks to their edition, translation of Valla’s Dialectical 
Disputations. They point out, justifiably, that Valla does not anticipate, 
lead us to, post-Kantian notions of philosophical discipline, and that Valla 
has an incomplete notion of the contemporaneous philosophical work 
available to him. Their introduction, however, is overwrought.60
They mention Valla’s “titanic self-confidence,” his “odious self-
regard” (vii). They note the “venom, bombast, self-celebration” (viii). 
Valla’s text is a “sketchy medley” (xxiii), or, regrettably, “elaborate, dialogic 
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stagecraft” (xxxv); he is often at work “berating, belittling, or being befud-
dled” (xx); “he displays attitude that sometimes collapses into a posture” (xxxv). 
Copenhaver and Nauta, at times, simply adopt the tone of Poggio Bracciolini’s 
Humanist invective. Also, they complain of investigative dysfunction: 
Valla is an “eclectic pragmatic” (xxxvi), and that what Valla says about God 
and the soul is “quite speculative ... heterodox” (xxii), that he philosophizes 
on a grand scale, idiosyncratically, with great expectations about language 
itself (xxxviii), that he “turns philolog y against philosophy” (xxxvi)— 
they slight as faults what Camporeale regards as sheer gain.61 And, after 
these strictures about his temper, Nauta is, I think, just plain wrong when 
he observes Valla is “careless in his formulations.”62
They do speak of Valla’s grammar as “an archive of common usage 
in speaking and common sense in thinking” (viii). Yet, their “common 
usage” is not a neutral term; recall their horror at appeals to “ordinary 
language” by modern Renaissance scholars of Valla; “ordinary language” 
is, evidently, a heretical sect of current analytic philosophy. Their “com-
mon sense” functions merely as a commonplace, a personal skill. But the 
use has none of the intellectual historical significance of Vichian common 
sense as “the unreflective judgments of an entire class, a people, a nation, 
or race” as disposition, understanding.63 An argument could be made for 
a Humanistic continuity between Valla’s inquiry and Vico’s simply on the 
basis of their parallel notions of this key construct in the history of politi-
cal thinking. And of course their critique lacks the sophistication of the 
revisionist Collingwood’s insistence on theoretical dispositions as possibly 
the source of horrific political miscalculation, malpractice.64 Copenhaver 
sees—in Valla’s work—rhetoric as anti-philosophy;65 Camporeale reads 
Valla’s rhetorical inquiry as anti-disciplinary dysfunction. Recall Valla 
claimed all disciplines—civil and canon law, medicine, philosophy—
know nothing of divine things.66
Patterns of usage disclose dispositions, understandings: basic to 
moments, and to revisions of sensibility to power. Camporeale insists on 
Valla’s criticism as radical liberty performed, as lived, intrusive liberty. He 
underlines Valla’s claim that the treatise on the Donation of Constantine is 
an “oratio, qua nihil magis oratorium scripsi,” “I have written nothing more 
oratorical, eloquent than this;” Valla reenacting a kind of evangelical, keryg-
matic moment—words as acts.67 Freedom of speaking, loquendi libertas, is 
a felt obligation to intrude. Valla proposes and performs an interconnected 
range of genres with topical reverberations; yet he offers serious critique of 
a particular historical—but unhistorical, inaccurate—clerical misuse of the 
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language of secular power. Engaging in invective is not mischief or mischance 
but revisionist care, Sorge; contest is a central, not peripheral skill. Thus 
Camporeale cites Valla: “nisi et dicere audent,” “unless one dares to speak” as 
asserting precisely an investigative imperative.68 And just so, Machiavelli as 
Humanist distinguishes understandings, dispositions persisting in political 
activity.
Camporeale’s account is readable as his re-enactment of Valla’s re-
enactments, a revival of the “attitudinal complex” of radical liberty as evan-
gelical, certainly, but with a powerful sense of one’s own obligations to 
engage with specific contemporary dysfunctions, our unique ad hominem 
contests. Valla’s dialogue De professione religiosorum describes the tempta-
tions of reification, when the monastic-opponent takes the term “religiosi,” 
which denotes disposition, attitude as referring to a strict institutional sta-
tus. Valla’s opposition, ratio/religio, is cleverly translated: “I attack not your 
Order, but your order of thinking.”69 Valla’s dialogue is a critical response 
to uncritical practice: the monastic has made a category mistake.
Then, the biblical critique, Valla’s Collatio Noui Testamenti , 
describes the false usages of the Latin version of the Greek text: thus mak-
ing psychologistic observations, the evangelical representations of the per-
sonal necessity for metanoia, for “thinking again,” into a protocol, a rule 
of penitence, as sacramental ritual.70 Valla would call the Latin translation 
“barbaric.” And, the “churchly” Aristotelians of the Middle Ages, with no 
“proper” knowledge of Greek (or Latin) have denied themselves historical 
accuracy, deprived themselves of insight.71
Of course, Valla’s compendious Elegantiae displays a remarkable 
Quintilianesque sensibility to the range of language’s aesthetic practices, 
effects. Valla’s own aesthetic activity is abstemious, yet he knows and 
exploits the aesthetic intrusion of narrative fables as figurative, explana-
tory. In the De libero arbitrio, a brief dialogue between Valla and Antonio 
Glarea on the topic of free will/determinism, Valla offers a fable, possi-
bly Aesopian, as a brief living narrative, claiming the authority of antiq-
uity, carrying a fierce moral message. Here Sextus Tarquinius, surely 
(emblematically) evil, goes to consult the oracle of Apollo. He hears 
his fate; he will perform monstrous deeds and be punished. Tarquinius 
laments: if his acts are fated, why the punishment? The opposition free 
will/determinism, bogged down in a dysfunctional philosophical/theo-
logical terminolog y, here is restated, questioned by relocating it in an 
imaginative story of lived experience, simplified, accessible. To grasp the 
narrative is to note the lack of doctrinal explanation: the figure argues 
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theoretical inadequacy. Valla’s narrative does not attempt to explain; 
Valla tells Glarea “read [the intransigent] St. Paul.”72
The investigative value of the fable is attested by Leibniz’s response 
in his Théodicée. Leibniz rewrites the fable, expanding the discussion; 
Tarquin appeals to a second oracle, of Jupiter: fails again. But Athena 
allows Jupiter’s priest, Theodorus, a dream that fables “fate” as a “mem-
ory” palace with an infinite number of rooms, each representing a pos-
sibility, an answer that, in effect, argues that the philosopher’s free will/
determinism false dichotomy cannot take in the notion of real historical 
obduracy, of the infinite numbers of possible historical consequences: all 
could be counted as “real,” including, of course, the real, historical effect of 
Tarquin’s crime: the crime had the unintended consequence of mobilizing 
the founding of the Empire of Rome; history is perhaps “the best of all 
possible worlds” since we live in it.73 Leibniz’s claim for the pertinence of 
modality: of necessity, probability and their instantiations, raises Richard 
Sorabji’s issues: does necessitarianism, moral determinism leave space for, 
allow our civil, moral discourse? That is, if we hold determinist theories, 
entailed by our zeal in building exhaustive rationalist systems, “could we 
still feel compunction, remorse, guilt, obligation, indignation, or resent-
ment? Or could we engage in self-criticism, repentance, and forgiveness? 
And finally, could we still be responsible, that is, deserving of praise or 
blame?”74 Valla, in short, starts a wider discussion, the “effect,” the strong 
historical effect of his fable is, we must acknowledge, Leibniz’s elaborate 
fable of modality, and then, as postscript, Sorabji’s historical-philosophical 
response. Fable historicizes theory; doctrine may ignore its place in the 
civil space, delete the activities of praise and blame.
Renaissance and Early Modernity: Defining Humanism
“Ursprünglich” is a term of art in Heidegger’s revisionism; for both revi-
sionisms, modern and Renaissance, inquiry prefers firstness, the factic, 
to the late, theory-laden; both revisions penetrate history, criticism, and 
may serve strong reform initiatives. Arguably, Cusanus’s De visione Dei 
is the most inventive contribution to the discussion of art’s production, 
reception of the incontestably brilliant Renaissance of the visual arts. 
Arguably, Valla’s Adnotationes on the New Testament is the most signifi-
cant treatise—made effective through Erasmus’s 1504 edition, and Luther’s 
use—in the general European moments of Christian Reformation of the 
sixteenth century.
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Rubini claimed the Petrarchan letter as “textual objectification of 
the research moment:”75 Marc Fumaroli has argued the proper generic suc-
cessor to the Petrarchan letter is the early Modernist Montaignian essay: 
“it is a practice conducing to a liberty and a simplicity, properly philosophic, 
[my emphasis] ... it is an adult literature, separated from all productions 
which smell of the oil and the lamp of scholarly exercises.” The essay 
requires informality, not simply the eschewal of disciplinary dialectics, 
but a resort to experiential glosses. The necessary liberty, thus responsibil-
ity of the work gives space to the liberty, the effort of the reader “to think, 
to freely accept or reject ... that is to judge, to criticize.”76 Thus reception as 
task: “meaning is realized at the point of reception”: Charles Martindale’s 
tenet—“philology is compendious reception history” is late Montaigne.77 
The letter assumes exchange; the essay solicits change: it employs pauses, 
interruptions, spaces for reader thinking, response, reception. The dishev-
elment of the text selects, favors, revisionary factors in inquiry practice, 
promotes reform interests: “historical criticism.”
Rubini claims as well that the early Modernist Giambattista Vico 
furnishes the link between Renaissance Humanist and modern Italian 
inquiry.78 Vico announced his “new science” was civil, not moral; he dis-
misses solipsist moralizing, systemic self-concern. Vico also asserted the 
“master-key” of his new science was the discovery that “poetry was first,” 
and “entirety,” all mental activity is investigative duty.79 Rubini’s Vichian 
gloss suggests that we focus on the combination of aesthetic and civil 
interest, on a “primordial” aesthetic sensibility as generating, enhancing 
civil values. His Petrarchan “Posteritism” reads in order to transform the 
Classics for future readers’ possible use. Humanism as frame assumes the 
task of critique as comprehensive civil awareness. Humanism as radical 
possibility, not piety.
“Art Cannot Avoid Creating New Possibilities”80
The early Modernist Leibniz’s fable assumes infinite possibilities of activity, 
and also assumes our freedom, thus our responsibility to judge; for Sorabji’s 
Aristotle, the range of unrealized possibilities is a source of freedom, coun-
tering determinist regret. Then, Hannah Arendt has appealed to Kant, 
and claimed that it is (responsible) judging activity that creates our public 
space.81 Judging, then, is a “civil” act. Humanism as frame can possibly func-
tion to enable inquiry to be strenuously, even meticulously revisionist, and, 
perhaps, to be engaged in generating the possibilities of reform.
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IN HIS WORK ON THE RECEPTION OF MARSILIUS OF PADUA’S DEFENSOR PACIS, Thomas M. Izbicki emphasizes the 
attractiveness of Marsilius’s work in early Reformation circles. Soon after 
the publication of the first printed edition of Defensor pacis in Basel in 
1522, a number of editions printed in Frankfurt and Heidelberg surfaced. 
Izbicki highlights the fact that while Marsilius’s writings proved of inter-
est to intellectuals as well as princes backing the Reformation—whether 
for religious or political purposes, or a combination of both, Luther’s foes 
simultaneously used Marsilius of Padua’s name as a means to attack Luther, 
his supporters, and Reformation ideas more generally.1
This essay aims at following Izbicki’s line of inquiry by exploring the 
earliest known German abridged translation of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis. 
This translation, by M. Marxen Mueller von Westendorff, was initiated 
by Ottheinrich of Neuburg-Pfalz (Palatine) and printed by Hans Kilian 
in Neuburg an der Donau (Danube) in 1545.2 The German abridged ver-
sion appeared ten years after William Marshall’s abridged “translation” of 
Defensor pacis that aimed at supporting Henry VIII’s claim of supremacy 
over the Roman papacy as well as the king’s supremacy in all temporal 
affairs.3 Yet, despite the fact that both Henry VIII and Ottheinrich speak 
to a Reformation context, their goals and specific contexts cannot be more 
different. Henry VIII could use his power to gain independence from the 
Roman papacy and the Roman church’s influence; Ottheinrich’s power 
and influence as a regional count was, to say the least, limited. The latter is 
not simply a result of the fact that Ottheinrich was a regional prince, but 
also because he had failed to obtain the rank of Palatine Elector for years. 
In the Bavarian succession treaty, settling the Landshut War of Succession, 
Ottheinrich was granted the claim to the title of Palatine Elector. Yet, 
because of his support for the Reformation cause, he did not receive the 
title until February 1556, shortly before his death.4 Thus, the context(s) 
in which one has to place the Fridschirmbuch concerns regional early 
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Reformation history as well as the history of the Holy Roman Empire 
under Emperor Karl V. Because Mueller von Westendorff ’s abridged 
translation is often mentioned but seldom studied, the present chapter’s 
main interest lies in a (partial) comparison of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis 
and the Fridschirmbuch. Before exploring the Fridschirmbuch itself, how-
ever, it is necessary to contextualize Mueller von Westendorff ’s rendering 
of Defensor pacis.
The Fridschirmbuch in Context—Neuburg-Pfalz and  
the Holy Roman Empire
In his dedication to Ottheinrich (“Dem Durchleuchtigen Hochgebornen 
Fuerſten und herrn / Herrn Otthainrichen / Pfalgrauen bey Rein”), M. 
Marx Mueller von Westendorff narrates that the Count Palatine had sent 
him Marsilius’s Defensor pacis in three volumes, requesting that he renders 
the work in vnnſer hochteutſche ſprach—“in our high-German language.” 
Contrary to Ottheinrich’s apparent demand to translate the entirety of 
Defensor pacis into German, Mueller von Westendorff apologized ironi-
cally for his partial disobedience. Instead of translating the whole of 
Defensor pacis, Mueller von Westendorff suggests that he only supplied in 
German the sections he considered essential under the circumstances. As 
for his—again ironic—justification, he asserts that because of the work’s 
length, a translation of the whole work would only bring disappointment 
and displeasure to the Christian reader.5 At least to some degree, Marsilius 
scholars can certainly sympathize with Mueller von Westendorff ’s frus-
tration. Yet, whether to accept Mueller von Westendorff ’s claim that he 
otherwise remained true to the text needs to be verified.6
Before examining the texts, it is necessary to explore the context fur-
ther: Who is the translator? What is his relationship with Ottheinrich? 
What is Ottheinrich’s role in the Reformation disputes? And how does 
Marsilius’s Defensor pacis fit into the story? As far as the first question 
is concerned, we have only very little biographical information about 
Mueller von Westendorff. He seems to be identical with Markus Millenus, 
who served as town clerk in Neuburg; he is also credited with the author-
ship of a Latin epitaph for Elector Palatine Ludwig V.7 At the time the 
Fridschirmbuch appeared in print, we find him as syndic at Augsburg.8 
Because Mueller von Westendorff was once in Ottheinrich’s service and 
Ottheinrich personally commissioned the translation, we can assume some 
measure of loyalty to the count palatine’s cause. However, the fact that the 
selection of the sections was done at the translator’s discretion, contrary to 
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Ottheinrich’s initial request, demands some caution. One may be tempted 
to read some of Ottheinrich’s political program into the translated sections 
of Defensor pacis.
While caution is necessary when attempting to draw conclu-
sions from the particular content of the Fridschirmbuch, the interest in 
Defensor pacis nonetheless falls into Ottheinrich’s greater political and 
ecclesio-political program. Two years after Ottheinrich introduced the 
Reformation (1542) into Neuburg-Pfalz, the Kilian printing house was 
founded. Since 1537, the printer Hans Kilian served as Ottheinrich’s 
Rentschreiber (“bursary officer,” Latinized, principalis questurae scriba), 
responsible for the administration of Ottheinrich’s finances. Because 
of Ottheinrich’s notorious shortage of funds, however, it is fair to sug-
gest that Hans Kilian rather administered his significant debts.9 In the 
case of Ottheinrich and his printer Hans Kilian, it is hard to overrate 
the significance of the printing house for and in the context of the 
Reformation. Despite, or maybe because of, Ottheinrich’s notorious 
financial problems, his library, the Bibliotheca Palatina, was considered 
the most significant Reformation literature library in the entire Holy 
Roman Empire until 1622, the year in which Heidelberg was conquered 
by the Catholic League.10
More important than the quality of the library was its political 
relevance for the Reformation cause. The success of the Reformation 
depended heavily on the development of printing technolog y. In the 
Schmalkalden War of 1546—resulting in a sudden military defeat of 
the Lutheran princes—Emperor Karl personally and explicitly ordered 
the Kilian printing house to be destroyed. As Horst Stierkopf notes, 
Karl’s order has to be seen in the context of the emperor’s knowledge 
of an “engaged” and ambitious printing house in the service of the 
Reformation.11 Moreover, Helga Unger emphasizes the relevance of 
the library and the printing house for Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political 
goals. Unger underscores the significance of Ottheinrich’s overt strategy 
of returning to medieval works that could be utilized for Reformation 
causes. For Ottheinrich, Mueller von Westendorff ’s partial transla-
tion of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis served as an exemplar.12 In this sense, 
Ottheinrich and his printer Kilian followed a more general pattern 
observable throughout the Reformation age, namely, the identification of 
useful medieval texts, particularly by early modern scholars and intellec-
tuals leaning towards humanist and Reformation ideas.13 Moreover, Karl’s 
order highlights the relevance of books and the ability to print them for 
or against particular political causes. Yet, the significance Karl attaches to 
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the printing house also hints at Ottheinrich’s role in the conflict between 
the Schmalkalden League, the Protestant estates (Reichsstände) more 
generally, and the emperor. Thus, Ottheinrich’s role in the Holy Roman 
Empire and in the Reformation needs to be considered.
While earlier studies suggest that Ottheinrich’s interest in the Holy 
Roman Empire and its politics is only recognizable after he was eventu-
ally granted the rank of Elector Palatine, from 1556 until his death three 
years later, Axel Gotthard vehemently objects to this view. Although the 
young Ottheinrich is more concerned with the social aspect of political 
gatherings (one finds him in the dancehall, not in the meeting room), 
this attitude changes in the late 1530s. By the end of 1539, Ottheinrich 
campaigns for a confessional alliance that propagates “teutsche libertät” 
(German liberty) by suggesting that Karl would soon bring Spanish troops 
into the German lands to initiate a war against such liberty in which reli-
gion would be only used as an excuse. By the end of the 1530s, Ottheinrich 
makes a first attempt to join the Schmalkalden League.14 Because of his 
disastrous financial situation, his first formal request to join the League 
was rejected; the defeat of the League made a later attempt in 1546 impos-
sible. Ottheinrich’s diplomats were still on their way to deliver the request 
when the Schmalkalden League was defeated. In his second application, 
Ottheinrich once again argues for the need to join the Protestant league 
officially. Ottheinrich explicitly refers to Karl’s constitutional rhetoric 
that, in Ottheinrich’s eyes, only serves as a rationalization for what he 
deems essentially a religious war.15 Ottheinrich’s judgment is not without 
merit. Karl did not justify warfare against the Schmalkalden League with 
religious disagreements, but rather as a means to maintain the peace of 
the empire. A similar argument was proposed when Karl rejected the free 
cities’ request to move to the Lutheran creed, although the cities as well 
as the German principalities pledged allegiance to him for all but the reli-
gious issue. This brings the question of confessional diversity to the fore-
front of the conflict.16
Even though Ottheinrich was not a formal member of the 
Schmalkalden League, he was a respected supporter of the Reformation and 
the Protestant cause. Frequently, one finds him in the role of a moderator 
between the confessionally neutral and the Protestant estates. Simultaneously, 
after he became actively engaged in the Reformation and the Protestants’ 
conflict with the Catholic League and Emperor Karl, Gotthard identifies an 
increasing militancy in Ottheinrich’s attitude, not just in terms of content, 
but also in terms of his methods: confrontation instead of compromise. 
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Thus, in the 1540s and 1550s, one finds Ottheinrich as a constant promoter 
of the Lutheran estates’ unifying strategy and politics.17
Although partly motivated by propaganda, Ottheinrich’s conversion 
to the Lutheran creed was attributed to his desperate financial situation, 
and thus viewed as primarily motivated by economic reasons. Switching 
to the Lutheran rite meant instant access to the territory’s church prop-
erty. Yet, early on, the accusation of conversion for financial reasons was 
disputed.18 With his conversion to the Lutheran creed, Ottheinrich lost a 
credit of 100 000 fl. At the time he failed to secure this significant credit, 
Ottheinrich’s total debt amounted to about one million fl. Thus, the rea-
son for Ottheinrich’s conversion seems unlikely to have been economic. 
Although church property was inventoried in 1543, none of the monaster-
ies in his territory were secularized. Although the inhabitants of the mon-
asteries were encouraged to accept the new church order, forced conver-
sions did not take place.19 Yet, although it is a widely shared assumption 
that the Lutheran confession afforded a welcome ideology for territorial 
state building purposes,20 it is apparent that Ottheinrich was not too inter-
ested in the political or worldly implications of that theology—at least 
not as far as his subjects were concerned. As early as 1544, two years after 
Ottheinrich introduced the Reformation into Neuburg-Palatine, he del-
egated the entire political administration of the territory to the provincial 
diets (Landstände). Through this move, he could burden the provincial 
diets with his enormous debts. Despite the economic benefits, Gotthard, 
however, reads the delegation of administrative power to the Landstände 
as an indication that Ottheinrich was more concerned about the well-
being of his subjects’ souls than in their worldly welfare.21
Defensor Pacis Versus Fridschirmbuch
As indicated earlier, drawing direct conclusions from the translator’s selec-
tion of passages in support of Ottheinrich’s political and ecclesio-political 
program is not unproblematic. It is worth stressing, however, that Mueller 
von Westendorff did not translate a single section of Dictio I in which 
Marsilius outlined his secular political principles, which defend popular 
consent to government and the rule of law. Of the entire Defensor pacis, 
which runs in Richard Scholz’s modern critical edition to 613 pages,22 
Mueller von Westendorff translated only a fraction. Fridschirmbuch con-
sists of a one folio dedication, ten folios of Vorrede, and the abridged 
translation of seventy folios; only the latter are directly concerned with 
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Defensor pacis’s content. Thus, the Fridschirmbuch amounts to a little less 
than one quarter of Marsilius’s original treatise.
With Dictio I of Defensor pacis completely missing, Fridschirmbuch 
consists of eighteen chapters referring to sections of Defensor pacis’s 
Dictio II23 and a chapter entitled schlußreden that contains selected sec-
tions from the second chapter of Dictio III.24 While a thorough textual 
comparison of the two texts would require at least a book-length study, a 
brief juxtaposition of the sections taken from Dictio III (see Appendix 1) 
affords a good impression of the topics that were absent in Mueller von 
Westendorff ’s translation. (For the reader’s convenience, the sixteenth-
century German and the Latin texts are matched with Gewirth’s English 
translation.25) Indeed, the omissions from the German version are more 
telling than what is actually in the translation. For instance, Mueller von 
Westendorff excises all sections that refer to the general council of believ-
ers that is at the heart of the ecclesiolog y of Defensor pacis. Similarly, 
references to the human as well as the faithful legislator, implying that 
some power belongs to the citizens and ordinary believers, disappeared. 
Exceptions are clauses that grant the bishops the power, if sanctioned by 
the faithful human legislator, to excommunicate the pope. Otherwise, the 
human or faithful legislator only appears in contexts in which the citizens’ 
political role (and rights) can be ignored or read without attaching to it a 
more inclusive meaning of “legislator.” Whether referring to the “human” 
or the “faithful” legislator, Ottheinrich’s sixteenth-century context makes 
it evident that the legislator equals the ruler.
Before his actual translation of Defensor pacis ,  Mueller von 
Westendorff introduces it with a Vorrede in which he introduces the reader 
to the evils of his times. He draws the picture of an utterly corrupt state in 
which the poor are deprived of all (worldly) justice; fraud, perjury, high-
way robbery, and war even bring the formerly well-off into the almshouse 
(Spital). Mueller von Westendorff points to the neglect of God’s word and 
divine truth that has been caused by the papists, whom he portrays as fol-
lowers of the Pharisees instead of the Apostles, as the source of all evil and 
the reason for the state’s corruption. The words of pro-papal theologians 
have become undecipherable by the apostles because they have turned 
divine truth into the opposite.26 “Wherever you turn your head, you face 
vicious, hideous, dreadful, and miserable things. It is war against the old; 
the peasant against the noble man. All things [are] split, broken, scattered, 
bringing you down to the floor. And it is to be feared that other more oner-
ous and gruesome plagues will follow.”27 For Mueller von Westendorff, 
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the origin of this misery is papal insolence. He notes that the papacy has 
“highjacked” the power of the Roman emperor and the power of kings in 
the Holy Roman Empire. The popes, who have taken both swords, neglect 
the word of Paul and see themselves above the concilia and even the gos-
pel.28 Yet, Mueller von Westendorff remains confident that divine punish-
ment eventually will strike the papiſtiſchen Pfaffen (papal/Catholic priests) 
down.29 In a sense, Mueller von Westendorff ’s narrative captures, although 
with emphasis on the ecclesiastical realm by ignoring the political, the 
spirit (and the polemics) of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis remarkably well.30 
Indeed, the reader might even remain under the impression that noth-
ing has changed in more than 200 years. Marsilius’s discontent with the 
papacy in the first half of the fourteenth century reads remarkably similarly 
to Mueller von Westendorff ’s narrative of the ecclesio-political situation 
of the early sixteenth century. An innocent reader might even conclude 
that the pope and emperor are still in an ongoing struggle over supremacy, 
while in reality Karl V sided forcefully with the papacy and remained an 
uncompromising defender of the old order and its religious outlook. The 
German principalities’ claim for religious freedom—understood as the 
privileged right of the empire’s estates that does not extend to ordinary 
believers and the German principalities’ subjects—clashed with Karl’s tra-
ditional perception of the Roman church as the only religious authority 
and of the emperor as her protection and shield.31
Yet, demonizing the Roman papacy assists Mueller von Westendorff 
in his attempt to remain relatively true to the text of Defensor pacis. To 
achieve this goal, however, Mueller von Westendorff has to eliminate 
some ambiguities and ambivalence in Marsilius’s work. As is well known, 
Marsilius often has the whole citizenry in mind when discussing the leg-
islators, while on other occasions he refers to an aristocratic elite, namely, 
the Seven Electors.32 Yet, Mueller von Westendorff does not completely 
eliminate Defensor pacis’s vagueness. Citing Aristotle, he maintains that 
ecclesia means the assembly of a people as yederman, everyman.33 Although 
he keeps Marsilius’s wording, the meaning changes nonetheless. For the 
German princes, yederman had come to designate whoever had a seat 
and a vote in the Imperial Diet.34 Thus, even if traces of Marsilius’s more 
inclusive conception of the citizenry and the human or faithful legisla-
tor remain in the translation, what they denote has shifted in such a way 
that, for the sixteenth-century reader, only the princes and representatives 
at the Imperial Diet could be designated by this terminolog y. For the 
very same reason, Marsilius’s detailed discussion of the general council, 
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particularly the more democratic-sounding sections in which he elabo-
rates on the determination of lay representatives, could be or had to be 
omitted.35 From a sixteenth-century Reformation perspective, the power 
to determine church issues eventually rests with the princes. From the 
perspective of the Holy Roman Empire, the princes and cities are rep-
resented at the Imperial Diets, constituting a version of a Marsilian 
legislator. If one considers the Imperial Diets under Karl V, it was the 
Reformation or religious issues more generally that caused most of the 
tensions and disputes. Eventually, as Henry Cohn notes, “When religious 
matters were discussed the more hard-line Protestant and Catholic estates 
met in separate blocs, with moderate or ‘neutral’ princes of both faiths 
sometimes mediated between them, instead of effective negotiations over 
the religious disputes taking place in the colleges.”36 In 1543, by the time 
Ottheinrich requested his German translation of Marsilius’s Defensor 
pacis, the religious parties had stopped meeting together entirely and 
had begun assembling only separately. Yet, despite the difficulties embed-
ded in the negotiations, the Imperial Diets were not without results. By 
1544, at the Imperial Diet in Speyer, an agreement had been reached that 
granted the Reformation princes the right, recognized by imperial law, 
to seize church property. Thus, ecclesiastical revenues turned into a state 
issue. The corresponding canon law that prevented the seizure of church 
property was annulled.37
While one can, with good reason, assume that Ottheinrich’s inter-
est in allowing his subjects an active say in religious matters was lim-
ited or nonexistent, Mueller von Westendorff had an additional reason 
for omitting most of Marsilius’s sections on the general council: In the 
Imperial Diets, one finds an institution in place that arrogates some of 
the responsibilities Marsilius directed to the general council. Moreover, a 
Lutheran prince like Ottheinrich claimed the right to determine theologi-
cal disputes, a key purpose of Marsilius’s general council, in his territory 
at his own discretion. A general council would only jeopardize his freshly 
claimed authority over such matters.
Despite reasonable epistemological concerns about the direct 
applicability of the translated excerpts to Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political 
interests, it is striking, although not especially surprising, how well the 
translated sections and chapters suit the Count Palatine’s agenda. At 
first, it was mandatory to reject all papal and lower-ranked officials 
(bishops, priests) of the Roman church’s interference in coercive judg-
ment or jurisdiction over princes, colleges, communities, lay persons 
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and priests.38 Christ did not claim temporal power; thus, temporal 
power cannot belong to any pope, bishop, or priest.39 This chapter is 
followed by a narrative that provides further proof from Scripture, 
repeating the claim that no one has to follow either papal commands 
or decrees.40 Most of the remaining chapters deal with the question of 
how the Roman bishop claimed plenitude potestatis, how he secured 
his power over lay persons and temporal authority,41 particularly over 
the Roman emperor,42 and why the papal claims are invalid and have 
to be rejected.43 While these chapters are important in the sense that 
they demonstrate how the Roman papacy has usurped powers that 
rightfully belong to the worldly authorities, the chapters in between 
are of more practical concern. They discuss the authority of priests 
and the question to whom the power to appoint and, if necessary, to 
depose priests belongs. In these chapters, one also finds sections from 
Marsilius’s discussion of church property. Here, again, Mueller von 
Westendorff remains relatively true to Marsilius’s texts, while omitting 
some sections and abbreviating others. Following the authority Christ 
bestowed upon the Apostles, Mueller describes them first and foremost 
as ministers of the sacraments. He emphasizes primarily the sacrament 
of penance, including the power of loosing or binding the human soul 
of mortal and less grave sins.44
The ability to perform the priestly office is, as with all offices, 
dependent on the habitus animae. Mueller von Westendorff renders the 
habit of the soul into the phrase the “soul’s subtlety.” The second cause 
is necessity. The logic applied here is the same that has to be applied to 
all other parts of the state; it has to follow the same rules.45 With the 
claim that priests follow the same rules and perform the same duties as 
other offices in the political realm, the first step, stated by Marsilius and 
endorsed by Mueller von Westendorff, to subjugate the priestly office to 
the political realm has been achieved. While Marsilius and Mueller von 
Westendorff emphasize the priestly office’s equality in its power to bind 
and loose, such theological equality does not eliminate order of ranks 
among them. Through Christ’s appointment, all priests are equal in power; 
through a second human appointment, hierarchy among them can be 
established.46 Because the hierarchy is human, questions over the second 
appointment (after Christ’s initial appointment of the Apostles) of priests 
and bishops emerged. The conditions for the appointment of priests have 
changed throughout history. The first appointment through Christ does 
not exist any longer. Thus, the responsibility of appointing priests rests 
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either in the community of the faithful or in the human legislator.47 Yet, 
and not unsurprisingly, although Mueller von Westendorff does not trans-
late the selected chapters completely, he follows Marsilius concerning the 
dangers of appointing the wrong person to the priestly office. If a priest 
turns out to be ain boͤſer Bueb / oder ain ungelerter Eſel (an evil knave or an 
illiterate blockhead), he might lead the believers into eternal damnation.48 
Marsilius emphasizes both the negative consequences for the believer in 
the world to come but also—and perhaps more importantly—the conse-
quences for the status of a citizen and the potential harm to the political 
sphere more generally. The second issue, although not completely omitted 
in Mueller von Westendorff, is Marsilius’s tipping point for finally locating 
the authority to appoint and depose priests with the human legislator or 
the ruler. Here, Marsilius follows his logic that whatever may cause harm 
to the civitas must be under the authority of the civitas.49 Even though 
Mueller von Westendorff also speaks of nit ain klainer burgerlicher nach-
tail (not a small civic disadvantage),50 his wording emphasizes the impor-
tance of the eternal over temporal consequences. Nonetheless, he follows 
Marsilius in eventually allocating the authority to appoint and depose 
priests in the temporal authority. To use his wording, to avoid harm, the 
priest should durch die Obrigkait aufgenommen / oder verworffen werden.51 
Because for Muller von Westendorff the human legislator and the ruler are 
identical, Obrigkait refers to the ruler, excluding other worldly authorities 
like the human legislator as an assembly of all citizens, not ruled out in 
Defensor pacis.
The shifting in wording and meaning is also relevant in the discus-
sion of the auftailung der geiſtlichen pfruͤnden (distribution of ecclesiasti-
cal benefices).52 The relevance of this issue is also highlighted by the fact 
that it reappears among the very few clauses Mueller von Westendorff 
selected from Dictio III for translation.53 As indicated above, the issue 
about the authority over church property was among the hotly debated 
topics at the Imperial Diets, though the Reformation princes eventually 
prevailed.
Given the significance of the topic in contemporary debate, then, 
it makes sense that Mueller von Westendorff includes a significant part 
of Marsilius’s discourse on ecclesiastical property. By divine law, the com-
munity of the faithful is required to provide the ecclesiastic ministers with 
food and clothing, with which they ought to be content.54 The surplus may 
be used to collect taxes “for the defense of the fatherland, the redemption 
of prisoners, or to avert public grievances as deemed appropriate by the 
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faithful and allegiant ruler.”55 Mueller von Westendorff, however, omits 
that Marsilius explicitly speaks of the redemption of subjects taken captive 
in defense and in service of the faith. Thus, Mueller is less restrictive in the 
use of ecclesiastical funds than Defensor pacis.
Mueller von Westendorff undertakes another adjustment to the 
text of Defensor pacis that is of greater significance. In Defensor pacis, 
Marsilius refers to the examples of the Catholic kings of France to demon-
strate that the authority to appoint bishops and priests rests in temporal 
and not in ecclesiastical authority. Yet, Mueller von Westendorff replaces 
the Catholic kings of France with the Roman Emperor in order to argue 
that the appointment of priests as well as the determination of the use of 
benefices and other temporal goods remains in the domain of temporal 
authorities.56 Through this move, he adjusts Marsilius’s position regarding 
a contested issue about the legal reality of the Reich, oscillating the author-
ity between the Holy Roman Empire, the Imperial Diets, and the princes’ 
territorial power.
Conclusion: Marsilius of Padua Versus  
Mueller Von Westendorff
Mueller von Westendorff ’s main technique in adapting Defensor pacis 
to the needs and the context of a Lutheran prince is omission. While 
one can observe occasional changes in wording, the shift in meaning of 
political terms works in favor of relative fidelity to the text, while allow-
ing for a significant transformation of meaning. Thus, even though 
Mueller von Westendorff remains relatively true to the letter of Defensor 
pacis, it does not mean he remains true to the spirit of Marsilius’s work. 
Because the context of the Holy Roman Empire remains basically the 
same, some of the pressing issues that are central in Marsilius’s work 
still remain intact. While Mueller von Westendorff ’s translation can 
be clearly seen as “remittance work,” his refusal to make the whole of 
Defensor pacis speak German nonetheless remains puzzling. Was he 
anticipating that Ottheinrich may not have appreciated Marsilius’s ideas 
of civil liberties? Or did he omit them because they were simply irrel-
evant for the contemporary concerns? We cannot answer these questions 
conclusively. Yet, it is obvious that he focused precisely on the section 
from Defensor pacis that suited not just pressing questions of his time but 
also Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political interests extremely well, particularly 
because Ottheinrich seemed to be primarily interested in the well-being 
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of his own and his subjects’ souls, and evidently not as interested in the 
purely earthly dimension.
Compared with Marsilius’s original fourteenth-century work, 
its sixteenth-century vernacular version reads rather like an intellec-
tual regression than a progression. Yet, submitting all religious issues to 
worldly authority marks a significant step towards “modern” seculariza-
tion. As Olivier Roy notes, “[a]s quietist Iranian religious figures under-
stood when they asked for a separation of state and clergy: the absence 
of a distinction between state and religion secularizes religion more than 
it makes politics religious.”57 In this sense, Marsilius’s move to subjugate 
religious institutions and the interpretation of doctrine under the politi-
cal realm can be read as a first step towards the secularization of religion. 
The Lutheran princes continued in this very direction by attempting to 
subordinate the religious sphere completely under their authority, thus 
furthering the secularization of religion, albeit by jeopardizing civic 
liberties—at least for the moment— as prominently foreshadowed in 
Defensor pacis.
Appendix 1
LXIXv – LXXr : Nun volgen hernach etlich ſchlußreden / inn disem Auszug begriffen
LXIXv
CONCLUSIO 
I. Zu der 
Seelenseligkait 
ist von noͤtten / 
allain zuglauben / 
was die Goettliche 
Schrifft ſagt / 
und was derſelben 
gleichförmig und 
gemaͤß iſt. 
Defensor pacis, 3.2.1: Solam 
divinam seu canonicam 




cummuni consilio fidelium 
factam veram esse, ad 
eternam beatitudinem 
consequendam necesse 
credere, si alicui debite 
proponatur. Huius siquidem 
certitudo est et sumi potest 
19° secunde, ex 2a in 5am.
1. For the attainment 
of eternal beatitude it is 
necessary to believe in the 
truth of only the divine 
or canonic Scripture, 
together with its necessary 
consequences and the 
interpretations of it made  
by the common council  
of the believers, if these  
have been duly  
propounded to the person 
concerned. The certainty 
of this is set forth in, and 
can be obtained from, 
Discourse II, Chapter XIX, 
parapgraphs 2 to 5.
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II. Die Decretales 
oder Decreta der 
Roͤmiſch oder 
anderer Biſchoͤff / 
die on bewilligung 
des menschlichen 
Geſatzgebers 
geordnet ſind / 
moͤgen bey ainer 
zeitlichen ſtraff 
niemants binden.
Defensor pacis, 3.2.7: 
Decretales vel decreta 
Romanorum aut aliorum 
quorumlibet pontificum 
communiter aut divisim 
absque concessione legislatoris 
humani *vel generalis concilii* 
constituta, neminem obligare 
pena vel supplicio temporali 
*nec spirituali*: [12° prime, et 
28° secunde, 29a.]
7. The decretals or decrees 
of the Roman or any 
other pontiffs, collectively 
or distributively, made 
without the grant of the 
human legislator, bind no 
one to temporal pain or 
punishment: Discourse I, 
Chapter XII; Discourse II, 
Chapter XXVIII,  
paragraph 29
LXXr
III. Kain Biſchoff 
oder Prieſter 
/ in quantum 
huiusmodi, hat uber 
kain gaiſtlichen 
oder weltlichen 
/ ob Er ſchon ain 
Ketzer wer /gar 
kain gewalt.
Defensor pacis, 3.2.14: 
Principatum seu 
iurisdiccione coactivam 
supra quemquem clericum 
aut laicum, eciam si 
hereticus extet, episcopum 
vel sacerdotem inquantum 
huismodi nullam hebere: [15 
prime, ex 2a in 4am, 4°, 5° et 9° 
secunde ac 10°, 7a.]
14. A bishop or priest, as 
such, has no rulership or 
coercive jurisdiction over 
any clergyman or layman, 
even if the latter is a heretic: 
Discourse I, Chapter XV, 
paragraphs 2 to 4; Discourse 
II, Chapters IV, V, IX, and 
X, paragraph 7.
IIII. Es gezimbt 
kainen Biſchoff 
oder Prieſter / oder 
derſelben Collegio 
/ on ain gewalt 
des glaubigen 
Geſetzgebers / 
yemant in Bann 
zethun / oder die 
Goͤttlichen aͤmpter 
zuverbieten.
Defensor pacis, 3.2.16: 
Excommunicare quemquam 
absque fidelis legislatoris 
auctoritate ulli episcopo 
wel presbytero aut ipsorum 
collegio non licere: [6° 
secunde, ex 11a in 14am, et 
21° secunde, 9a.]
16. No bishop or priest or 
group of them is allowed 
to excommunicate anyone 
without authorization by the 
faithful legislator: Discourse 
II, Chapter VI, paragraphs 
11 to 14; Chapter XXI, 
paragraph 9
V. All Biſchoff 
haben onmittl 
durch Christum 
/ ainen gleiche 
gewalt: Es mag 
auch durch das
Defensor pacis, 3.2.17: 
Omnes episcopos equalis 
auctoritatis esse immeddiate 
per Christum, neque 
secundum legem divinam 
convinci posse,
17. All bishops are of equal 
authority immediately 
through Christ, nor can it 
be proved by divine law that 
there is any superiority or 
subjection among them
(continued)
128  BETTINA KOCH 
Goͤttlich Geſatz 
nit erwiſen werden 
/ das Sy weder 
inn gaiſtlichen 
noch weltlichen 
sachen /uber oder 
untereinander ſein 
ſoͤllen.
in spiritualibus aut 
temporalibus preesse invicem 
vel subesse: [15° et 16° 
secunde.]
in spiritual or in temporal 
affairs: Discourse II, 
Chapters XV and XVI.
VI. Durch den 
Goͤttlichen 





/ moͤgen die 
andern Biſchoff 
ſamptlich und 
ſonderlich / den 
Babſt ſelbs in 
Bann thun / und 
iren gewalt wider 
in gebrauchen.
Defensor pacis, 3.2.18: 
Auctoritas divina, legislatoris 
humani fidelis interveniente 
consensu seu concessione, sic 
alios episcopos communiter 
aut divisim excommunicare 
posse Romanum 
episcopum et in ipsum 
auctoritatem aliam exercere, 
quemadmodum e converso: 
[6° secunde, ex 11a in 14am, et 
15° et 16° secunde.]
18. By divine authority, 
accompanied by the consent 
or concession of the faithful 
human legislator, the 
other bishops, collectively 
or distributively, can 
excommunicate the Roman 
bishop and exercise other 
authority over him, just as 
conversely: Discourse II, 
Chapter VI, paragraph 11 to 
14; Chapters XV and XVI.
VII. Der 
Geſatzgeber mag 
ſich der gaiſtlichen 
guͤeter / nachdem 
Er den Prieſtern / 
kirchendienern / 
und den armen / 
ir notdurfft davon 
geraicht / nach 
dem Goͤttlichen 
Geſatz / zu dem 
gemainen nutz 
wol gebrauchen. 
Defensor pacis, 3.2.27: 
Ecclesiastics temporalibus, 
expleta sacerdotum 
et aliorum evangelii 
ministrorum, et hiis que 
cultum divinum pertinent, 
ac impotentum pauperum 
necessitate, licite utilitatibus 
aut defensionibus uti posse 
legislatorem simpliciter et in 
parte: [15° prime, 10a, at 17° 
secunde, 16a, et 21° secunde, 
14a.]
27. Ecclesiastic temporal 
goods which remain over 
and above the needs of 
priests and other gospel 
ministers and of the helpless 
poor, and which are needed 
for divine worship, can 
lawfully, in accordance with 
divine law, be used in whole 
or in part by the legislator 
for the common or public 
welfare or defense: Discourse 
I Chapter XV, paragraph 10; 
Discourse II, Chapter XVII, 
paragraph 16; Chapter XXI, 
paragraph 14.
(continued)
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Es moͤchten 






/ Wir wellen aber 
andenen erſettigt 




Defensor pacis, 3.2.42: 
Possent autem alie 
quamplures et utiles 
conclusiones ex prioribus 
diccionibus per necessitatem 
inferri quas tamen 
deduximus, contenti, sumus, 
quoniam ad predictam 
pestem cum ipsius causa 
succidendam facilem 
atque sufficiente prebent 
ingressum, et propter 
abbreviacionem semonis.
42. We might infer many 
other useful conclusions 
which necessarily follow 
from the first two discourses; 
but let us be content with 
those deduced above, because 
they afford a ready and 
sufficient entering wedged 
for cutting away the afire-
mentioned pestilence and its 
cause, and also for the sake of 
brevity. 
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NICHOLAS OF CUSA (1401–1464) WAS A LEADING CHURCHMAN, philosopher, and theologian of the fifteenth cen-
tury. The son of a boat owner and ferryman in Kues—today Bernkastel-
Kues—on the Mosel River, he studied canon law at Padua and began a 
long and often controversial career. Milestones along the way included 
the Council of Basel, where his De concordantia catholica (1433–1434) 
defended the Conciliar Movement; a dramatic switch to the papal cause, 
and travel to Constantinople to accompany Byzantine representatives to 
the Council of Ferrara/Florence; successful work in Germany on behalf 
of Pope Eugenius IV against Basel’s anti-pope, Felix V; appointment as 
Cardinal, and the legation tour through German-speaking lands (1451–
1452); six tumultuous years as resident bishop of Brixen/Bressanone 
(1452–1458); and service in the Curia during his last years in Rome.1 In 
the midst of this busy career, Nicholas wrote a series of speculative works, 
beginning with De docta ignorantia (1440) and ending with De apice 
theoriae (1464). These works reveal a restless, inquiring mind as Cusanus 
rethinks issues of human knowing, cosmology, mathematics, perspective, 
and religious tolerance. His core theme of “learned ignorance”—knowing 
that we cannot know God—required a “conjectural” view of thinking as 
always approaching truth without ever grasping it precisely. Consistent 
with this view, Nicholas recognized the limits of his own inquiries, and 
continually sought newer, more precise ways to speak of God. Hence, as 
F. Edward Cranz and Kurt Flasch have shown, we can follow the develop-
ment of Nicholas’s thought by attending to shifts in his vocabulary and 
arguments, and to what his writings and library tell us about his reading.2 
While this developmental approach is hardly novel for intellectual histo-
rians, more unusual is the material Cusanus gives us by self-consciously 
highlighting his own evolving views and insights. This process becomes 
especially clear in his intellectual autobiography, De venatione sapientiae 
(The Hunt of Wisdom), and suggests his place at the edge of modernity.
Cusanus’s Philosophical Testament
De venatione sapientiae  
(The Hunt of Wisdom) (1462)
Donald F. Duclow
138  DONALD F. DUCLOW 
In his last years, Nicholas’s vision and health were failing. As 
Erich Meuthen notes, he nearly died in June 1461, and gout pained him 
for last three years of his life.3 So it is not surprising that he worked to 
build his legacy. With his family’s foundation—St. Nicholas Hospital in 
Kues4—nearly complete, he commissioned and corrected manuscripts of 
his works, which reside in his library at the Hospital and in the Vatican 
Library.5 Similar concerns for his reputation led him to write De venatione 
sapientiae late in the year 1462. In the Prologue he tells us,
My purpose here is to leave for posterity a summary record of my 
hunts for wisdom—which up until this present state of old age I 
have considered, on the basis of mental insight, to be quite true. For 
I do not know if perhaps a longer and better time for reflecting will 
be granted to me, since I have now passed my sixty-first year.6
Two related images would guide his efforts: wisdom as sapida scientia, the 
tasty knowledge that feeds the intellect, and philosophy as the venatio 
(hunt) for this food.7 Nicholas develops these venerable tropes in unusual 
detail throughout the book, as he maps out wisdom’s three “regions” —
eternity, the perpetual, and time—and revisits ten “fields” where he has 
hunted for it: learned ignorance, Possest or actualized possibility, non-aliud 
or not-other, light, praise, unitas (unity), equality, connexio (connection 
or union), terminatio (delimitation), and order.8 Of these fields, the first 
three refer to specific works, while the others are themes that have guided 
Cusanus’s inquiries—for example, his favorite Trinitarian scheme of unity, 
equality and connection.
Yet this review is shaped by two complicating factors. First, Nicholas 
tells us that it has been prompted by his reading of Diogenes Laertius’s 
Lives of the Philosophers.9 He had also read two recent translations that he 
had commissioned: Pietro Balbi’s translation of Proclus’s Theology of Plato, 
and George of Trapezunt’s of Plato’s Parmenides. Recalling the ancient 
philosophers’ hunts for wisdom, he recounts his own modest catches and 
insights, “in order that more acute thinkers may be motivated to deepen 
their minds further.”10 The second factor is that De venatione sapientiae 
does not simply review Cusanus’s earlier writings and themes, but reframes 
them in light of a new principle: “quod impossibile fieri non fit ”—“what 
is impossible to be made is not made” or “what is impossible to become 
does not become.”11 Nicholas uses this principle from Aristotle to advance 
the novel approach to possibility and potency that he began in De pos-
sest (1460). De venatione sapientiae thus has a complex agenda: it presents 
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Nicholas’s intellectual autobiography, reflects on the ancient philosophers 
and their heirs— especially Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite—and 
carries forward his own speculative agenda. Nicholas thus inserts himself 
into the history of philosophy with his fellow hunters for wisdom, and 
continues to pursue their common prey into still newer fields. Here we 
cannot deal with this entire project, but we shall highlight two strands 
within the work: 1) how Cusanus develops his thinking about the dynam-
ics of possibility and potency, and 2) how he reads Plato, Proclus and 
Dionysius on God and the One. In the process, we shall observe Nicholas 
marking out his own place within an ongoing history of philosophy.
The Dynamics of Posse
Possibility and actuality, becoming and making, are central to De vena-
tione sapientiae, as we see in the second field where Cusanus hunted wis-
dom: “Posset”—a name for God that he coined in the Trialogus de possest 
(1460). Fusing the infinitive “posse” (to be possible or able) and the verb 
“est ” (is), the term is difficult to translate. Matthieu van der Meer sug-
gests “the-possibility-to-be-is,” while Jasper Hopkins prefers “actualized- 
possibility.”12 Yet “possibility” misses other connotations of “posse”: ability, 
capacity, potential, and power. So, I suggest that we avoid the translation 
issue and stay with Nicholas’s paradoxical term “Possest.” His point is clear: 
like many of Cusanus’s names for God, “Possest” places the divine prior 
to all distinctions, even those “between something and nothing, being 
and non-being, and prior to the difference between difference and non-
difference.”13 It specifically emphasizes the coincidence of act and potency 
or possibility within God, who transcends and grounds this very contrast. 
For, as Nicholas tells us, “Possest is actually everything possible—Possest 
est actu omne posse.”14 Simply stated, Possest is all that can be. In De pos-
sest, Nicholas had emphasized that actuality precedes possibility, but also 
affirmed that “absolute possibility (potentia), absolute actuality, and the 
union (nexus) of the two are coeternal ... They are eternal in such a way 
that [they are] Eternity itself.”15 Within Possest, possibility, act and their 
coinciding union thus express the eternal Trinity. In their hunting, many 
philosophers avoided the field of Possest because they sought God among 
opposites, rather than “prior to a difference of contradictory opposites.” 
For them, the principle of non-contradiction became a “No Trespassing” 
sign closing off the field of the Possest, “where possibility-of-existing and 
actually existing do not differ—ubi posse esse et actu esse non differunt.”16 
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This had been Nicholas’s complaint since the Apologia doctae ignorantiae 
(1449), where he lamented Johannes Wenck and the “Aristotelian sect’s” 
refusal of the coincidence of opposites.17
As Nicholas rethinks De possest’s scheme in De venatione sapientiae, 
he removes potency or possibility from the eternal Trinity, and describes it 
as created and perpetual. He introduces the discussion in chapter 2, where 
he cites Diogenes Laertius’s life of Thales, “the first of the wise, [who] says 
that God is very ancient because he is unbegotten, and that the world is 
very beautiful because it is made by God.”18 This broad claim leads Nicholas 
to consider how God shines forth in the world’s beauty and order, and to 
ask himself about “the designer (artificem) of this very admirable work.” 
Seeking a secure basis for his inquiry, he recalls a principle so certain that 
it is “presupposed and undoubted” by all philosophers: “quod impossi-
bile fieri not fit—what is impossible to be made is not made.”19 Nicholas 
finds this principle in Aristotle’s Physics,20 but uses it to explore possibility, 
becoming and making in ways that would have surprised Aristotle. Thales 
and Aristotle thus launch a distinctively Cusan hunt for wisdom.
Chapter 3 begins by stating the obvious: “Since what is impossible 
to be made does not come to be, nothing has been made or will come to 
be which was not or is not possible to be made.”21 This tautology becomes 
more interesting when Nicholas sets it against another claim: “That which 
is, but which has been neither made nor created, neither was nor is possible 
to be made or created. For it precedes the possibility-of-being-made (posse-
fieri) and is eternal, because it is neither made nor created and cannot be 
made other [than it already is].” Here we have De venatione sapientiae’s key 
contrast between the posse-fieri—the potential or possibility of becom-
ing or being made—and its “one absolute beginning and cause,” which is 
so fully actual that “it is all that can be—est omne quod esse potest.”22 All 
making presupposes the posse-fieri, which therefore cannot be itself “made 
(factum).” But as a “passive potency,” it can neither make itself nor bring 
itself to actual being.23 It therefore requires a beginning or principium, 
and Nicholas says, “We speak of it as created, for it does not presuppose 
anything from which it exists, except its Creator.”24 The posse-fieri is cre-
ated from nothing—de nihilo.25 Here, the posse-fieri is no longer the co-
eternal “absolute possibility” of De possest. Rather, Nicholas distinguishes 
between the creator as eternal and the posse-fieri as created and perpetual, 
having a beginning but no end. To complete the scheme, Cusanus says 
that the creator produces “all things subsequent to the posse-fieri” out of it. 
Although created, the posse-fieri thus functions like Aristotle’s prime matter, 
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a reservoir of potential and possibilities.26 Indeed, Nicholas says that 
Aristotle erred in claiming that posse-fieri has no initium (beginning ).27 
He goes on to note how differently created things realize their potential. 
Celestial and intelligible things—the heavens and angels—fully exercise 
their specific, created capacities and are perpetual. Other creatures—like 
ourselves—are not all that they can become; these “are never constant, and 
perish ... They imitate perpetual things but will never attain them ... They 
are temporal, and are called earthly and perceptible things.”28 Nicholas thus 
presents a three-part structure: 1) the fully actual and eternal Creator, 2) 
the perpetual posse-fieri, along with heavenly and angelic beings, and 3) 
the shifting, sublunary world of time where we dwell. He explains this 
structure in terms of enfolding and unfolding, complicatio and explicatio. 
Looking toward the eternal, Nicholas sees “Actuality itself (ipsum actum)” 
and “all things as enfolded in their absolute cause.” Gazing at “the everlast-
ing and perpetual,” he sees the posse-fieri and within it “the nature of each 
and every thing as it ought to be made in accord with the perfect unfolding 
of the divine mind’s predestining.” Finally, looking into time, he perceives 
“that all things are unfolded in a succession, in imitation of the perfection 
of things perpetual.”29
Since the posse-fieri runs like a thread through the whole fabric of De 
venatione sapientiae, we cannot trace it completely here. Let us look at only 
two sections. First, in chapter 10, Nicholas returns to Diogenes Laertius 
to discuss “How the wise name the posse-fieri.” Thales saw it in water, and 
Zeno the Stoic similarly focused on air as the medium between fire and 
water. But Nicholas objects that “the posse-fieri precedes all the elements 
and whatever has been made.”30 Second, in the Epilogue, Cusanus recasts 
his three-part scheme into a hierarchy of powers and possibilities. He dis-
tinguishes 1) posse-facere, God’s power to make and create, 2) posse-fieri, 
the possibility and capacity for being made, and 3) posse-factum, potential 
or “possibility-made-[actual].”31 The fully actual creator God becomes the 
posse-facere, which Nicholas describes in a familiar litany: like Possest, it “is 
all that can be”; it is maximal and minimal; like the non-aliud, it cannot 
be other. Finally, “it is the efficient, formal or exemplary, and final cause 
of all things, since it is the delimitation (terminus)”—the ninth field of 
wisdom’s hunt—“and end of the posse-fieri and therefore of the posse- 
factum.”32 The posse-facere is, in a word, omnipotent. As such, it contains 
all that can be within itself “antecedently” or virtually, and “is present in 
all things” as their absolute cause. Since it alone creates the posse-fieri “from 
nothing” and sets its limits, the posse-fieri cannot perish and is perpetual. 
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Sketching the relation between the posse-fieri and the posse-factum, 
Nicholas says, “in all things that are made (factum), the posse-fieri is the 
respective thing which has been made, but in a different mode of being : 
in potency in a less perfect mode, and in actuality in a more perfect mode. 
Therefore, the posse-fieri and the posse-factum do not differ in essence. But 
the posse-facere ... is not essence, but the cause of essence.”33
To illustrate this scheme, Cusanus takes the example of heat. In all 
hot things, the posse facere calidum or power-of-making-hot precedes the 
posse fieri calidum, the possibility-of being-made-hot; and from this possi-
bility, it brings everything hot into actuality.34 Citing Plato, Nicholas then 
says that “what we call fire … is fiery or something on fire,” while “fire-per-
se precedes, and is the cause of, every ignitable thing and everything that 
has been set afire.” Yet this fire-per-se is not simply an “Idea,” but rather—
as Dionysius explained—“a likeness of the First Cause.” For Paul describes 
God as “a consuming fire.”35 Cusanus signals his creative use of sources 
when he claims that Proclus, Aristotle and the Platonists—if their state-
ments are “correctly understood (sane intelligi)”—confirm his analysis of 
the one cause and the order which unfolds from it.
Nicholas also explored these issues in De ludo globi (1462–1463), 
and returned to them in his last work, De apice theoriae (1464). Here he 
drastically simplifies De venatione sapientiae’s scheme by naming God and 
the “quiddity” of all things as posse ipsum—possibility, potential or power 
itself. As “posse” drops its qualifiers—est, facere, fieri and factum—its very 
simplicity attracts Nicholas. Because, he says, “nothing can be more pow-
erful (potentius), earlier or better,” posse ipsum exceeds Possest and every 
other name for God.36 In this compressed view, there are only posse ipsum 
and its appearances or manifestations. Commentators have noted the 
“dynamization” in Nicholas’s late works that culminates in De apice theo-
riae. As Peter Casarella notes, here “Cusanus achieves an outright reversal 
of the Aristotelian-Thomist priority of God’s actuality” over potentiality, 
which he had retained—with qualifications—in De possest and De vena-
tione sapientiae.37
Cusanus on Plato, Unitas, and History
Let us now look at another strand in the fabric of De venatione sapientiae: 
the Neoplatonic theme of the One or unity. Central to Cusanus’s history 
of philosophy is Plato. As Raymond Klibansky notes, De venatione sapien-
tiae is Nicholas’s first work that shows his reading of the whole Parmenides 
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in the Latin translation that he had commissioned from George of 
Trapezunt.38 So he no longer interprets Plato mainly through Proclus’s 
eyes, but occasionally against him as well. For example, he tells us, “Plato 
affirmed that the First Beginning, God, is One through itself and Good 
through itself. And the beginnings of other things—namely, of being, of 
life, of intellect, and the like—he called being through itself, life through 
itself, intellect through itself; they are the beginnings and causes of exist-
ing, living, and understanding.”39 Nicholas then criticizes Proclus’s han-
dling of these issues. For in The Theology of Plato, Proclus correctly affirms 
“the first God of gods” to be “the one good (unum bonum),” but errs 
when he multiplies gods. He does so by considering the traditional triad 
of being, life, and intellect to be distinct “maker-gods (conditorios deos).” 
The first of these, “the cause of beings,” he calls “a second god, namely, the 
Creator-Intellect,” which he identifies as “Jove, the king and ruler over all 
things.”40 Complicating matters further, Proclus
posits celestial and mundane gods and various other likewise eternal 
gods ... Nevertheless, at the head of all [these gods] he placed the 
God-of-gods, the universal Cause of all things. And so, those 
attributes which we ascribe to our good God— attributes which are 
different only in conception and not in reality—Proclus is seen to 
assert of different gods, because of different distinctions among the 
attributes.41
For Cusanus, Proclus thus mistakes the names or attributes of God for 
many gods. He traces this error to his basic assumption that “nothing is 
intelligible unless it actually exists ... And so, everything that is under-
stood, he affirmed to [really] exist. Thus, he asserted to exist intellectu-
ally … an intelligible man, an intelligible lion, and whatever else he saw 
to be abstract and free-of-matter.”42 On these issues, Nicholas sides with 
Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who “recognize that conceptual being is 
constituted by our intellect and does not attain the status of real being.”43 
They also have the advantage of not declaring the Good to be more 
ancient than being, but rather to affirm “that one, being, and good are 
interchangeable.”44 Yet Aristotle in turn errs by limiting the first cause’s 
governing role to the heavens, rather than to the entire cosmos. As we have 
seen, Proclus gets this point right by affirming that Jove rules all things.
Later in the work Nicholas sharpens his critique of Proclus on 
these issues, saying that he “engaged in utterly futile efforts” (supervacuos 
labores) to describe many “eternal gods” and their complex relations to 
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“the one God of gods.”45 This critique and its concomitant telescoping 
of Plato’s Ideas and the Neoplatonic triad of being , life and intellect 
into the Christian Godhead are a familiar story, going back at least to 
Pseudo-Dionysius.46 But one more text will clarify Cusanus’s perspective 
on this story.
Discussing De venatione sapientiae’s sixth field, unity or oneness, 
Nicholas sees a common focus on transcendence and negation in Plato, 
Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. He tells us that Plato, by “deny-
ing all things of the One … saw it ineffably before all things.” In the 
Parmenides he hunted for the One “by means of logic,” an approach that 
Proclus summarizes when he says that “those who believe Plato remain 
among negations.”47 Explaining this negative turn, Cusanus again follows 
Proclus, noting that any “addition to the One contracts and diminishes 
the excellence of the One,” and in fact displays not the One, but its other 
or not-One.48 The Cardinal here puts us on the familiar metaphysical turf 
of the Parmenides’s first hypothesis, but he also highlights the work’s dia-
lectic. For, as Klibansky comments, Nicholas “is primarily interested in 
the dialogue as demonstrating the process of thought by which the mind 
approaches its highest object”—its “hunt for the One through logic.”49 
Cusanus then adds Dionysius’s negative theology to the mix. Imitating 
Plato, the Areopagite paradoxically claims that, when speaking about 
God, “Negations that are not privative assertions, but excellent and abun-
dant affirmations, are truer than [simple] affirmations.”50 Nicholas says 
that Proclus follows Dionysius in denying that the ineffable “First is one 
and good”—although we have seen Plato and Proclus himself affirm this 
elsewhere. Finally, Cusanus praises all three thinkers as “marvelous hunt-
ers (mirandos venatores)” of wisdom, whose writings merit close study.
In light of this passage, we cannot ignore the ghost in the room: 
Dionysius the Areopagite. As John Monfasani has shown, Nicholas knew 
the suspicions concerning the dating and authorship of the Dionysian cor-
pus that emerged in Rome beginning in the 1450s.51 Lorenzo Valla chal-
lenged the works’ authenticity, but made no mention of their similarity to 
Proclus. Yet in Cusanus’s dialogue De non aliud (1462), Pietro Balbi—who 
was translating the Theology of Plato—asks the Cardinal to explain pre-
cisely these similarities. He replies, “It is certain that your Proclus was later 
in time than Dionysius the Areopagite. But it is uncertain whether he saw 
the writings of Dionysius.”52 Here Nicholas leaves open the question of his 
influence on Proclus. Balbi and the Cardinal then discuss the two think-
ers’ similar statements placing the “existing one” after “the unqualifiedly 
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One,” and note Proclus’s reliance on Plato for this view. A year later in De 
venatione sapientiae, Nicholas reaffirms Dionysius’s apostolic dating, and 
states that Proclus—who cites Origen—comes later. In the passage cited 
above, Nicholas then makes the stronger historical claims that Dionysius 
“imitates” Plato and that Proclus “sequendo (follows)” Dionysius’s teach-
ing. On this view, the Areopagite becomes a key intermediary between 
Plato and Proclus. We now know that Cusanus gets this chronolog y 
wrong, and with it his chain of readers and influence. Dionysius—now 
Pseudo-Dionysius—relies on Proclus, not the other way around.
Yet a curiously tangled and revealing web remains in Nicholas’s 
reading of these two thinkers. Werner Beierwaltes stresses that we cannot 
neatly separate Proclus from Dionysius in Cusanus’s thought and works. 
Indeed, he suggests that Nicholas unwittingly reads Proclus through the 
“mask” of Dionysius.53 Yet we may also note that Nicholas uses Proclus 
to clarify and accent the Neoplatonic themes and structures within 
Dionysius’s writings. On this view, the two thinkers’ reciprocal influence 
on Cusanus, and what he makes of them, become more compelling issues 
than their scrambled chronolog y. For we can trace what Hans-Georg 
Gadamer calls their “effective history” (Wirkungsgeschichte)54 in Cusanus’s 
commissioning of translations, his reading and marginal glossing, and his 
writing De non aliud and De venatione sapientiae. The latter work, indeed, 
calls attention to Nicholas’s reading of Plato’s Parmenides, Proclus and 
Dionysius within his broader history of philosophy. As Pauline Watts says, 
“What Cusanus himself is doing in De venatione sapientiae, giving his own 
individual interpretation of the interrelationship of various important 
pagan and Christian philosophers and theologians and of the historical 
developments they produce, is itself an enactment of his whole concep-
tion of the historical nature of philosophy and theology.”55 In this respect, 
Nicholas shares the historical awareness that Eugenio Garin considers 
central for the Italian humanists.56 This is hardly surprising since Cusanus 
moved in humanist circles from his student days in Padua through his 
later years in Rome, and adapted their attitudes and practices in his own 
projects. Early in his career his haunting of libraries and archives led 
him to discover twelve comedies of Plautus, and to judge the Donation 
of Constantine apocryphal.57 He not only commissioned translations of 
Plato and Proclus, but also learned sufficient Greek to correct George 
of Trapezunt’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides against the Greek text.58 
These humanist habits inform De venatione sapientiae throughout. Its very 
title echoes the Renaissance quest for prisca sapientia (ancient or primal 
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wisdom), a search which mined ancient texts not for historical curiosi-
ties or isolated bits of useful doctrine, but for live items within a peren-
nial tradition of unified truth.59 This is the wisdom, the sapida scientia 
or tasty knowledge, that for Nicholas nourishes the intellect and leads to 
God. The work thus takes its start from Nicholas’s reading of Diogenes 
Laertius’s Lives of the Philosophers, which he folds into his own studies of 
Plato’s Parmenides, Dionysius, and Proclus to trace a history of philoso-
phy in the Platonic vein. As Cusanus negotiates this history, he gives it a 
strongly self-conscious turn by reviewing his own hunts for wisdom. For 
he adapts and criticizes not only earlier thinkers, but also his own previous 
conjectures and methods. He thereby inserts himself into this story, and 
makes the whole into a remarkably personal history.60 Nor is this history 
simply retrospective, since De venatione sapientiae introduces the posse-
fieri, which opens a new “field” for Nicholas’s ongoing hunt for wisdom. 
Hence, as Wilhelm Dupré comments, for Cusanus “the philosophical tra-
dition … becomes the concrete starting point for a further development 
of thought.”61 Further, Nicholas sees this development extending beyond 
himself, as he offers his book to future readers in the hope that it will stim-
ulate “more acute thinkers ... to deepen their minds further.”62
This self-conscious historical turn has received little attention, 
although it fits well with Nicholas’s views of knowledge, perspective, and 
creativity. In all these areas, Cusanus emphasizes human subjectivity—
knowing that we don’t know (learned ignorance); highlighting visual per-
spective and its limits; and viewing mathematics, measures and tools as 
creations of the human mind. Since Cassirer, this focus on subjectivity 
has fueled heated debates about Nicholas’s place at the edge of moder-
nity: is he “medieval” or “modern”?63 While Cusanus’s self-historicizing 
has not figured in these debates, it casts a peculiar light on them. For it 
clearly differs from the “modernity” of Descartes, who claimed to discard 
tradition and to ground philosophy in an ahistorical act of thinking, “cog-
ito ergo sum.” In contrast, Nicholas starts not with a clean slate, but in 
conversation with Plato, Dionysius and Proclus as partners in the hunt 
for wisdom. Philosophy is indeed an historical enterprise. But this turn 
suggests another, more recent strand of modernity or post-modernity: 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer writes that “Real his-
torical thinking must take account of its own historicity.”64 History is not 
just one damned thing or text after another, but requires that we acknowl-
edge and rethink our own relation to the events and texts that we study. 
Hence, Gadamer writes, “The horizon of the past, out of which all human 
life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion. 
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The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by historical consciousness. 
But in it this motion becomes aware of itself.”65 Like the Renaissance pur-
suit of prisca sapientia, Gadamer sees continuity between early texts and 
their contemporary readers. But since tradition’s horizon continues to 
shift, he recognizes that understanding remains forever incomplete and 
open. Cusanus is aware of how “conjectural” his reading and thinking are. 
Hence we see him correcting himself and continually seeking more ade-
quate names for God, as he moves from De docta ignorantia’s “Maximum” 
to “Possest,” “Non-aliud,” and “Posse ipsum.” This process bears fruit in De 
venatione sapientiae, where Nicholas reviews the fields where he and his 
forebears have hunted for wisdom.
Yet Cusanus may place himself so firmly within this continu-
ing philosophical tradition that he pays little attention to the tensions 
between the texts he reads and his own perspective on them. Hence, he 
may fail Gadamer’s test of “guarding against overhastily assimilating the 
past to our own expectations of meaning.”66 For example, he transforms 
Aristotle’s obvious dictum that “the impossible does not happen” into 
the posse-fieri, a principle central to De venatione sapientiae’s metaphysi-
cal scheme, which clearly differs from Aristotle’s. But even when Cusanus 
attends closely to his sources, he often takes them in new and idiosyncratic 
directions. Perhaps F. Edward Cranz gives us the most radical view of 
Nicholas’s creative reading. Discussing the late works, Cranz argues that 
“if Cusanus at the end accepts almost the whole of the philosophic tradi-
tion he does so only by translating it entirely into his own new terms.”67 
Dionysius the Areopagite becomes Cranz’s Exhibit A. While Nicholas 
praises no thinker more highly than Dionysius, “the greatest of theologi-
ans,”68 the two men work with such different assumptions and goals that 
Cranz speaks of the “Cusanizations of Dionysius.”69 Where Dionysius 
begins with beings and moves toward mystical union, Cusanus begins 
with meanings and intentions and moves toward an “absolute concept” 
and vision of the divine.70 For Cranz these differences mark Cusanus not 
only as a self-aware “Renaissance” thinker, but also as continuing a major 
“reorientation” that began around the year 1100 when Western thought 
turned from thinking beings to thinking meanings and intentions.71 
More conventional historians date this shift to late medieval nominal-
ism and Quattrocento humanism. Within either scheme, Cusanus plays a 
pivotal and inevitably controversial role. Whether or not Cranz is right, 
he certainly forces us to re-examine the assumptions—what Gadamer 
calls “prejudices”—that drive our own readings of Cusanus, his sources, 
legacy and position at the edge of modernity.
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26 See van der Meer, “World without End,” 331–32; Manzo, “Possibilitas – 
Materia,” 198.
27 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 9.26.1295.
28 Ibid., 3.8.1284.
29 Ibid., 3.8.1285; emphasis added. See ibid., 11.30 listing Wisdom’s three 
“regions:” eternity, the perpetual, and time.
30 Ibid., 10.27.1296.
31 Ibid., 39.115.1349. See Miller, Reading Cusanus, 208–11.
32 Ibid., 39.115.1350; translation modified.
33 Ibid., 39.116.1350.
34 Ibid., 39.118.1351.
35 Ibid., 39.119.1352; citing Heb. 12:29.
36 Nicholas of Cusa, Opera omnia, vol. 12, De apice theoriae, 5; Hopkins, 
Complete Treatises, 2:1424.
37 Casarella, “Power of the Possible,” 27. See Brüntrup, Können und Sein, 
124–26; and Duclow, Masters, 250–53.
38 Klibansky, “Plato’s Parmenides,” v–vi, 27–8.
39 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 8.20.1292.
40 Ibid., 8.21.1292; translation modified. Yet, in the next chapter (9.24.1294), 
Nicholas notes with approval that the Platonists call the divine Word a “Maker-
Intellect,” which Proclus describes as “the Only Begotten and the Lord of all 
things.” See Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, Book 5, pp. 14–20. Subsequent cita-
tions to Proclus include book number, section number, and page number. See 
also Nicholas’s marginal gloss to Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, 5.20.73: “nota 
totum de conditorio intellectu. quem dicit vnigentum et simulacrum perfecti dei/
regem vniversi et regem regum” (Marginalien, 366, pp. 105–6). See also D’Amico, 
“Nikolaus von Kues,” 59–60.
41 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 8.21.1292–93; translation mod-
ified and emphasis added.
42 Ibid., 8.21.1293.
43 Ibid., 8.22.1293. Cusanus’s editors trace this analysis not to Aristotle or 
his ancient commentators, but to the “sapida scientia” and William of Ockham 
(Quodlibet 3, q. 3).
44 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 8.22.1293. However, Plato 
describes the Good as more ancient than being (Rep. 508e).
45 Ibid., 21.62.1317.
46 See Gersh, Iamblichus to Eriugena, 153–67. In contrast, Eric Perl argues for 
a close fit between Proclus and Dionysius’s metaphysics; see Perl, Theophany, 65ff.
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47 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 22.64.1318; translation modified.
48 Ibid., 22.64.1318. See Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, 2.10.63.
49 Klibansky, “Plato’s Parmenides,” 32; emphasis added.
50 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 22.64, my translation follow-
ing the Opera omnia: “negationes, quae <non> sunt privationes, sed … affir-
mationes.” Hopkins’s translation (1318–19) alters the text to read “negations 
that are not privative assertions but … [negative assertions]”—which erases the 
passage’s dialectic and paradox. See Dionysius, Mystical Theology 1, 2 (PG 3, 
1000B); Nicholas of Cusa, Opera omnia, vol. 10, De principio, 34: “Affirmatio 
melius est in negatione, cum negatio sit eius principium”; and Eckhart, Expositio, 
n. 207, p. 175.
51 Monfasani, “Pseudo-Dionysius,” 197–204. Cusanus’s manuscript of Tra-
versari’s translation of Dionysius (Cod. Cus. 44, fol. 1v; Marx, Verzeichnis, 39–40) 
contains his note stating that Ambrose, Augustine, and Jerome do not mention 
Dionysius, while (pseudo-)Athanasius, John Damascene and Gregory the Great 
cite him (Monfasani, “Pseudo-Dionysius,” 203–4; De venatione sapientiae’s Edi-
tors’ Note 10, p. 155).
52 Nicholas of Cusa, Opera omnia, vol. 13, De non aliud, 90; trans. Hopkins, 
Complete Treatises, 2:1151, emphasis added.
53 Beierwaltes, “‘Centrum Totius Vite,” 633–34. See also Riccati, “La Presenz 
di Proclo,” 23–38; and Cranz, Cusa and the Renaissance, 95–108.
54 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 267–74.
55 Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, 209; emphasis added.
56 Garin, Italian Humanism, 14–15. For example, Lorenzo Valla viewed his-
tory “as the synthesis of all branches of knowledge” (Garin, Italian Humanism, 
54–5), and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s wide-ranging search for “concord” 
among texts and traditions “amounted to something like a critical history of phi-
losophy” (Garin, Italian Humanism, 106–7).
57 See Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus, 3–4; Watts, “Renaissance Humanism,” 174; 
Meuthen, Nicholas of Cusa, 28. Nicholas rejects the Donation of Constantine 
in Opera omnia, vol. 14, De concordantia catholica 3.2.294–301; trans. Sigmund, 
216–19. Finding no evidence in early texts, Nicholas considers the story that 
“Constantine gave the Western Empire to the Roman pontiff Sylvester” to be 
“invented and false.” This critique may have influenced Lorenzo Valla’s De falsa 
credita et ementita Constantini Donatione (1440).
58 Monfasani, “Cusa, the Byzantines, and Greek Language,” 223–24.
59 See Leinkauf, “Prisca scientia vs. prisca sapientia,” 135–42.
60 See Flasch, Nikolaus von Kues, 605. This history is selective even in terms of 
Nicholas’s own readings and concerns. It sets aside theological themes like Chris-
tology, and does not mention his principal medieval sources: Thierry of Chartres, 
Raymond Lull, and Meister Eckhart (Flasch, Nikolaus von Kues, 622). Following 
Diogenes Laertius, it focuses on Nicholas’s “ancient” sources.
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39.124.1354.
63 See Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos; Cubillos, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 239–
49; Gadamer, “Cusanus and the Present”; and Moore, Kairos of Modernity.
64 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 299.
65 Ibid., 303.
66 Ibid., 304.
67 Cranz, Cusa and the Renaissance, 58.
68 Cusanus, De non aliud, 14.54: “Dionysius, theologorum maximus.” See 
also Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, 30.89–90.1334, where Nicholas 
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69 Cranz, Cusa and the Renaissance, 143. See also Casarella, “Cusanus on 
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NICHOLAS OF CUSA LOVED COLLECTING BOOKS. Yet, while he very likely became aware of the technological revolution 
initiated by Johannes Gutenberg in Mainz in 1452 (and his assistant, 
Giovanni Andrea de’ Bussi, would direct the first publishing house in 
Italy), his personal library comprised books in manuscript rather than in 
print.1 The catalogue of the manuscripts that he bequeathed to the hospital 
he established at Cusa testifies to the remarkable range of his intellectual 
interests.2 In this essay, I focus not so much on the thought of Nicholas 
himself, as on certain twelfth-century authors who laid foundations that 
Nicholas would develop and interpret in his own way. He was fascinated 
by the ideal of how concord might be established in the light of reason 
and providence. While it is common to identify Nicholas as a renaissance 
figure who broke with scholastic tradition, close analysis of his ideas shows 
that he was unusually aware of less well-known currents of thought in the 
twelfth century. As Thomas Izbicki has emphasized, Nicholas of Cusa was 
not just a philosopher and theologian, but a reformer profoundly con-
cerned with ecclesiology and society.3 The issue of how to identify concord 
was as much an issue in the twelfth century as in the fifteenth, even not 
with the same range of resources as available to Nicholas within his library. 
While it is common to define the renaissance in terms of the rediscovery 
of classical authors, the books owned by Nicholas of Cusa remind us that 
the intellectual renaissance of the fifteenth century was also shaped (par-
ticularly in northern Europe) by recovery of less well-known authors of 
the twelfth and thirteenth century, whose writings did not gain authority 
within a standard scholastic curriculum.
The sur viving books in Nicholas’s library demonstrate great 
familiarity with the major Latin theological authors of the patristic and 
medieval period. The catalogue, drawn up in 1905, reveals that it had 
four volumes of Augustine (nos. 31–35), one of Anselm (no. 61) 
and Peter Lombard (no. 66), three of Thomas Aquinas (nos. 72–74), and 
Peter Abelard, Anselm of Havelberg, and 
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of Bonventure (nos. 75–77). Yet he also owned translations, some quite 
recent, of various Greek Fathers, including Chrysostom (nos. 46–47) and 
above all of Dionysius the Areopagite (nos. 43–45). His library also had 
copies of the Scivias of Hildegard of Bingen (no. 63), the Opus tripertitum 
of Meister Eckhart (no. 21), and seven volumes of the writings of Ramon 
Lull (nos. 82–88).4 Nicholas even sought out rare texts about Islam, 
including a Latin translation of the Quran (no. 108).5 He was interested 
in John of Piano Carpini’s account of the Tartars (no. 203). In this sense, 
his library demonstrates his desire to come to terms with recognition of 
cultural difference.
In many ways, the intellectual interests of Nicholas were fully medi-
eval. While he owned and appreciated various Latin writings of Petrarch, 
including his Liber de sui ipsius et multorum ignorancia (nos. 198–200), 
an influence on his own De docta ignorantia, his library did not include 
Cicero, but did contain many works of Aristotle (nos. 182–84) as well 
as other texts shaped by Platonic tradition, such as the Consolation of 
Philosophy of Boethius, preserved with a commentary from the early 
twelfth century that mentions a master Manegaldus (no. 121). More unu-
sual, however, was that he owned many writings of Plato himself, includ-
ing his Phaedo, Apology of Socrates, Crito, Axiochus, Meno, and Phaedrus, 
recently translated by Leonardo of Arezzo (no. 177), as well as the com-
mentaries of Proclus on Plato (nos. 185–86), and heavily Platonic writings 
like those of Avicenna (nos. 205, 298–300) and the Liber de causis, attrib-
uted to Aristotle (no. 195). Nicholas’s intellectual interests embraced both 
theology and philosophy, including some of the most innovative currents 
of thought in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He also collected texts 
on medicine (nos. 222, 296–309), astronomy (nos. 207–16), and had a 
very large collection on civil and ecclesiastical law (nos. 223–95), vital for 
his own commitment to religious and ecclesiastical reform.
In singling out Nicholas’s debt to Thierry of Chartres, David 
Albertson picks up on a discovery, first made by Pierre Duhem, that 
Nicholas was particularly interested in the Platonic (and more particularly 
Pythagorean) elements of Christian thought formulated in the first half of 
the twelfth century by Thierry of Chartres in a commentary on the six days 
of creation. Thierry’s writings were never widely copied in the twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries.6 Nicholas never referred to Thierry by name 
and we do not possess the precise copy he used, although he may well 
have used a summary (Fundamentum naturae) of Thierry’s ideas to which 
he had access when composing his De docta ignorantia in around 1440.7 
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The difficulty with singling out the influence of Thierry of Chartres by 
name is that it tends to privilege debt to an abstract Platonist tradition 
such as the “the school of Chartres,” when this concept is itself highly con-
tested. The so-called mathematical analogy of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit as like unity, equality, and connection, was one that originally had 
been mentioned in passing by Augustine in his De doctrina christiana, but 
would be developed by both Thierry of Chartres and Nicholas.8 While 
Thierry was certainly an original thinker, fascinated by the challenge of 
bringing together Platonic ideas as formulated in the Timaeus (on which 
his brother, Bernard, wrote an important commentary in the early twelfth 
century), I would suggest he was only one of a number of twelfth-century 
authors who offered Nicholas an opportunity to depart from the more 
stultifying aspects of scholastic theology, as defined by Peter Lombard and 
his interpretation of the teaching of Augustine.
Nicholas of Cusa and Peter Abelard
A contemporary of Thierry who deserves attention as attracting the 
interest of Nicholas is Peter Abelard, whose copy of the controversial 
Theologia “Scholarium,” once in the library of the hospital at Cusa, now 
in the possession of the Capuchin Friars in Koblenz-Ehrenbreitstein 
(K Archivbibliothek des Provinzialiat der Rheinische-Westfalische 
Kapuzinerprovinz, cod. 1), has largely escaped scholarly attention. The 
only exception to this is a short paper by Rudolf Haubst, who suggested 
that this text could have influenced certain parts of the De pace fidei and 
De visione Dei, both written in 1453.9 The codex, which seems to date 
from the mid fifteenth century, contains two separate sections, one (fols. 
3–97v) containing Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexameron, the other 
(fols. 104–64v) Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” without identification 
of its author.10 From a textual point of view, K does not offer anything of 
particular value for establishing the text of Abelard’s Theologia and so its 
variants were not included in the critical edition. From the perspective 
of Cusanus studies, however, the manuscript deserves attention because 
of what it reveals about the interest of Nicholas in Abelard’s treatise. 
Unknown to Haubst is the fact that K contains every variant (and a few 
more) found in another manuscript of the Theologia “Scholarium” that 
once belonged to the cathedral school in Magdeburg (M Berlin, Deutsche 
Staasbibliothek, Magdeburg 34).11 Because the scribe of M includes the 
date Mcccclii in die septem fratrum (11 July 1452) on fol. 283v, he must 
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have copied the Theologia “Scholarium” (on fols. 193–261v) before this 
date. This manuscript was one of many copied after the destruction of 
the Magdeburg cathedral library by fire in 1450, from books preserved 
in neighboring libraries. Most of the authors copied into the first part of 
M (fols. 1–192v) are classics of high scholasticism: Alan of Lille, Thomas 
of Augsburg (circulating as Aquinas), and Aquinas himself, while the sec-
ond section (fols. 193–416) contains an anonymous copy of the Theologia 
“Scholarium.” The conclusion must be that Nicholas of Cusa, who was 
appointed papal legate in 1451 with a mission to reform the church in 
Germany, became aware of the Theologia “Scholarium” in M and had a sec-
ond copy made for himself, in order to acquire copies of both this text and 
Bonaventure’s Collationes. The combination of Abelard and Bonaventure 
in K itself attests to the range of Nicholas’s intellectual interests, and a 
desire to distance himself from the major scholastic authors copied into M. 
I shall argue that Nicholas incorporated certain ideas from Abelard in 
that remarkable group of writings which he produced in 1453. I shall also 
suggest that the manuscript of Abelard’s Theologia from which M and K 
derive, is textually related to a copy owned in the twelfth century by a 
reform-minded bishop of Havelberg (in the archdiocese of Magdeburg), 
whose interests in religious parallel those of Nicholas of Cusa, who him-
self became papal legate in Germany in 1450, charged with implementing 
the cause of religious reform.
The nine annotations that Nicholas makes to Abelard’s Theologia 
reflect an intelligent awareness of its most important themes.12 Two occur 
at the beginning of the section in which Abelard introduces philosophi-
cal testimony about the trinitarian nature of God as supreme good. In his 
Sentences, completed in the 1150s, but still authoritative within scholastic 
theology in the fifteenth century, Peter Lombard had certainly absorbed 
certain of Abelard’s techniques of evaluating discordant testimonies about 
the Trinity, but avoided any allusion to philosophical testimony to support 
Christian doctrine, such as the notion that Plato’s idea of a world soul in 
the Timaeus might refer to the Holy Spirit. Nicholas was particularly inter-
ested in how Abelard interpreted the key passage of St. Paul about philoso-
phers’ natural knowledge of God in Romans 1:20 (in the Douai version: 
“For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly 
seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, 
and divinity: so that they are inexcusable”). Whereas Paul (and following 
him, Augustine) had emphasized the moral failing of certain philosophers, 
Abelard glossed the passage in a more positive way, saying that “the reason 
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itself of philosophy” coupled with “the sobriety of a most continent life” 
led to their capacity to understand that God was one.13 His annotation 
on fol. 114va, “Tully, that the philosophers posit one God” (Tulius, quod 
philosophi unum deum ponant) draws attention to a passage identified by 
Abelard in the De inventione (widely assumed to be by Cicero), claiming 
that philosophers did not think there were a multitude of gods. Abelard left 
out the words about this being a probable opinion.14 Scrutiny of databases 
of Latin texts reveals that no Christian thinker before or after Abelard had 
picked up the potential relevance of this passage of Cicero. The only excep-
tion is that of Nicholas of Cusa who argued in a passage within his De pace 
fidei, completed in 1453 (without alluding to the authority of Cicero or 
Abelard): “At no time have philosophers ever been found to have sensed 
otherwise that it was impossible for there to be many gods over which one 
was not exalted.”15
Nicholas also added a note on fol. 115rb “Jerome on behalf of the 
philosophers” (Ieronymus pro philosophis) to a passage in which Abelard 
had found a passage in Jerome’s Commentary on Matthew, interpreting 
the parable of the good and bad servants as about those who followed the 
good life of the gentile philosophers rather than those who squandered 
that life. This was in fact a slight distortion of Jerome, who actually said 
that it could illustrate the good life of gentiles and philosophers, while 
also referring to those who did not live up to their ethical ideals.16 It was 
a little-known passage that may well have struck Nicholas as offering a 
more positive apology for the potential of philosophers than traditionally 
assumed of Jerome.17
Nicholas also indicated his interest in Abelard’s discussion of a phil-
osophical understanding of how God the Son might be eternally generated 
from God the Father with a note on fol. 113va: “how the nativity of any-
thing is eternal” (quomodo cuiuslibet nativitas est aeterna). Nicholas high-
lights a passage of Abelard about how the Word of God did not just begin 
with the birth of Jesus in Jerusalem, but rather was eternal because it had 
been seen from eternity.18 This theme of the eternity of the Word is one 
that Nicholas includes in his De visione Dei, completed on 8 November 
1453, even though he goes much further than Abelard in reflecting on how 
God could be seen beyond the coincidence of apparent opposites.19
Nicholas also singles out part of Abelard’s discussion about God’s 
will in the third book of the Theologia with a note on fol. 151ra “Note the 
two-fold will” (Nota duplex velle), when Abelard explains that the phrase 
“God does whatever he wills” (Ps 93:5) refers to a different kind of will 
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from the phrase “God wants all to be saved” (I Tim 2:4).20 One refers to 
his ordinance (which Abelard understands as implying that God cannot 
act differently from the way he does, namely according to reason), while 
the other refers to God’s desire, not always followed out, because people 
could choose their own destiny. Again, it is a core theme of the De pace 
fidei of 1453 that humans always have the free will to choose their destiny. 
While Abelard did not provide Nicholas with his definition of God as an 
infinite circle whose center was everywhere, his teaching that God could 
not act other than he did, namely according to reason, reflects a theologi-
cal perspective with which Nicholas resonated.
Nicholas also singled out a number of passages in the Theologia 
“Scholarium” in which Abelard insisted on his teaching on the concord-
ance between many teachings of the Platonists with those of the catholic 
faith.21 Thus, on fol. 123vb, he adds the note De platonicis to highlight 
Abelard’s quotations from Augustine’s City of God and Confessions, in 
which he highlighted how Augustine often spoken positively of Platonist 
writings, countering those other passages in which the bishop of Hippo 
highlighted the gulf between the Platonists and Scripture. A little fur-
ther on, Nicholas adds in the margin of fol. 124ra libro IIo de doctrina 
Christiana and then (on fols. 124rb and 124va) Nota! to signal passages 
in Augustine that highlight his debt to Plato. Unlike so many medieval 
scholastics, Nicholas of Cusa never studied theology at Paris. Rather, he 
studied at Cologne, where he absorbed from his own teacher Haimeric 
de Campo (ca. 1395–1460) Platonist traditions transmitted by Albert 
the Great and Eckhart. In Abelard’s Theologia he was discovering an 
early strand of Platonic Christianity in the twelfth century before Peter 
Lombard effectively eliminated any reference to the authority of Plato in 
the teaching of theology.
Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium” and Anselm of Havelberg
The idea that there might be different ways of acknowledging one faith 
had been mentioned very briefly by Gregory the Great in a letter to his 
friend, bishop Leander, “that in one faith, is different custom is in no way 
harmful to the Holy Church.”22 This phrase would be quoted by Peter 
Abelard in his Sic et Non, from where it would be quoted in Gratian’s 
Decretum and Peter Lombard’s Sentences.23 Yet neither Gratian nor Peter 
Lombard would develop this remark into a systematic exploration of 
the relationship between Latin and Greek definitions of orthodox faith. 
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Peter Abelard’s comparison of Latin and Greek theologies of the Trinity 
went much further than that of any previous author with the possible 
exception of St. Anselm.24 Peter Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium” never 
circulated widely, however, in the medieval period. The controversy provoked 
by the work in 1141, when Bernard of Clairvaux influentially condemned 
it as heretical, was such that it circulated in very few manuscripts. There 
survive only five known copies of the Theologia “Scholarium,” three from 
the twelfth century (London, British Library Royal 8.A.I; Douai, Bibl. 
mun. 357, from the abbey of Anchin; Paris, BnF, Bibl. de l’Arsenal 265, 
from Saint-Victor), one from the mid fourteenth century (Oxford, Balliol 
College 296), and one from the early fifteenth century (Paris, BnF lat. 
14793), copied by Simon de Plumetot (1371–1443), himself a remarkable 
humanist, who bequeathed his entire library ca. 1440 to Saint-Victor.25 
Rather like the writings of Thierry of Chartres, texts by Peter Abelard 
were hard to come by, even in the mid fifteenth century. This makes it 
all the more interesting that, just as Nicholas of Cusa was embarking on 
a new administrative phase in his career, taking up in 1452 his appoint-
ment as bishop of Brixen (Bressanone), where his attempts at implement-
ing reform would encounter severe resistance, he encountered Abelard’s 
Theologia “Scholarium.”
One figure who has not been studied as transmitting awareness of 
the Theologia of Peter Abelard is Anselm of Havelberg (ca. 1100–1158), a 
bishop whose fascination with accepting religious diversity deserves to be 
compared with that of Nicholas of Cusa.26 In the introduction to the criti-
cal edition of Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” I observe a series of signifi-
cant textual parallels between the part of the Theologia “Scholarium” about 
the contrast between Latin and Greek views of the Holy Spirit and the text 
of the Antikeimenon of Anselm of Havelberg (ca. 1100–1158). Anselm was 
a remarkable reform-minded bishop of the twelfth century, whose interests 
could be said to presage those of Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century.27 
In brief, Anselm was an early disciple of Norbert of Xanten, archbishop of 
Magdeburg (1126–1134), but developed his interest in religious diversity 
after being sent to Constantinople in 1136, where he engaged in conversa-
tions with Nicetas of Nicomedia. Anselm’s Antikeimenon or Dialogi had 
no influence in the twelfth century, but survives only in manuscripts, one 
copied in Freising in 1437, another from the sixteenth century. The writ-
ings of Anselm of Havelberg were like those of Abelard in that they were 
rediscovered in the fifteenth century by humanist minds keen to go beyond 
the scholastic orthodoxies of a previous generation.28
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There has been occasional recognition of parallels between the 
thought of Anselm of Havelberg and Peter Abelard with regard to the 
recognition of plurality of perspectives within the church.29 It has not 
been realised, however, that Anselm was directly familiar with the text of 
the Theologia “Scholarium” in his Antikeimenon, written 1147–1149, but 
recalling debates in Constantinople from a decade earlier. Anselm studied 
in Liège, but is not known to have spent time in Paris. Anselm’s interest 
in Abelard is all the more intriguing given that his mentor, Norbert of 
Xanten, was identified by Abelard as an ally of Bernard of Clairvaux and 
a critic of his teaching. Anselm could have obtained a copy of Abelard’s 
Theologia from sympathetically minded cardinals, like Guido di Castello 
(who became the short-lived Celestine II in 1143–1144).30 In any case, 
Anselm withdrew to Havelberg to write the Antikeimenon between 1147 
and 1149, drawing on his experiences to provide theological justification 
of his vision of how the Holy Spirit governed one church, but in many 
different ways.
Nicholas of Cusa, Anselm of  
Havelberg, and Peter Abelard
While there is no firm evidence that Nicholas of Cusa came across the 
Antikeimenon of Anselm of Havelberg, it is a remarkable coincidence that 
the earliest-known manuscript of that work, produced at Freising in 1437, 
was prepared in the same year as Nicholas was sent to Constantinople 
to seek reconciliation of the Greek and Latin churches. Four years ear-
lier he had written his De concordantia catholica, asserting the conciliar 
cause about the importance of consent and representation. His experi-
ence in Constantinople provoked his writing in the 1440 De docta igno-
rantia, while he was working in his first spell as papal legate in Germany 
(1438–1448). Administrative duties did not prevent Nicholas from being 
extraordinarily productive during these years, a period that culminated in 
his being appointed Cardinal in 1448 and then sent to Germany again 
in 1451 to reform the church. It is in this period, I suggest, that he came 
across a copy of Peter Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” perhaps discovered 
in the process of replacing the library of Magdeburg cathedral, destroyed 
by fire in 1450. On the eve of Gutenberg’s printing of the Bible, libraries 
were still constituted by handwritten books.
In his Antikeimenon Anselm of Havelberg anticipates the con-
cerns of Nicholas of Cusa about overcoming diversity, but, in the twelfth 
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century, this was understood only through the divergences between dif-
ferent forms of Christian life:
Behold the one body of the church is seen to be vivified by the 
one Holy Spirit, who is unique unto himself and multiplied in 
the diverse distribution of his gifts. Truly this body of the church, 
vivified by the Holy Spirit and divided and separated through its 
different members in different ages and times, begins with the 
just Abel and is consummated in the last of the elect, always one 
in the one faith, but greatly separated by the manifold variety of 
ways of living.31
Anselm of Havelberg was not particularly interested in those philosophi-
cal aspects of the Theologia “Scholarium” that so interested Nicholas of 
Cusa. Nonetheless, Anselm shared Abelard’s interest in the way the Holy 
Spirit could be manifest in many different forms in different periods of 
history. In this respect, Anselm was picking up themes of Rupert of Deutz 
(originally active in Liège, before moving to Cologne), while foreshad-
owing elements in Joachim of Fiore. As Lees argues, Anselm’s theology 
gave recognition to history as a place where new ideas could legitimately 
develop.32
Anselm shared with both Abelard and Nicholas of Cusa disgust 
with hypocrisy in religious life. While Anselm acknowledged the impor-
tance of Bernard and the Cistercian order in renewing monasticism, he 
also spoke highly of the canons regular, a movement promoted by Norbert 
of Xanten, and refused to engage in the traditional arguments between 
these two movements of reform. Anselm’s recognition of religious diver-
sity was subtly different from that of Bernard, who only spoke about the 
divine inspiration behind the Latin Church. Anselm, by contrast, spoke 
glowingly of the diversity of modes of practicing the Christian faith:
In the Eastern church, among the Greeks and Armenians and 
Syrians, there are different kinds of religious who are in accord 
in one catholic faith, and yet in behaviour, order, habit, food and 
office of psalm-singing, they are divergent from each other in no 
small way.33
Anselm’s exposure in Constantinople to the cultural diversity of 
Christendom led him to insist on acknowledging the multiplicity of 
the gifts of the Spirit. Nicholas of Cusa certainly sympathized with 
this perspective. Whether or not he precipitated the copy of Anselm’s 
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Antikeimenon in 1437, prior to going to Constantinople, three centu-
ries after Anselm’s own visit to that city, both writers were much more 
aware than Bernard of Clairvaux of the reality of the diversity of rites in 
Christendom.
The theological discussion of the Holy Spirit that Anselm draws 
from the Theologia “Scholarium” offers a similar perspective that the dif-
ference between the Latin and Greek theological perspectives may not be 
as great as often considered. In his theology of the Holy Spirit as divine 
goodness, Abelard was consciously aware of the power and importance of 
Platonist tradition, as mediated through the Timaeus of Plato. Abelard 
argued against those Greeks who insisted that the Holy Spirit proceeded 
only from the Father, but acknowledged that while the ecumenical coun-
cils insisted on uniformity of faith, this did not necessarily mean diversity 
of words, only diversity of faith: “Therefore just as diverse is taken as oppo-
site, thus it is not incongruously tied in a different way, that is differently 
in place of being in an opposite way.”34 Anselm of Havelberg shared with 
Abelard a testimony of Dindimus about the Holy Spirit as the spirit of 
truth, proceeding from the Father and the Son. At the same time Abelard 
did not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeded principally from the Father.35 
Anselm did not include, however, Abelard’s philosophical reflection that 
if any took a more philosophical gaze on Platonic reason they would see 
that Plato was talking about the profound rationality of creation.36
Thierry of Chartres, Peter Abelard,  
and Nicholas of Cusa
Whereas Bernard of Clairvaux focused in his theology on the visiting of 
the Word of God to the soul (exemplified for him by the narrative of the 
Song of Songs), Abelard had always devoted much more attention in his 
Theologia to the Holy Spirit. Bernard’s theological perspective was always 
more shaped by Augustine’s conviction that the human soul, even after 
sins had been forgiven through receiving the grace of baptism, was marked 
by the stain of original sin. Augustine’s anti-Pelagian rhetoric was directed 
against what he saw as an excessive optimism about human nature. Bernard 
continued an Augustinian perspective about the stain of sin, while intro-
ducing themes of awareness of the experience of love as part of the process 
by which sin was overcome. Abelard, by contrast, was much less comfort-
able with this Augustinian perspective on human nature. His reading of 
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Plato’s Timaeus in particular led him to reflect on the fundamental good-
ness and rationality of creation. In this sense, Abelard shared a very similar 
perspective to Thierry of Chartres, even if he did not have Thierry’s expertise 
in the study of the natural world.
Abelard and Thierry certainly knew each other, as is evident from 
Abelard’s account of his trial at Soissons in 1121, when he describes how 
Thierry was rebuked by his bishop, namely Geoffrey of Chartres, for mock-
ing the theological accusations being made against Abelard, that he was 
effectively denying divine omnipotence. In his commentary on the seven 
days of creation, Thierry made a concerted, and perhaps naive attempt 
to reconcile the accounts of Genesis and the Timaeus (as also the brief 
details he knew about Hermes Tresmegstus). Without any of Abelard’s 
careful discussion of Plato’s image of a world soul as a metaphor or cov-
ering (involucrum) not to be taken literally, Thierry asserted that what 
Plato called the world soul and described by Virgil (Aeneid 6:723–25) as 
the interior spirit nourishing the world, was the same as what Christians 
called the Holy Spirit.37 In his Dialectica, Abelard mentions that there 
were Platonists who went too far in simply identifying the two concepts. 
Because Abelard refines this critique of Thierry’s argument in each version 
of his Theologia (and goes into more detail on precisely those passages of 
Virgil cited by Thierry), it seems most likely that Thierry may have com-
posed his discussion of the days of creation before the Dialectica, possi-
bly before 1117/1118.38 Thierry was then still under the influence of his 
brother, Bernard of Chartres (d. 1126) who had produced an important 
commentary on the Timaeus, which steered away from potentially con-
troversial connections with Christian doctrine. Because Thierry never 
repeated these claims about the world soul as being the same as the Holy 
Spirit, it seems more likely that Thierry decided to immerse himself in the 
study of the Opuscula sacra of Boethius as an authoritative framework on 
which to base his teaching.
Nicholas of Cusa never identifies by name Abelard, Thierry of 
Chartres or Anselm of Havelberg in his writing. Nonetheless, each of 
these three figures of the twelfth century offered ideas to Nicholas of Cusa 
quite different from the most widely copied theologian of the twelfth cen-
tury, namely Peter Lombard. As is evident from the contents of the library 
at Cusa (of which Abelard’s Theologia was originally part), Nicholas was 
aware of the diversity of medieval thought, in particular of the twelfth 
century, to a much greater degree than most of his contemporaries. Yet 
Nicholas was also influenced by later writers, such as Ramon Lull and 
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Meister Eckhart, that I have not touched on here. The originality of 
Nicholas is such that his ideas cannot be traced back to any single literary 
source. Nonetheless, this little glimpse into one corner of his library ena-
bles us to see that he was always fascinated by how other writers handled 
the same problems of diversity and concord with which he was engaged.
NOTES
1 On Bussi, see Miglio, Giovani Andrea Bussi.
2 On the Cusa library, see Marx, Verzeichnis, available at https://archive.org/
details/verzeichnisderh00biblgoog.
3 See, for example, Izbicki’s introduction to Nicholas of Cusa, Writings on 
Church and Reform.
4 References are to the entries in Marx, Verzeichnis. On individual MSS, see: 
Ullman, “Manuscripts of Nicholas of Cues”; Van de Vyver, “Annotations de Nich-
olas de Cues”; Haubst, “Les études sur manuscrits.”
5 Biechler, “Three manuscripts on Islam.”
6 Albertson, Mathematical Theologies; see also his review article, “New Direc-
tions in Research on Nicholas of Cusa.” Thierry’s influence was first noted by 
Duhem, “Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues.” Häring describes all known 
manuscripts in Commentaries on Boethius, 25–33 (on the Commentum, the Lec-
tiones and Glosa on Boethius) and 34–35 (Abbreviatio Monacensis in Munich, 
Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 6942, unusual in being copied in the fifteenth 
century). Thierry’s most widely circulated work, always transmitted anonymously, 
was the Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, ed. Häring, 555–75, of which Häring 
notes (52) only a single fifteenth-century MS, from France.
7 Hoenen discovered a text (Fundamentum naturae) in Eichstätt, Univer-
sitätsbibliothek, Cod. St. 687, close to the ideas of Thierry, that he argued served 
as a stimulus for Nicholas, in “‘Ista prius inaudita.’ Eine neuentdeckte Vorlage der 
De docta ignorantia.”
8 Augustine, De doctrina christiana 1.5, 9: “in patre unitas, in filio aequalitas, in 
spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia, et tria haec unum omnia propter 
patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, conexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum.”
9 Haubst, “Marginalien des Nikolas von Kues.”
10 Mews, Introduction to Peter Abelard, Theologia ‘Scholarium’, 241–43.
11 Ibid., 238–41.
12 Haubst describes these annotations in “Marginalien,” 288–92.
13 Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 1.94, 356: “Nunc autem post tes-
timonia prophetarum de fide sanctae trinitatis, libet etiam testimonia philoso-
phorum supponere, quos ad unius dei intelligentiam tum ipsa philosophiae ratio 
perduxit, qua iuxta apostolum inuisibilia ipsius dei a creatura mundi per ea quae 
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facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur; tum etiam ipsa continentissimae uitae sobri-
etas quodam eis merito id ipsum acquisiuit.”
14 Ps-Cicero, De inventione 1.29.46, 39: “in eo autem, quod in opinione posi-
tum est, huiusmodi sunt probabilia: impiis apud inferos poenas esse praeparatas; 
eos, qui philosophiae dent operam, non arbitrari deos esse.”
15 Nicholas of Cusa, De pace fidei 6, 16: “Nullo umquam tempore philosophi 
aliter sensisse reperiuntur, quam quod impossibile sit esse plures deos, quibus 
unus superexaltatus non praesit.”
16 Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 1.107, 360, quoting Jerome, Com-
mentaria in Matthaeum 4, 242: “ex eo quod malus seruus ausus est dicere: metis 
ubi non seminasti et congregas ubi non sparsisti, intellegimus etiam gentilium et 
philosophorum bonam uitam recipere dominum et aliter habere eos qui iuste, 
aliter qui iniuste agant et ad comparationem eius qui naturali legi seruiat, con-
demnari eos qui scriptam legem neglegant.”
17 Cited otherwise only by Raban Maur, Expositio in Matthaeum, 661 and 
Aquinas, Catena aurea in Matthaeum 25.2, 368.
18 Peter Abelard, Theologia ‘Scholarium’, 1.86, 352: “Si autem dicant eum 
aeternaliter egredi ex Bethleem, eo quod eius natiuitas in eo loco futura, ab 
aeterno prouisa sit a deo et predestinata, hoc utique modo cuiuslibet hominis uel 
cuiuslibet rei natiuitas aeterna est, quia uidelicet ab aeterno prouisa.”
19 Nicholas of Cusa, De visione Dei 1.10, 48.
20 Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 3.24, 510: “Velle itaque deus duobus 
modis dicitur, aut secundum uidelicet prouidentiae suae ordinationem, secundum 
quod scilicet aliquid disponit apud se ac deliberat statuit que in sua prouidentia, 
ut sic postmodum compleat; aut secundum consilii sui adhortationem uel appro-
bationem qua unumquemque ad hoc admonet, quod per gratiam suam remuner-
are paratus esset.”
21 Ibid., 1.181, 394: “Pluribus quoque sanctorum testimoniis didicimus pla-
tonicam sectam catholicae fidei plurimum concordare.”
22 Gregory the Great, Registrum I.41, 00: “De trina uero mersione baptisma-
tis, nil respondi uerius potest quam ipsi sensistis, quia in una fide nil officit sanctae 
ecclesiae consuetudo diuersa.”
23 Peter Abelard, Sic et Non 112.2, 366; Gratian, Decretum 3.4.80, 1388; 
Peter Lombard, Sententiae 4.3.7.1, 2: 439.
24 Anselm of Canterbury, De processione spiritus sancti.
25 Mews, Introduction to Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 232–38, 
243–64.
26 On Anselm, see the excellent study by Lees, Anselm of Havelberg.
27 Mews, Introduction to Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 267–68; the 
parallels are between Antikeimenon (Dialogi) 2.7, 2.24–26 (PL 188: 1174BD, 
1202D–1207CD) and Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 1.122 and more 
importantly 2.157–64, 368, 483–88.
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28 Lees identifies these three MSS in Anselm of Havelberg, 287. The earliest 
may be Munich, BSB Clm 6488 (from Freising, dated to 1437). The Antikei-
menon was edited by d’Achery in 1677 (from an unknown MS), and reprinted in 
PL 188: 1139–1248; the first book is translated (but without any further critical 
edition) by Salet, Dialogues.
29 Eberhard, “Ansätze zur Bewältigung ideologischer Pluralität,” mentioned 
by Lees, Anselm of Havelberg, 209 n. 146.
30 On the MSS owned by Guido di Castello, see Mews, “Introduction,” 268.
31 Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 1.2 (1144BCE), 44: “Ecce apparet man-
ifeste unum corpus Ecclesiae uno Spiritu sancto vivificari, qui et unicus est in se, et 
multiplex in multifaria donorum suorum distributione. Verum hoc corpus Ecclesiae 
Spiritu sancto vivificatum, et per diversa membra diversis temporibus et aetatibus 
discretum et distinctum, a primo Abel justo incoepit, et in novissimo electo consum-
mabitur, semper una fide, sed multiformiter distinctum multiplici vivendi varietate.”
32 Lees, Anselm of Havelberg, 205–6.
33 Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 1.10 (1156CD), 160: “Item in Ori-
entali Ecclesia, apud Graecos et Armenos et Syros, diversa sunt genera religioso-
rum, qui in una quidem fide catholica cordant, ac tamen in moribus, in ordine, in 
habitu, in victu, in officio psallendi non parum ab invicem discrepant.” Cf. Lees, 
Anselm of Havelberg, 212–13.
34 Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 2.152, 481: “Sicut ergo diuersum 
pro opposito dicitur, ita diuerso modo, quod est altiter, pro opposito modo non 
incongrue sumitur.”
35 Ibid., 2.163, 486: “Proprie tamen seu principaliter eum a patre procedere 
non negamus.” Cf. Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 2.25 (1205B): “Anselmus 
Havelbergensis episcopus dixit Quod Spiritus sanctus a Patre proprie procedat, 
non negamus, quia id ipsum doctores nostri nos docuerunt sive hoc ipsi a viestris, 
sive vestri hoc ab ipsis habuerint.”
36 Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 2.167, 489.
37 Thierry, De sex dierum operibus 27, in Thierry, Commentaries, 567.
38 Abelard discusses the texts quoted by Thierry in Theologia “Scholarium,” 
1.177–178, 392–93. Häring (Thierry, Commentaries, 46–47) is not aware of the 
subtlety of Abelard’s discussion of Platonists in the Dialectica, or its implications 
for assigning a date before 1118 for Thierry’s De sex dierum operibus, which he 
thinks could have been written between 1130 and 1140.
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THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY IS THE HISTORIAN’S DISPUTED NO-MAN’S LAND. For Johan Huizinga “the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries ... [were] the end of the Middle Ages ... 
the age of medieval thought in its last phase of life ... fully unfolded and 
developed,” the waning or the autumn of the Middle Ages.1 For others, 
the fifteenth century is like John Wyclif, the morning star of the modern 
world.2 In recent years, some medievalists have become even more aggres-
sive, arguing for the long Middle Ages, stretching the period up to the 
seventeenth or eighteenth century, while some modernists have moved in 
the opposite direction, beginning the early modern era in the fourteenth 
century.3 The fifteenth century has thus lost some of its significance.
While this debate might seem to be of interest only to a small num-
ber of specialists, it is important for the organizing of the great amounts of 
data available to historians into manageable units. Furthermore, the terms 
medieval and modern are commonly used when discussing levels of social 
and cultural development in international affairs. Are the medieval and 
the modern eras universal stages of human development, is modernity the 
rejection of the medieval, is it the next stage in a gradual course of human 
development, what is sometimes termed the theory of progress? Or is the 
three-fold structure of development, ancient, medieval, modern not uni-
versal but only applicable to Europe?4
What can be said of the fifteenth century as a whole can also be 
said of leading figures and events: did they reflect medieval or mod-
ern developments and intellectual currents? Such judgments obviously 
depend on the perspective from which the observer begins. Nicholas of 
Cusa is one such individual. According to Ernst Cassirer, from a philo-
sophical perspective Cusa was “the first modern thinker,” while Jasper 
Hopkins has taken the opposite position, asserting that Cusa never 
crossed “over the threshold that distinguishes the Middle Ages from 
Modernity.”5 Perhaps Thomas Izbicki best categorized Cusa, saying that 
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he was “a protean figure,” one whose writings dealt with a wide variety of 
contemporary intellectual concerns, old and new, pointing in particular 
to Cusa’s work on “history, theology, philosophy, science and art.”6 One 
omission from Izbicki’s list of disciplines to which Cusa made a contribu-
tion was the realm of international relations, a topic that was of growing 
importance in the fifteenth century and culminated in the creation of the 
great European overseas empires.
In fifteenth-century terms, the problem of international relations 
was a two-fold one. In the first place, there was the problem of conten-
tious relations among European states that were beginning to acquire 
overseas territories and trade routes in the Atlantic. In the second place, 
there was the larger question of the relation of Christian societies to non-
Christian societies. These problems were becoming increasingly complex 
as Iberian seamen were moving down the west coast of Africa and out into 
the Atlantic in the search for a water route to Asia that would outflank the 
Muslim cordon that blocked the land routes.7
There were a number of responses to these issues in the fifteenth 
century, ranging from the theoretical, even visionary, to the hard-headed 
and practical. One can illustrate this range of options by comparing the 
way in which Nicholas of Cusa discussed the place of infidel peoples in his 
Catholic Concordance with the way in which contemporary papal policy 
dealt with Christian–infidel relations. The papal position is found being 
developed in the letters of popes Nicholas V (1447–1455) and Alexander 
VI (1492–1503) dealing with the Castilian and Portuguese exploring 
activities in the Atlantic.
Cusa was not only a speculative thinker but also a participant in 
the ecclesiastical crises of the fifteenth century, in the conciliar contro-
versy as a theoretician, as an activist at the Council of Basel (1431–1449), 
as a reform-minded bishop, and as a member of the papal court. He also 
contributed to political and legal theory by his emphasis on “the consent 
of the governed [that] runs like a leitmotif through what Cusa has to say 
about empire and church alike” and on his discussion of representation as 
the means for achieving such consent.8
Although Cusa’s writings dealt primarily with the internal cri-
ses facing the contemporary Latin Christian world, he was also aware of 
the world beyond Europe, an aspect of his work that has received little 
attention except for his discussion of the Muslim world.9 The increas-
ing interest in the non-Christian world, those who inhabited it and how 
Latin Christians would deal with these newly revealed peoples would 
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have reached Cusa from two sources. In the first place, he was serving 
the papacy when access to the only inhabited Atlantic island chain, the 
Canaries, the site of missionary activity, became contested. The Portuguese 
and the Castilians sought a monopoly of Christian access to the islands 
and appealed to the papacy to regulate Christian entry into them for the 
well-being of the indigenous population and to prevent conflict between 
Christian nations engaged in exploration.10 In the second place, he learned 
of the wider world being revealed from the contemporary interest in geog-
raphy through his friendship with Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli (1397–1482), 
a scholarly humanist who was interested in ancient geographers, especially 
Strabo (d. 23 ad), and who proposed reaching Asia by sailing west, per-
haps also being an influence on Christopher Columbus.11
From the beginning of Iberian overseas voyages the papacy had 
been involved, especially in issuing bulls dealing with the Canary Islands 
because they were the only inhabited islands that Europeans had discov-
ered in the Atlantic.12 The fact that the islands were inhabited justified 
papal involvement in European contact with them because of the church’s 
mission to preach to all mankind. In addition, popes sought to reduce, 
if not prevent entirely, conflict between Castile and Portugal over access 
to these islands and the other lands Europeans encountered in the course 
of seeking a water route to Asia by regulating Christian access to them. 
In 1436, King Duarte of Portugal (1433–1438) requested Pope Eugenius 
IV (1431–1447) to resolve a dispute over access to the Canary Islands, 
which led to two legal briefs and a papal bull that foreshadowed the great 
Spanish debates about the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas in 
the coming centuries.13
Cusa discussed the relation of infidel peoples to Christian society 
in his Catholic Concordance, a vision of “an ordered harmonious universe 
[that] was derived from the version of the Christian world view,” found 
in the work of Dionysius the Aeropagite (fifth century).14 He began the 
Concordance with the premise that all of creation is designed to reflect 
“the underlying divine harmony in the church,” a harmony that would ulti-
mately include all mankind as the church expanded throughout the world. 
According to Cusa, “Every living being has been created in harmony” 
so there is a natural inclination to bring all mankind into a harmonious 
world order.15
The harmony that Cusa envisioned was not, however, the result of 
an inevitable developmental process. It required the coming together of 
people who form a government in which all are represented and the rulers 
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of which govern with the consent of the people. In Book 3 of the Catholic 
Concordance, he discussed the nature of right-ordered government accord-
ing to Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero who had described the nature of “well-
ordered political, economic, and monarchic regimes.” According to these 
writers, “Natural laws precede all human consideration and provide the 
principles for them all.”16 To determine these principles as they pertain 
to human existence, humanity has “been endowed with reason” so that 
men might recognize what will best serve their needs. The ancient think-
ers concluded that reason led men to recognize that “association and shar-
ing are most useful” in order “to achieve the purpose of human existence.” 
Consequently, men “have joined together and built villages and cities in 
which to live together.” The stability and good order of such communities 
“would be maintained by laws adopted with the common consent of all—
or at least with the consent of the wise and illustrious and the agreement 
of the others.” Thus, the harmony that ought to exist will not inevitably 
develop; it will require the active participation of human beings, wise men 
working with the consent of their fellows, to work out the specific details 
of the harmony.17
Cusa’s description of the proper human way of life, that is, in 
organized societies in which all the members participate to some extent 
in governance, reflected not only the ancient writers, but prior European 
thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua (1275–1342/43) as well, and the 
experience of Europeans, especially in the Italian city states, no doubt 
contributed to his understanding of government. Such communities 
require an agricultural base and at least some trade in order to acquire 
goods and services not available locally but that are necessary for full 
human development. To achieve the ideal order, the ruler “should take 
special care to avoid great inequality among his subjects.”18
According to Cusa, although all men are “naturally inclined to 
civilized life,” not all are capable of participating in governance. Citing 
both ancient pagan authors and Ambrose (337–397), bishop of Milan, 
he offered the example of “the ignorant and stupid” who clearly lack the 
capacity to participate fully in civic affairs. Can they share in any way in 
civic life? In fact, they can to some degree because “God has assigned a 
certain natural servitude to the ignorant and stupid so that they readily 
trust the wise to help them to preserve themselves” from the consequences 
of their ignorance.19 Given the often violent conflict within and between 
Italian city-states, this seems optimistic but it does reflect Cusa’s theme of 
the essential harmony of God’s creation, so that all the elements should 
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work together according to their God-given capacities, in effect creating a 
good society by reconciling the wisdom and capacity for leadership of the 
“wise and illustrious” with the natural desire of the “ignorant and stupid” 
to improve their lot.
Cusa did not see the “ignorant and stupid” as an entire category 
of people destined to remain such generation after generation, that is, 
Aristotle’s “natural slaves,” as it came to be understood in the sixteenth 
century, and he did not assert that they should be enslaved or otherwise 
physically controlled any more than any other citizen.20 Individuals were 
wise or stupid, not entire communities of people. Their condition was due 
to ignorance, not biology. As Ambrose wrote, following the ancient philo-
sophical tradition, “the wise man is free and the stupid man a slave.”21
To demonstrate this point, Cusa turned to the story of Noah and 
his sons, re-writing it somewhat in order to support his argument. The 
patriarch had cursed his son Ham and his descendants for laughing at him 
while drunk and naked, thus not showing proper respect for his father, a 
characteristic of the ignorant and stupid. By the terms of the curse, Ham, 
the elder brother, and his descendants, would be household slaves to his 
brethren because of the lack of respect Ham had shown to his father, the 
wise elder. To reinforce his point, Cusa then pointed to the story of Esau 
and Jacob wherein the younger brother Jacob, “who was preferred [by 
their father] to the older, brother, Esau, because of his wisdom” and so 
inherited from their father.22
These biblical examples reinforced the teaching of the ancient 
pagan philosophers with a Christian twist. Within a family there could 
be a wise son and an ignorant one and the wise parent supports the virtu-
ous son and restrains the ignorant one. In each case there was a “devoted 
father [who] was torn between his two sons in fatherly affection” but 
when facing the choice of an heir the decision had to be “made on the 
basis of merit,” not affection. In the final analysis, “certain wise men act 
as guides for the unthinking people.” They rule “through the imposition 
of their power which they use to compel the unwilling to obey those who 
are wiser and to submit to the laws.” Cusa then added a curious comment: 
“Servitude can be by choice—it is less worthy if by compulsion and better 
if freely chosen” by those who recognize their need to be guided by the 
wiser. At the same time he also wrote that “nature does not make a slave, 
but ignorance, nor does manumission make one free, but learning.” Those 
who do not recognize their limitations and follow their natural inclina-
tion to accept the leadership of the wise will be compelled to accept it. 
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Again quoting Ambrose, Cusa added that “law is only imposed on the 
ignorant, and how because of sin he is compelled by fear of punishment to 
obey the law” which he would not do of his own volition.23
Cusa’s approach to the issue of the disparity of intelligence among 
men is an interesting shift from the Aristotelian one. For Ambrose and 
Cusa, true slavery was not biologically-based but rooted in man’s sinful 
nature. He is a “slave of fear ... desire ... avarice ... lust ... malice ... anger.”24 
These sinful proclivities can and should be restrained for the good of 
the individuals who submit themselves to them and thereby enslave 
themselves. If education and adherence to the guidance of the wise do 
not restrain the sinners from their wicked behaviors, then force can be 
employed.
Cusa’s discussion of the responsibility of the wise to assist, even 
restrain, the “ignorant and stupid” and his stress on the importance of just 
government based on the consent of the governed dealt with the situation 
of Latin Christendom. These issues, however, were not unique to Europe 
but concerned all mankind, not just Christians, although he provided 
only brief references to these issues in non-Christian lands. What would 
be the nature of European relations with the peoples of Asia who lived in 
highly developed, civilized societies such as those Marco Polo described 
and were the sources of the products that Europeans sought? Where and 
how would these people fit into Cusa’s Concordance?
Cusa did not specifically mention primitive peoples in the non-
Western world, but his premises suggested that if there were no indigenous 
wise leaders to bring their fellows to a civilized level of existence, then per-
haps European Christians ought to do so. Christian missionaries seeking 
the conversion of the peoples whom they encountered would be in a posi-
tion to instruct such people not only in religion but in the skills necessary 
for civilized existence as well.25 They could serve as the wise men to whom 
these primitive people could look for leadership and guidance.
Relations with non-Christian governments that Europeans 
expected to encounter in Asia were another matter. Men after all were 
naturally inclined to joining together to achieve the fullness of human life 
so that government was a natural development, as the ancients, especially 
Aristotle, demonstrated. It was not only a natural way of life, however, 
because “all rulership is sacred and spiritual and comes from God,” whether 
the ruler is a Christian or not.26 Cusa considered the status of non-Christian 
rulers from two perspectives. In the first place, there was the question of 
their relation to the Holy Roman emperor who was “the vicar of Christ, 
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the King of kings and Lord of lords” in Cusa’s opinion. He “is first over all 
other princes because he rules in subordination to Christ … and subjects 
himself to Christ and his laws.” The result is that “the Christian empire is 
higher than all other governments because it is the one closest to God.”27 
The ultimate standard for determining the moral quality of any govern-
ment is therefore the degree of adherence to Christian principles. This is 
not to say that infidel rulers are by definition illegitimate, only that they 
do not live up to the highest standards.28
Having described the emperor as the highest ruler in the world 
because of his close relation to God, Cusa then turned from the theo-
retical and visionary to the practical. Although the emperor possesses the 
supreme status as ruler, “his power to command does not extend beyond 
the territorial limits of the empire under him.” The Roman law termed 
him “the lord of the world” because “the Romans had the greater part of 
the world under their rule,” but not the entire world. Beyond the bounda-
ries of the Roman Empire there were numerous regions stretching from 
Norway to the Himalayas to the great lands of the east, China, India, 
and Ceylon, and to Libya and Mauritania in the south where the Roman 
eagles never appeared. Cusa recognized the extent of these regions, quot-
ing Ptolemy’s observation that these lands “make up no small part of the 
world” and are quite heavily populated.29 He added that in Africa, prob-
ably Ethiopia, there was a ruler, “Prester John who is said to be a Christian 
and a most faithful deacon with seventy kingdoms subject to him” but 
Cusa was not impressed, concluding that “those kingdoms are not very 
populous or large.”30
It is easy to see how the Latin Christian kingdoms and lesser politi-
cal units of Europe could be fitted into Cusa’s harmonious structure, but 
what about the inhabitants of these distant lands? Cusa had no difficulty 
in fitting them into his scheme. In the first place, all men are by nature in 
social and organized societies “to preserve unity and harmony” and “estab-
lished guardians of all these laws with the power necessary to provide for 
the public good,” just as European Christian rulers did.31 Furthermore, “all 
rulership is sacred and spiritual and comes from God.” All rulers are not 
equal in status, however, and “there are gradations in excellence accord-
ing to [the ruler’s] closeness to, or distance from God.” The ruler “who 
in his public rule resembles God least is least worthy while the one who 
resembles him most is the greatest.” Cusa then provided a brief list of rul-
ers and where they stand in the order of excellence. In his opinion, “a king 
of the Tartars is the least worthy because he governs through laws least in 
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agreement with those divinely instituted,” while “a king who belongs to 
the Mohammedan sect is greater since he venerates the laws of the Old 
Testament and certain of those of the New Testament.” A “Christian king 
is the greatest because he accepts both the laws of nature and those of the 
Old and New Testaments and the orthodox faith.”32 In other words, man-
kind exists in a gradated series of nations at various stages of development 
toward ideal rule and the Christian God.33
The purpose of rulers in Cusa’s schema is to establish peace and 
“to direct their subjects to their eternal end” and to the “means to reach 
that end.” This was not the responsibility of Christian rulers alone, but 
of all rulers by the very nature of their office. Cusa pointed out that 
the ancient “pagan emperors were called supreme pontiffs because of 
the care which they took for religion.”34 For a ruler to fail to support the 
religious development of his subjects was therefore to fail in his most 
important function.
The overseas voyages introduced Europeans to a wide range of 
other peoples and lands, not all of which fitted the image of Asian socie-
ties provided by Marco Polo and other travelers. Some places, particularly 
the Azores, Cape Verde, and Madeira island chains, were uninhabited. 
Others, the Canary Islands and the coastal regions of Africa, for exam-
ple, were inhabited but not with great trading cities. The inhabitants that 
Europeans encountered lived at a variety of levels, from the most primitive 
to the organized, although not as developed as the Asian countries such 
as China. In Cusa’s vision, those peoples who had not reached the level of 
existence associated with towns and agriculture would submit to the wise 
leadership of the Europeans and begin the process leading to civilized sta-
tus and Christianity. As for Muslim, Tartar, and other infidel rulers who 
had reached a civilized level of development, when presented with more 
sophisticated forms of society and with the Christian religion, they would 
accept them and bring their people to the fullness of human development 
as was their responsibility.
What Cusa did not explain was exactly how in practice the goal 
of universal concordance was to be accomplished. He suggests that the 
nature of mankind would move people in the direction of universal 
concordance under the guidance of Christian missionaries. Given his expe-
rience as a lawyer, papal official, and bishop, he had to have recognized that 
even within Latin Christendom his vision was not being realized. As for 
the Muslims and the Tartars, they were traditional enemies of Christians 
and showed no willingness to become Christian and participate in 
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Cusa’s concordance. Likewise, the less developed societies, those peoples 
who lived in the fields and the forests, did not always appreciate the wis-
dom of missionaries and did not readily accept civility and Christianity. 
Was the concordance to be only a fantasy or would it be possible to 
implement it to some degree?
One way to appreciate the difference between Cusa’s vision of a 
harmonious world order and contemporary political reality is to examine 
contemporary papal letters that deal with relations with non-Christians. There 
were more than one hundred such letters beginning about 1420. Taken 
together, they outline the developing papal policy regarding Christian 
overseas expansion. The letters of two popes are especially interesting. 
The first was a letter of a pope contemporary with Cusa, Nicholas V, 
who issued the bull Romanus Pontifex (1455) dealing with a longstand-
ing issue, conflicting Castilian and Portuguese claims to access to the 
Atlantic islands and the coast of Africa, and with the traditional enemies 
of Christendom such as Muslims. The second was a series of letters, those 
of Alexander VI, three bulls usually referred to by the heading of the first 
of the series, Inter caetera (1493), issued following Columbus’s first voy-
age. These were concerned with peoples with whom Europeans had had no 
previous experience, the peoples of the New World who would provide a 
unique challenge.
The bulls of Nicholas and Alexander opened with a statement of 
papal responsibility for achieving the salvation of all mankind. For Pope 
Nicholas, his responsibility was to contemplate “with a father’s mind all 
the several climes of the world and the characteristics of all the nations 
dwelling in them,” in order to secure “the salvation of all.” The world was 
not, however, at peace and Christians have to “restrain the savage excesses 
of the Saracens and of other infidels, enemies of the Christian name” 
before peace is secured under Christian direction and the work of mis-
sionaries is possible.35
Nicholas V pointed to the work of “the noble personage Henry, 
infante of Portugal” who was leading efforts to spread the church and its 
teachings overseas. According to the pope, the Infante has been encour-
aging seamen to sail south and east into lands “unknown to us western-
ers” where dwell people of whom “we had no certain knowledge” but who 
might be helpful in the wars against the Saracens and other enemies of 
Christendom. The Infante was expected to support missionary efforts 
among these peoples, suggesting that they would receive the missionar-
ies peacefully and not as the result of conquest. In this the Infante was 
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following in the heroic tradition of Portuguese monarchs, “inflamed with 
zeal for the salvation of souls and with fervor of faith” seeking out “the 
most remote and undiscovered places, and also to bring into the bosom 
of his faith the perfidious enemies of him and of the life-giving cross,” 
work that continued the crusades and has brought part of Africa, Ceuta, 
under Christian domination. One consequence of this Portuguese activity 
in Africa was that “many Guineamen and other negroes, taken by force, 
and some by barter of unprohibited articles, or by other lawful contract 
of purchase” have been acquired by the Portuguese and “converted to the 
Catholic faith” and been saved.36
The slave trade mentioned in Romanus Pontifex as a source of con-
verts posed a problem for Pope Nicholas. What troubled him was that 
some slaves had been purchased with weapons and other war materials that 
could be employed against Christians. Those engaged in such trade were 
“strangers induced by covetousness” who sought to evade long-standing 
papal bans on such trade.37 One of the responsibilities of the Portuguese 
was to police European contact with the recently discovered lands and 
ensure that unauthorized Europeans did not enter. In effect, the Portuguese 
would have a papally-granted monopoly of access to these lands and there-
fore a monopoly of European trade there. In return for managing European 
Christian entry into the lands and receiving a monopoly of trade, the 
Portuguese would also be responsible for establishing “churches, monaster-
ies, or other pious places” and they “may send over to them any ecclesiasti-
cal persons whatsoever” to minister to “all who live in the said lands or who 
come thither in the future” in the course of Portuguese activities there. The 
profits of trade with Africans would subsidize the missionary efforts among 
the indigenous population and also provide spiritual care for Europeans 
who migrated there.38
From the papal perspective, the peaceful reconciliation of all 
mankind was not a likely prospect, at least not in the immediate future. 
Some of the Africans were converted, but there was no mass conversion 
of an infidel people led by their ruler.39 The expansion of Christianity 
was largely reduced to the uninhabited islands of the Atlantic that were 
“peopled with orthodox Christians,” that is, colonists brought from 
elsewhere. There was, however, one place where there were significant 
numbers of converts. In an apparent reference to the Canary Islands, 
the pope noted that “many inhabitants or dwellers in divers islands situ-
ated in the said sea ... have received holy baptism,” thus expanding the 
Christian world.40
NICHOLAS OF CUSA, THE PAPACY, AND WORLD ORDER  181
In Romanus Pontifex Nicholas V dealt with some of the problems 
that those who wished to fulfill Cusa’s dream of universal reconcilia-
tion would face, and he outlined a way in which such a process might be 
achieved at least to some degree. The grant of a monopoly of access to and 
trade with the newly found lands to the Portuguese and the heavy respon-
sibilities that such a grant carried with it would become a model for later 
explorers. Christendom was besieged by hostile Muslims and Tartars who 
were resistant to missionary efforts and to the accepting of a place within 
Cusa’s harmoniously constructed world order. If the Portuguese were suc-
cessful in evading the infidel cordon and reaching Asia by water, however, 
it might be possible to connect with Christian rulers believed to exist in 
Asia and to engage jointly in a last great crusade that would lead to Cusa’s 
vision of concordance. Almost fifty years later the possibility of this actu-
ally happening occurred when Christopher Columbus announced to the 
world that he had reached the outer edge of Asia.
When Columbus returned from his first voyage and announced 
that he had achieved the long-sought goal of a water route to Asia, he pre-
sented a new and potentially useful situation for Latin Christians to con-
sider. The people he encountered were not Muslims or Tartars or any other 
known enemy of Christians so they could be approached peacefully and 
in this way would not only expand the Christian church but also provide 
support for a last crusade. By sailing west, Columbus had not only evaded 
the Muslim cordon, he also avoided impinging on the papally authorized 
Portuguese monopoly of access to the Atlantic Ocean along the coast of 
Africa, although the Portuguese were not sure of that at first and held him 
for some time on his return when he sailed into the port of Santa Maria in 
the Azores.41 When Columbus returned to Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella 
approached Pope Alexander VI to provide them with a monopoly of the 
western route to Asia, similar to the grant to the Portuguese. The result 
was three bulls issued on May 3 and 4, 1493.42
The initial bull, Inter caetera, was in the tradition of papal letters 
stretching back to 1420, but also recognized that Columbus’s voyage led to 
situations not dealt with in the earlier bulls. It began by placing Columbus 
within the crusading tradition, specifically the Spanish conquest of 
Granada in 1492, at which Columbus was present.43 His first voyage was a 
logical consequence of the monarch’s crusading spirit because the Spanish 
monarchs “had intended to seek out and discover certain lands and islands 
remote and unknown and not hitherto discovered by others” in order to 
bring the inhabitants of these lands to the Christian faith. They supported 
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Columbus who rewarded the monarchs by discovering “certain very 
remote islands and even mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered 
by others,” that is, by other Europeans, especially the Portuguese. The peo-
ple that Columbus found did not, however, inhabit cities and engage in 
the trade for which Columbus searched. Instead, he found “many peoples 
living in peace, and as reported, going unclothed, and not eating flesh.” 
At the same time, there was a positive side to Columbus’s encounter with 
the people of the Caribbean, namely, that they “believe in one God, the 
creator in heaven, and seem sufficiently disposed to embrace the Catholic 
faith and be trained in good morals.”44 To some degree, they fitted Cusa’s 
program of concordance. Thus, one of the Spanish monarchs’ goals was 
potentially achieved, the conversion of the peoples of the Caribbean.
The pope’s response to the request for papal recognition of what 
Columbus had accomplished led to Inter caetera in which he declared that 
this bull will “give, grant, and assign forever to you and your heirs ... all and 
singular the aforesaid countries and islands ... discovered by your envoys 
and to be discovered hereafter.”45 What this authorized was the patronado, 
the authority to establish and administer the church in the newly discov-
ered lands.46 The profits of the trade monopoly would subsidize the work 
of the church in these lands. There was, however, an exception to this 
general grant. It applied only to lands that “at no time have been in the 
actual temporal possession of any Christian owner.” This phrase refers to 
the Christian kingdoms believed to exist in Asia and linked to the story 
of Prester John.47 There was no need to grant a trade monopoly to Latin 
Christians to establish the church because it already existed in such lands.48
There were more than a score of Christian communities across 
Asia, although none actually formed a kingdom. These churches, the larg-
est being the Greek church, were separated from the Roman church by 
schism, that is, by rejection of papal universal jurisdiction and not by her-
esy, that is, doctrinal differences. The papacy had been attempting since 
the thirteenth century to reconcile these churches with Rome, a part of 
the concordance that Cusa sought. The Greek Orthodox church was of 
special interest because of the Byzantine Empire’s role in the crusades. 
From the thirteenth century onward, western support for the Byzantines 
was linked to re-uniting with Rome.49 Cusa was involved in these negotia-
tions when he served as a legate for Pope Nicholas V at Constantinople in 
1437.50 Reconciliation with the other eastern churches was proposed by 
Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241) who outlined how such a reconciliation 
would proceed in his bull Cum hora undecima (1239).51
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In return for receiving a papally-authorized monopoly of Christian 
access to spread Christianity in the newly encountered lands the Spanish 
were expected to “appoint to the aforesaid countries and islands worthy 
and God-fearing, learned, skilled, and experienced men to instruct the 
aforementioned inhabitants and residents in the catholic faith, and to 
train them in good morals.” The bull also forbade “all persons of no matter 
what rank” to go to these lands to trade or for any other purpose “without 
your special permit” and authorization.52
The third bull in Alexander VI’s series Inter caetera (May 4, 1493) 
clarified the zones assigned to the Spanish and the Portuguese, “drawing 
and establishing a line from the Arctic pole ... to the Antarctic pole ... the 
said line to be distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south 
from ... the Azores and Cape Verde.” The bull also restated the ban on 
other Christians from entering these regions without the formal permis-
sion of the responsible Christian monarch.53
Taken collectively, Cusa’s Concordance and the papal bulls outlined 
the development of fifteenth-century Christian thought about peaceful 
Christian–infidel relations ranging from Cusa’s broad vision of a peace-
ful, harmonious world order fulfilling the church’s universal mission to 
the papal letters that chart the development of policies that would imple-
ment such a vision but not necessarily in an entirely peaceful fashion. The 
manner in which Cusa’s vision is described is rather like a schematic for a 
complex machine. The parts are shown neatly laid out, ready to be slipped 
into place to create a harmoniously balanced operating machine by the 
actions of a skilled mechanic, relying on man’s natural desire for associa-
tion with his fellows and rulers’ natural responsibility for the spiritual wel-
fare of their subjects.
Cusa’s system assumed the cooperation of all involved, but what 
if incompetent or stupid individuals refused to accept their proper place 
within the social order? Or what if an infidel ruler denied that he had a 
responsibility for the spiritual welfare of his people or that he did have 
such a responsibility, but rejected Christianity and favored another reli-
gion? Should force be employed to insure that individuals accepted their 
place and that rulers fulfilled their obligation in Christian terms?
The papal letters provided an answer to the questions Cusa’s vision 
raised. They opened with a statement of the church’s universal mission 
that reflected Cusa’s vision of a harmonious world order under papal head-
ship, but they recognized that this will not occur without the use of force 
in some cases. Christians will have to defeat their longtime enemies and 
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they may have to coerce uncivilized peoples to recognize that only with 
wise Christian leaders will they advance to the civilized level of existence 
that is natural for mankind. The papal letters did not, however, present a 
static picture of the unfolding situation. To some degree, papal policies 
were gradually modified and expanded as the Iberians had more experi-
ence in the world beyond Europe and faced situations that Cusa and ear-
lier popes had not contemplated. The Tartars and Muslims for example, 
with whom Christians had warred for a long time, had never shown any 
interest in accepting Christianity peacefully. In the thirteenth century a 
Mongol Khan had even responded to a papal letter seeking his conver-
sion by ordering the pope to submit to him.54 In the fifteenth century, 
while the papacy was praising the crusading fervor that characterized the 
Portuguese and Spanish advance against the Muslims in the west, Islam 
was advancing in the east, seizing Constantinople in 1453 and advancing 
up through the Balkans, reaching Vienna in 1683. A harmonious relation-
ship did not appear likely.
The second issue the papacy had to face was that many of the peoples 
the Spanish and the Portuguese were encountering were not town dwell-
ers, agriculturalists, and merchants, but people living at a pre-civilizational 
level. Furthermore, they existed as social groups, not random individu-
als as Cusa described and seemed to fit Aristotle’s conception of natural 
slaves. At the least they would need training in the basic skills required 
in a civilized society as well as religious instruction. What if they were 
not inclined to accept civilizational and religious instruction?55 Could or 
should they be coerced to do so for their own good?
These fifteenth-century figures were participants in an early stage of 
what Lewis Hanke termed the Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest 
of America.56 They were not isolated academic thinkers, but ecclesiasti-
cal officials who were engaged in directing a church that claimed univer-
sal jurisdiction in spiritual matters and could call upon secular powers 
to assist it. From the perspective of Cusa and the popes discussed here, 
Christians were engaging in legitimate trade and missionary efforts around 
the world. Cusa seems to have envisioned a peaceful path to, ultimately, 
the concordance of all mankind, a naturally and divinely ordained goal. 
The papal letters, however, took a harsher position: it would be necessary 
to fight against the traditional enemies of Christendom in the course of 
creating the desired harmony and it might be necessary to use some force 
in order to achieve a greater good, the harmonious world order that would 
enable all mankind to achieve their nature and their supernatural goals. 
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In the final analysis, Cusa and the popes stood astride the medieval–modern 
divide. They all proclaimed the universal mission of the church, but Cusa 
did so without any discussion of how this would actually be achieved. The 
popes, however, had a fuller appreciation than did he of the difficulties 
that would have to be faced in achieving Cusa’s vision. They were dealing 
with the first stages of the construction of European overseas empires that 
had their own conception of world order.
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Part 4
The Great Schism and the Conciliar Option

ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1376, THE PAPACY RETURNED TO ITALY after some seventy years spent in Avignon, on the banks of 
the Rhône. By 1376, the circumstances that had kept the papacy away 
from its traditional seat had evolved. The Hundred Years War and rebel-
lions in Rome and the Papal States were in remission, and Gregory XI, 
intent on returning the papacy to its historical location, concretized the 
move.1 Gregory did not enjoy his accomplishment for long: he died on 
March 27, 1378. A few days after his death, the first Roman conclave 
opened since Nicholas IV was elected in 1287, close to one hundred years 
previous. Sixteen cardinals were present: eleven French, four Italian, and 
one Spanish. Regardless of internal divisions within the conclave and a 
noisy crowd chanting words like “We want a Roman pope—or at least an 
Italian. If not, we’ll cut you to pieces!,” the cardinals chose Bartolomeo 
Prignano, archbishop of Bari, as Pope Urban VI. A well-qualified curial 
servant, Urban had never belonged to the cardinalate.
Crowned on April 10, 1378, the man was changed by the office. 
Urban VI was rigorous and a man of integrity, but he could also be tem-
peramental and violent. Displeased French cardinals eventually moved 
out of Rome to Anagni. On August 2, 1378, the cardinals publicly ques-
tioned the election, and on August 9 they denounced Urban as illegiti-
mate by reason of procedural impropriety, as the election had taken place 
under duress and violence. They labeled the pope intrusus (usurper), and 
anathematized him.2
On September 21, 1378, thirteen “rebellious” cardinals entered 
their own conclave at the court of Onorato Caetani in Fondi, in the 
Kingdom of Naples, where they had found refuge. The cardinals elected 
Robert of Geneva, who took the name Clement VII. Clement was 
crowned in Fondi a month later, on October 31, with the papal tiara 
brought from Castel Sant’Angelo by Gregory XI’s former camerlengo, 
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Pierre de Cros, who had joined Clement’s side. After learning of the 
election of his rival, Urban VI responded by remaking his College of 
Cardinals, naming twenty-five new candidates. This act confirmed the 
Schism. For the first time in its history the papacy had two popes, with 
two courts, two colleges of cardinals, and two sets of political supporters 
or obediences that perpetuated for over close to forty years. This was not 
the first time the papacy was divided. Antipopes had quite frequently 
been set up by the external intervention of Holy Roman emperors, for 
example. But, never had a college disowned and delegitimized its own 
election to start a new one. Close to two generations of the faithful lived 
with and accommodated themselves to a double and even triple papacy. 
But eventually unity was restored when the Council of Constance 
(1414–1418) elected Martin V as sole pope recognized by all.
This essay will dwell not on the Schism per se, as much as focus 
on its rhetoric and the consequences of its actors using the language of 
usurpation (intrusus). I will argue that the use of this kind of vocabulary 
during the Schism may have facilitated a slip into the rhetoric of tyran-
nicide, and may have incited it. I will suggest that the climate and rhetoric 
of the Schism may have led John the Fearless to rationalize tyrannicide 
against his cousin, Louis of Orléans.3 In a circuitous way, I will also pro-
pose that the rhetoric of usurpation during the Schism may have in turn 
allowed the Council of Constance to maintain powerful oversight over 
the pope. In his defense, Burgundy argued that, first, it is permissible to 
kill a tyrant; second, the Duke of Orléans was a tyrant; and, third, the kill-
ing of Orléans was thus permissible. When it came time to condemn the 
logic of this assertion—it is permissible to kill a tyrant—the Council of 
Constance tergiversated on many procedural points, but did not condemn 
the syllogism. By equivocating on tyrannicide did the council leave itself 
open to accept papacide?
General reflection about legitimacy and quality of governance was 
bound to happen when two popes ruled Christianity. During the Schism, 
religious and secular authorities contemplated the means of responding to 
illegitimacy with one aim, restoring unity: The self-explanatory so-called 
way of force and warfare; the way of cession with a withdrawal of obedi-
ence; and the way of council with the deposition of a pope or two by a 
general council, or a pope’s self-imposed resignation.4 The way of council 
included a huge caveat, that of finding the legitimate authority that would 
call the council. These were the respective “ways” chosen by ecclesiastics 
and princes. Though in hindsight we now know that a council did solve the 
Schism, the question of violence against an unjust ruler lingered throughout 
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the period, and was effectively used in the early years of the Schism (the 
so-called via facti), and in the secular world for the 1399 deposition of 
Richard II of England (and his eventual murder), and the violent murder of 
Louis of Orléans in 1407, upon which I will particularly focus.
It is somewhat easy to consider political murder, especially that of a 
so-called “tyrant,” part of the late medieval zeitgeist. From the mayhem of 
Italian city-states, to the deposition of Richard II (1367–1400), and John 
the Fearless’s own murder in 1419, it seems that a narrative of just retribu-
tion surrounded proponents of unseating despotic rulers.5 The legitimacy 
of killing an unjust ruler, tyrannicide, was debated both in light of the “non 
occidere” Christian injunction, as well as how unjust rule was defined.6 
Anna Lisa Merklin Lewis summarizes medieval views most clearly:
In medieval discussions of tyranny a distinction was made between 
two types: tyranny quoad executionem referring to the rule of a bad 
king or despot with proper title to the throne, and tyranny quoad 
titulum, referring to a usurper. Virtually all medieval theorists 
believed that a usurper could be killed legitimately by anyone, 
although some commentators argued that killing should be a last 
resort. However, they stated that even though a usurper lacked the 
right to rule, the consent of the people would eventually give him 
legitimacy and confer on him the right to demand obedience from 
his subjects.7
A key thinker of the fourteenth century, Bartolus de Sassoferrato 
(1313–1357), drew a sharp distinction “between power unlawfully 
acquired and power unlawfully exercised.”8 More simply, he differentiated 
between the ones who held power “ex defectu tituli” and “ex parte exercitii,” 
that is, between usurpers and despots.9 This approach seems to have been 
somewhat counter to that of Thomas Aquinas. According to John Finnis,
In the writings of his last period, however Aquinas seems to have 
lost interest in the contrast between usurpers and other kinds of 
tyrant. In either kind of tyranny, the injustice of tyrannical exercises 
of authority renders them devoid of authority in the conscience 
of the subject and gives the tyrant the moral status of a brigand. 
Aquinas’ thesis (not denied in his late writings) that the tyrant can 
be killed by public authority (as the Emperor Domitian was put 
to death by the Roman senate) stands and falls with his theory of 
capital punishment. If one sets that aside, as it seems one should, 
there remains considerable scope for acts of war against the leader or 
leaders of a regime which is not merely tyrannical but violent, and 
who cannot otherwise be stopped from pursuing their oppression.10
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Bartolus’s On Tyranny, composed some thirty years before the initia-
tion of the Schism, moved away from Aquinas’s harshness and was addressed 
to secular rulers, but could still make popes and clerics squirm in their seats, 
especially after 1378. Bartolus’s definition of a usurper was one who was 
“ex defectu tituli,” who governed arbitrarily, was of a proud spirit, non jure 
principatur, who lacked a sound title, had “been chosen unlawfully,” was 
“crowned without being elected,” and “did not rule according to law.”11 This 
form of tyrant wallowed in pride (superbia) and had usurped power from 
“regular, established government.”12 As we will see, a usurper did not need 
to be named tyrant to be recognized as one. Thus, during the Schism, either 
obedience could argue that Bartolus’s definition fitted either pope.
In his Paragraph Thirteen, Bartolus asks,
What is a manifest tyrant by defect of title in a commonwealth? 
My answer is: One who rules there openly without a lawful title, as 
is evident from our previous definition. This may happen in divers 
ways. First, if the city or fortified place (castrum) in which he lives 
has not the right to choose its own ruler, and one acts there as ruler, 
he is a tyrant because he is ruling contrary to law, and he is subject to 
the lex Julia majestatis. The same is true if an official, after his term 
of office has expired, continue in it against the will of him who has 
the right of decision (ad quem spectat) [probably the overlord].13
Again, ruling “openly without a lawful title” is an accusation that could be 
made against either pope by the other.
By the end of the fourteenth century, tyranny was defined and asso-
ciated with usurpation or illegitimate taking of power.14 According to 
Guenée, Bartolus de Sassoferato broke from all the various past definitions 
of a tyrant when he defined the tyrant as “solely the one who had seized 
government illegitimately. A few decades later, the Great Schism made 
tyranny a daily concern of the clerics. The other pope, and soon the two 
popes were in their eyes usurpers, tyrants who had appropriated power, 
criminals who by maintaining the schism committed the highest of all 
sins, divine lese-majesty.”15 Guenée intuitively understood that the Schism 
had to affect any discussion of political legitimacy, and anyone who had 
been “in/formed” by the crisis. However, Guenée offered no evidence for 
this assertion. How prevalent, then, was the vocabulary of tyranny and 
usurpation during the Schism?
There is little doubt that, from the start of the Schism, it was the 
Clementist “lobby” that imposed the epithet “intrusus” upon Urban VI. 
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But a word of caution is needed. The historiography is muddled with 
biases. Obviously, Clementists then and later had to rationalize their views 
by demonizing the rival pope. If they found the election illegitimate, it 
is logical that they would label the pope a usurper. Theodoric (Dietrich) 
of Niem, a partisan of Urban VI, describes their effort at debunking the 
pope.16 Clementists made their first public attack, uttering the word 
“usurper” during a sermon.17 The anonymous Clementist author that 
Baluze chose as his “second biographer” for Pope Gregory has no qualms 
about liberally using the word “usurper” throughout his text in speaking 
for the rival obedience. He explains how shortly after the election, cardi-
nals surreptitiously left Rome, “duo una die, unus alia, unus cum licen-
tia, alter sine licentia,” despite Urban’s interdiction upon cardinals leaving 
the city. They reached Anagni to initiate proceedings against this usurper 
who wanted the papacy so badly that he did not fear using violence.18 
The author explains that the declaration of August 9 was pronounced in 
Anagni Cathedral after a sermon.19 The letter named the Apostolic seat 
vacant, “apostolica Sede vacante,” and called the election illegitimate with 
words like “nepharia intrusio in papatu.”20
A survey of Clementist narratives of the Schism reveals consider-
able evidence of the construction of Urban VI as usurper. From there it 
is not difficult to imagine the slip into the language of tyranny.21 Baluze’s 
first volume dedicated to the lives of the popes counts some sixty inci-
dences of the word “intrusus” (usurper) attached to Bartolomeo Prignano. 
The word appears nowhere before the first life of Gregory XI, the pope 
whose death precipitated the initiation of the Schism. From then on the 
word is used liberally where referring to Urban VI in phrases such as, 
“ille non esset papa, sed intrusus;”22 “Post paucos vero dies domini car-
dinales inceperunt exire Romam ... taliter quod nullus Gallicus remansit; 
et omnes iverunt Anagniam, volentes procedere contra dictum intru-
sum;”23 and “Et post sermonem fecerunt legere per unum clericum decla-
rationem contra intrusum.”24
A copy of a letter from Queen Joan of Naples in regards to Urban 
employs similar language, “Sane credimus in toto regno nostro Sicilie et 
in omnibus regnicolis nostrisque comitatibus Provincie et Forqualquerii 
manifestum ... quod etiam ad partes totius Ytalie ac ad remotas et varias 
mundi partes transivit notitia qualiter occupata Sedes apostolica contra 
canonicas sanctiones per intrusum illum de Neapoli, olim episcopum 
Barensem.”25 Similarly, the word abounds in the lives of Clement VII, 
where “dictum Bartholomeum intrusum” becomes a leitmotif.26
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Sometimes a touch of pseudo-reality adds to the construction of 
illegitimacy. According to certain texts, Urban VI was not only a usurper 
but he also behaved like someone who had no legitimacy. The author of 
Gregory XI’s second life adds that the usurper “traveled (rode) like a fool, 
without a cross or the Host preceding him, and without any of the cardi-
nals, and went to a city, which is called Tivoli.”27 No papal cortege would 
have stooped to such level of ceremonial inadequacy; only a false pope 
who did not know what he was doing could travel in such a manner.
Other documents, like the so-called Libri de Schismate, contain 
depositions offered to the Spanish kings of Aragon and Castile to persuade 
them to side with the Clementists, which the kings eventually did. The 
depositions, edited in the 1940s by Michael Seidlmayer, contain a wide 
array of information.28 The inquest into the 1378 election started in 1379, 
and was pursued into 1380–1381, with some 150 individuals from all 
ranks interrogated about what they saw during the election. Again, phrases 
like “declaravit ... Bartholomeum intrusum et dom. papam Clemente in 
papam septimum verum pastorem” abound.29 In 1380, Cardinal Pierre 
de la Vergne declared in the Libri de Schismate, “et alius B. est intrusus 
et fuit positus per impressionem Romanorum”; similarly cardinal Pierre 
Flandrin repeated, “Barensis esset intrusus.”30 Petitioning Clement VII in 
May 1381 to assent to Urban VI’s provision that allowed Spanish bishops 
to keep the “fruits that they had levied,” the king of Castile asked “que 
provea de nuevo et ratifique las provisiones de los obispados fechas por 
el intruso, otrosi que los proveidos deillos non sean tenidos a tornar los 
fruitos que han levado.”31
The language actually became so ingrained that any discussion of Urban 
VI was categorized with the words “usurper.” He was the party or faction of 
the usurper: “Ea que sunt facti pro parte intrusi.”32 Another example is found 
in the following Libri’s chapter titles, “Informaciones tradite mag. Stephano 
Fortis ad informandum dom. infantem Petrum de Aragonia super suis revela-
cionibus, ubi continentur multa mala de Roma, de Romanis et de intruso” or 
“Secuntur ea que sunt facti in scismate principali pro parte intrusi.”33
For the Clementists, most of whom were French, “intrusus” 
was the accepted denomination for the “illegitimate” pope, Urban VI. 
Illegitimacy, of course, was a concept that varied with obedience. One can 
find very few instances where the word was used by the Urbanists against 
the Clementists. And, when it was used, it was not the direct “Clement 
is a usurper,” but rather a more generic “opponent” who was defined as 
“usurper,” and in certain cases, also “heretical.” For example, in May 1379, 
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Urban addressed his legitimacy in a bull sent to the episcopate of Liège. 
The bull states, “ad significandum et affirmandum sue electionis factum 
tanquam canonicum et sue partis adverse hereticum et intrusivum.”34
The third volume of the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, cov-
ering the years 1350–1394, offers several examples of the use of “intrusus” 
that fall in line with contemporary usage. From 1378 on, the university 
described the papal election as non-canonical and Urban as a usurper of 
his title.35 A 1379 letter of the king asked the university to declare that 
Bartolomeo was “intrus ou sainct siège de Rome, et pape Clement VIIme 
est vray pastour de l’eglise universelle.”36 Still, the fourth volume of the 
Chartularium, which ranges from 1394 to 1452, shows no instances of the 
word “intrusus” linked to Urban, who died in 1389, or to his successors. 
This could mean that some of Bartolus de Sassoferrato’s legal opinions, 
namely that an illegitimate ruler can gain legitimacy with the acquiescence 
of his followers, may have gained ground with the recognition of the two 
obediences.37 One pope may have been a usurper, but his obedience gave 
him legitimacy.
The French cardinals’ insistence on using strong wording facilitated 
a slide of vocabulary from “usurper” to “tyrant.” It was in a sense a way 
to “demonize” the other pope. While the word “tyrannus” itself was not 
employed for the “illegitimate” pope, the association of “fear” with “usur-
pation” led readers down that path. As Bartolus had stated, a usurper 
who gained his title by fear was a tyrant. Edited by Louis Gayet, deposi-
tions taken by representatives of the Spanish king insist on fear during 
and especially after the election.38 For the French, fear was the ground on 
which the election had been uncanonical. For example, the Cardinal de la 
Vergne states,
on Easter, I assisted in the coronation of so-called Bartholomew 
[note that he is not named pope] and I rode throughout town with 
the other cardinals because I could not act any other way, and I 
feared that if I showed repugnance in doing so the Romans would 
have put me to death. And so, everything I did in relation to him 
during that conclave, and after, I did for fear of death, otherwise I 
would not have. I never had the intention of approving what had 
been done with him, nor of giving him any rights to the papacy.39
The Bishop of Assisi knew from conversation with Roman offi-
cials that if the cardinals were to renege on the election, “they and their 
servants would be put to death. This was known throughout Rome.”40 
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Depositions show that Roman militiamen were warning the French not 
to utter any words against the validity of Urban VI’s election, or “that 
he had been elected and crowned by force and violence. He is pope, all 
hold him as such and obey him, and that’s enough for us. He is pope, one 
must not doubt it, because if anyone would dare question the election, 
the Romans would certainly cut him to pieces, and his ear would perhaps 
be the largest chunk left of him.”41
Fear had impeded a canonical election, as the cardinals make clear 
in their August 2 and 9 declarations: “Officials compelled the cardinals 
to elect a Roman or at least an Italian to ensure that the curia remained 
at Rome. [...] They added that the cardinals had to declare publicly before 
the whole people that they would comply with the wishes of the popula-
tion in order to avoid grave perils and danger. [...] They believed that all, or 
at least the ultramontane cardinals, would have been slain, if one of them 
had not had the idea of announcing to the people that they had elected the 
Cardinal of St. Peter.”42
Thus, for the generation of thinkers born before or during the 
Schism, violence and illegitimacy impeded just rule and Christian unity, 
and solutions were needed. Options were laid out and one of them could 
be removal of the usurper by violence if necessary. This is the intellectual 
landscape that produced Jean Petit, the architect of the justification of the 
murder of Louis of Orléans,43 in which he states, “My third truth is, That 
it is lawful for any subject, without any particular orders from any one, but 
from divine, moral, and natural law, to slay, or to cause to be slain, such 
disloyal traitors; I say it is not only lawful for anyone to act thus in such 
cases, but it is also meritorious and highly honourable, particularly when 
the person is of such high rank that justice cannot be executed by the sov-
ereign himself. I shall prove this truth by twelve reasons, in honour of the 
twelve Apostles.”44 Would he have used the same defense if the Schism had 
not happened? And, taken to the extreme, could these words also incite 
papacide?
The “Murder of the Rue Vieille du Temple” remains a marker of 
French history, a medieval equivalent of the shot heard around the world. It 
is in that street, now in the heart of the Marais district, that on November 
23, 1407, Louis of Orléans, brother of “mad king” Charles VI of France, 
rode unknowingly into a deadly trap. Returning from visiting his sister-in 
law Isabeau of Bavaria, who had just lost her newborn child, and making 
his way from the Hotel Barbette to the king’s royal residence, Louis was 
assaulted by a large group of men who literally hacked him to death. A few 
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days later, while the murder was under investigation, the duke of Burgundy, 
John the Fearless, came forward and openly confessed that in a moment 
of weakness he had ordered the assassins to strike. He had done this some 
three days after having achieved a truce with Orléans.45
The combination of perjury and murder brought consternation to 
the nation. But in a serendipitous moment Burgundy embraced his decision 
and defended it. He rationalized his gesture by accusing Louis of treason and 
lese-majesty, arguing that he had acted in the interest of king and nation. 
He organized a campaign aimed at justifying his action by hiring a famously 
eloquent theologian, Jean Petit, to plead his case in front of the court and 
to disseminate his defense throughout France, Burgundy, Flanders, and any-
where people were willing to listen.46 A feeble Charles VI seemed to have 
acquiesced to his defense. But this left Valentina Visconti, Orléans’s widow, 
and their sons, especially Charles of Orléans, thirsty for revenge. 
On September 11, 1408, Thomas du Bourg, Abbot of Cerisy, pub-
licly attacked Burgundy’s defense on several grounds. Claiming the king’s 
justice, he rebuked Petit and denied the so-called tyranny of Orléans. Like 
many of his contemporaries, he argued that justice was the backbone of 
peace and needed to be rendered fairly. And thus, after much equivoca-
tion, on March 9, 1409, the Peace of Chartres sealed the renewed “friend-
ship” that united Orléans’s heirs to Burgundy. Most knew that the peace 
would not last, especially when Burgundy managed to again control the 
king. After his mother’s death in December 1408, Charles of Orléans 
buttressed his forces in 1410 by marrying Bonne of Armagnac, who was 
granddaughter of the Duke Berry, but, most importantly, daughter of the 
formidable Constable of France, Bernard of Armagnac, friend of Louis, 
and a great military leader. The Armagnac/Orléans party was born.
As early as March 1411, Charles of Orléans asked the University 
of Paris to condemn Petit’s Justification, but gained no results. Petit 
died in July 1411 but his words lived on. Paris suffered through the pro- 
Burgundian Cabochien revolt of 1413, and it is perhaps during that time 
that the renowned theologian Jean Gerson decided that Petit and his 
defense were wrong: the defense disseminated errors that were false, sub-
versive, and scandalous, that caused ills to France, and, as such, were worth 
refuting. Thus was born Gerson’s obsession with rebutting the Justification. 
In September 1413, he drew from Petit’s Justification seven clauses that he 
hoped to see condemned by the University of Paris. Between November 
1413 and February 1414, Gerson faced opposition on the accuracy of his 
interpretation of Petit at a “Council of Faith” set up to discuss the issue. 
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His seven assertions were deemed exaggerated, and were revised to (ironi-
cally) nine. Finally, on February 23, 1414, the university condemned the 
nine assertions.47 On February 25, copies of the Justification were burned 
in front of Notre Dame.48
Still, the opening of the Council of Constance in November 1414 
offered the Duke of Burgundy the occasion to renew his offensive. He 
brought his case forward to the council, and Gerson followed. But the 
appeal was somewhat limited in that it “had only to consider whether or 
not the Paris assembly had been entitled to form an opinion unilaterally 
on the heretical character of Petit’s ideas and not whether that opinion 
was in and of itself justified.”49 The debate came to a close on January 11, 
1416, when the council voted on the nine assertions: twenty-six members 
condemned them and fifty-one did not. The council’s rationale was sim-
ple: the assertions did not concern faith so were not judiciable by that 
body. On January 15, 1416, the three cardinals in charge of the affair 
annulled the Paris sentence of February 23, 1414. Orléans and Gerson 
had lost their battle in Constance and were left with a limited victory in 
Paris. On September 16, 1416, the French Parliament defended advocat-
ing tyrannicide as permissible without judgment, and forbade the copying 
and publication of the Justification.50
The historiography of the Petit affair is meager. When the 
Justification is mentioned, it remains a piece of propaganda, a moment in 
Orléans/Armagnac-Burgundy factionalized politics. It is rarely analyzed 
on its own terms.51 It is, above all, woven into the fabric of French politics 
and its political implications are considered above its moral, theological, 
and doctrinal overtones.52 When it is discussed in its conciliar context it is 
usually framed around Gerson’s ideological obsession.53
The council did in fact debate the question in depth. Alfred Coville, 
Petit’s foremost historian, remains perplexed and ponders why it occupied 
such a central place at the Council of Constance. Coville states,
In Constance, the Jean Petit Affair held a disproportionate place 
when one thinks that the council aimed at re-establishing union 
in the church, at restoring the papacy, at judging heresies way 
more serious than this case, like Jean Huss’, Jérôme of Prague’s, 
and Wyclif ’s, and finally at reforming the church. One can gauge 
the importance of the affair externally when perusing the number 
of manuscripts that hold deliberations of the council focused on 
that topic: 380 folios for the official transcript of the deliberations 
… 500 folios for the personal copy of the bishop of Arras, Martin 
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Porée ... and 668 columns in-folio of Gerson’s works ... and by the 
important complements offered by H. Finke in his Acta concilii 
Constanciensis.54
Still, the council refused to take a firm stand on Petit’s assertions. It 
argued on procedure but never deliberated on the foundation of the 
Justification: is it permissible to commit tyrannicide for the greater good? 
It provided a diluted, anti-climactic “procedural” response, regardless of 
Jean Gerson’s robust attacks and quest for conclusion. Did the council 
have ulterior motives?
Discussing inquisitorial processes at the council, Sebastián 
Provvidente argues “that in the case of the inquisitorial processes led by 
the Council of Constance a close association can be ascertained between 
inquisitorial practices and the consolidation of conciliar authority within 
the ecclesiastical ordo iudicarius.”55 Following the argument presented by 
Philip Stump on the reforms of the Council, Provvidente quotes Stump: 
“‘If the council could condemn abuses of papal power in a reigning pope, 
it could presumably also take action to prevent those abuses by limiting 
the exercise of papal power in the future’.”56 Provvidente further insists on 
the importance of discussions surrounding “the council’s potestas execu-
tiva and its at least contingent consolidation as the ultimate hierarchical 
instance of the church in possession of the clavis potestatis.”57 Referring to 
the council’s debate surrounding the condemnation of Wyclif, he presents 
Pierre d’Ailly’s affirmation that “condemnation should be made in the 
name of the council since concilium est maius papa cum sit totum, et papa 
sit pars eiusdem [the council as a whole is greater than the pope and the 
pope is a part of the council].”58 Provvidente concludes that even after the 
election of a single pope the council attempted to consolidate its power: 
“Indeed it is through judicial praxis that the council sought to affirm 
its own iurisdictio and demonstrate its potestas executiva as the ultimate 
instance within the church ordo iudicarius.”59
If we accept that after Haec Sancta the council flexed its conciliar 
muscles, I would suggest that the lack of response to the Petit affair may 
suggest that the council wished to keep its options open. When the coun-
cil did not firmly condemn an apology of tyrannicide after a thorough and 
lengthy review, it could intimate to any future papabile that he needed to 
behave because the “Petit option” (and it is terribly tempting to call it the 
“nuclear option”) was always available. To be clear, the council had con-
demned Quilibet tyrannus on July 6, 1415, which states that “Any tyrant 
can and ought to be killed, commendably and meritoriously, by any vassal 
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or subject, even by secrets, plots and subtle blandishments or flatteries, 
despite whatever oaths or confederations between them, and without 
waiting for a judicial sentence or mandate from anyone.”60 The council did 
not, however, condemn Licitum est, which limited “the legitimate targets 
of tyrannicide to those who are actively conspiring against the physical 
well-being of the king, and who have such great power that they cannot be 
brought to justice any other way.”61 Did Petit’s Justification face the church 
with a reality that it did not want to face? Or did the Council purpose-
fully embrace that reality?
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60 “Quilibet tyrannus is simply a Latin translation of the first of the seven 
assertions that were submitted by Gerson to the Council of Faith in Paris. They 
were rejected and replaced with the nine assertions, when it was decided that they 
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ACCORDING TO JOHN WYCLIF IT IS THE PREVAILING OPINION among the canon lawyers of his day that if anyone is pope 
he is thereby faultless (impeccabilis). And so it is that whatever the pope 
ordains is just since his letters may even possess greater authority than 
Holy Scripture. What is more, these canonists claim that the Gospel is 
not to be believed except on the pope’s authority. It is for the pope both to 
interpret Scripture and to explain its application. So great is his power it 
is said that he can render Holy Scripture heretical and make Catholic even 
what contradicts the Christian faith itself.1 In this same vein, if phrased 
slightly differently, Wyclif will complain of papal decretals being placed 
on par with the Gospel Books and surpassing the Epistles of Paul. Thus 
the canonists assert the right of the pope to correct the Gospel and dis-
pense against the Apostle. The current situation is so dire, laments Wyclif, 
that any theologian who would dare confine the pope’s authority to a solid 
scriptural foundation is now labeled a heretic.2
Although Wyclif often painted the canonists with a broad rhetori-
cal brush, there is some substance to what he recounted. Their affirmations 
of papal power, despite numerous caveats and conditions, could seem star-
tling at first glance. Wyclif had a great deal to say about the late medieval 
papacy in its many facets, but this essay will concentrate on the pope’s 
authority to grant dispensations, which would appear to contradict the 
teachings of Holy Scripture. Specifically, we will examine Wyclif ’s reac-
tion to the pope’s aforementioned right to “dispense against the Apostle.” 
In this case Wyclif was directly engaged with one canonist in particu-
lar: Johannes Teutonicus, compiler of the Glossa Ordinaria on Gratian’s 
Decretum, whom Wyclif often designates simply as the “glossator.”
The Authority of the Pope to Dispense
In his Decretum Gratian had defined dispensation as a merciful relaxation 
of the severity of discipline granted for reasons of usefulness or necessity.3 
For Gratian and the later decretists the Roman pontiff claims the right to 
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dispense in his unique role as “lord of the canons.” He alone has the power 
both to make and change the law in addition to interpreting the law and 
granting exceptions.4 Yet even as the decretists deduced from the pope’s 
supreme legislative power his authority to dispense, they did acknowledge 
limits. The pope could not change or relax the law arbitrarily or without 
cause, nor could he do damage to the fundamental order and well-being 
of the church, otherwise known as the “status ecclesiae.” Hence although 
Johannes Teutonicus, in his Glossa Ordinaria, allowed for relaxation of 
the common law done with knowledge by the one who has the right to 
dispense, he also insisted that no dispensation might be permitted to 
deform the state of the church.5
The parameters of the pope’s power to dispense were tested with 
regard to lawful ordinations. Gratian had discussed at length the so-called 
rule of the Apostle (regula Apostoli) laid down by Saint Paul in his First 
Epistle to Timothy and in his Epistle to Titus. Here Gratian addressed 
central questions regarding who is eligible to ascend to which grade of 
orders; whether or not a man can be restored to his order after having 
sinned; and which sins constitute grounds for removal from office.6 In 1 
Timothy, the Apostle Paul stated that a bishop should be “the husband of 
one wife” (1 Tim 3:2), and applied this rule to deacons a few verses later 
(1 Tim 3:12). Then in the Epistle to Titus (1:6), he laid it down also for 
presbyters. So it was that the men seeking these offices could not be twice 
married (the presumption being that they had remarried as widowers).
Three canons in the Decretum were devoted, however, to specific 
instances in which the pope seems to have acted contrary to the aforemen-
tioned “rule of the Apostle.” These canons, which were attributed (errone-
ously) to Pope Martin I, formed the basis of further discussion among the 
canonists, not simply regarding orders, but more broadly papal preroga-
tive in handling irregular cases. According to Si subdiaconus (D. 34 c. 17), 
if a subdeacon takes a second wife he should henceforth be counted 
among the ranks of the lectors and porters. Gratian in his own comments 
found some flexibility here as he determined that in cases of necessity the 
twice-married man can be promoted to the rank of subdeacon.7 Gratian 
seems to have secured this view on the basis of the following canon, 
Lector (D. 34 c. 18). This canon states that if a lector takes as his wife the 
widow of another he must remain in that office and not be promoted. 
Yet the text goes on to say that in cases of necessity he could rise to sub-
deacon, although no further; and the same is said of the twice-married 
man.8 Everything might appear to have been settled except for the fact that 
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a third canon attributed to Pope Martin, Si quis viduam (D. 50 c. 8), holds 
that the man who marries a widow must not be admitted to the ranks 
of the clergy and should be deposed if he had been already ordained.9 
Now the same pope seems to have closed the door on all such ordinations 
without allowing for flexibility in cases of necessity.
In his treatment of this topic, Stephan Kuttner points out that the 
first generation of canonists believed that the Apostle Paul’s rules applied 
only to major orders. Hence, in the case of the subdeacon (D. 34, c. 17), 
the pope was not actually dispensing “contra apostolum;” he was merely 
granting a dispensation from positive law. And if it seemed that Pope 
Martin was contradicting his own canon (D. 50, c. 8), Huguccio argued 
that in one case Martin was speaking “de iure” and in another “de dispen-
satione,” remarking that necessity can prompt a dispensation. Yet some of 
the more conservative canonists believed that the subdiaconate did qual-
ify as a major, or sacred, order. Pope Alexander III, moreover, declared 
that twice-married men promoted to sacred orders must be deposed, since 
it is not lawful to dispense against the Apostle on this matter. How then 
could the canonists reconcile Pope Martin’s decisions with current prac-
tice? Here recourse was had to considerations of historical context. In 
Martin’s time such a dispensation was lawful because the subdiaconate was 
not yet reckoned a sacred order. According to Hostiensis, the canon Lector 
(D. 34, c. 18) should be understood according to the state of the primi-
tive church, although these days the pope could not easily (de facile) grant 
such a dispensation to a subdeacon. Huguccio, for his part, maintained 
that Martin never intended to legislate in this case, but was only offering 
counsel to his successors. Yet, he said, the pope is nevertheless not bound 
by Martin’s decrees; in fact, the pope can dispense not only against his 
predecessor but also against the Apostle. For by reason of his jurisdiction 
every “apostolicus” is greater than the “apostolus.” So it is that the pope 
can dispense against the Apostle in all matters except those that pertain to 
faith and salvation. Hostiensis followed this line, noting that the one who 
stands in the place of Peter is greater than Paul in matters of administra-
tion: “Quia ratione prelationis quilibet apostolicus est maior quam fuerit 
apostolus.” Even were Saint Peter himself to prohibit something, the pope 
would still not be bound inasmuch as equal has no authority over equal, 
a principle that had been enunciated by Pope Innocent III (X. 1.6.20).10
By the thirteenth century such discussions turned on the papal 
fullness of power (plenitudo potestatis), which was extended to cover the 
pope’s supreme legislative authority and appellate jurisdiction. In his 
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decretal Quanto personam (X 5.39.31), Innocent III made the case that 
only the pope could approve an episcopal translation on the grounds that 
God alone could dissolve the bond of marriage between a bishop and his 
flock; and that this divine authority had been granted by Christ to Peter 
and his successors. According to Innocent, “the pope has this authority 
because he does not exercise the office of man, but of the true God on 
earth.” Later jurists built upon this principle as they outlined the breadth 
of papal authority. Thus when Goffredus of Trano glossed Quanto per-
sonam he determined that, as God’s vicar, the pope stands above the law, 
such that he is free to dispense against the Apostle (ipse dispensat contra 
apostolum).11 Pope Innocent IV took matters beyond the Pauline Epistles 
as he claimed that the pope could also dispense from the obligations of the 
Gospels, although he qualified this assertion noting that it applied only to 
the letter (verba) rather than the spirit (mentem) of the text. Along these 
lines, Guido de Baysio asserted that the pope could dispense from the 
evangelical counsels, although not the precepts and prohibitions. There 
were always limits, therefore, placed on the papal authority to dispense.12
Wyclif ’s General Position on Canon Law
John Wyclif was a theologian by trade, a Master of the Sacred Page (mag-
ister sacrae paginae), and, like many of his fellow theologians in the late 
Middle Ages, he was distrustful of canon lawyers and their expanding 
influence throughout the church. This is not to say that Wyclif discounted 
papal legislation and canon law out of hand. He did concede to the papacy 
the right to formulate statutes designed to promote the greater welfare 
of the church. And whenever popes do institute such laws they ought to 
be accepted, so long as they do not prove contrary to Holy Scripture. Yet 
it was surely blasphemous to imagine that such decrees, simply on the 
grounds that they are issued by the pope, might then claim equal authority 
with the Gospel.13 Hence Wyclif declared that he would accept only those 
canons that could be considered explications of the divine law already 
revealed in Scripture. Actually, says Wyclif, canon law at its best is just an 
abbreviated form of divine law, although it has been corrupted over time 
by spurious teachings.14
Wyclif was adamant that papal authority must always be kept 
within clearly defined limits, which the canonists, with their exuberant 
claims made on behalf of the Roman pontiff, often seemed to overstep. 
For, given that a sitting pope can lapse into heresy, according to Wyclif—a 
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possibility that canon law itself admits—his constitutions could not pos-
sibly be placed on par with Holy Scripture. Granted, there may be some 
Catholic principles contained within papal decrees that do possess the 
full authority of Scripture, but then such authority will rest upon their 
having been confirmed by Christ the Truth, not for having been asserted 
by the pope.15 For Wyclif, therefore, the pope possesses a purely subsidi-
ary authority as promulgator of the Divine Law already revealed to the 
Church in Holy Scripture.
At the heart of these questions of authority is the principle of 
authorship; a text is only as authoritative as its author. Wyclif would rely 
upon the classic argument made by theologians in asserting their superior-
ity over the canonists: the former study a divinely inspired text whereas 
the latter read documents authored by men. Directly authorized by God, 
says Wyclif, Holy Scripture must be of infinitely greater authority than all 
the papal decretals, since the latter are mere human creations.16 Exceeding 
all human traditions in both authority and subtlety, the sacred canons 
of Scripture thereby form an absolute standard by which all ecclesiasti-
cal legislation will have to be judged.17 No matter what the lawyers may 
say, Wyclif was confident that the Decretum itself supports his case, as he 
appealed to the canons in Distinction 9 to the effect that Holy Scripture 
holds a place of unique preeminence in the church. Thus to imagine that 
papal decrees could achieve the truth and certitude of Scripture would 
be to exalt their papal authors to the heights of Christ himself. In fact, 
the inherent instability of papal legislation would appear to undercut its 
claims to authority: an endless procession of contradictory bulls with each 
new one revoking the effects of the last.18
Even if Wyclif does not call for the abrogation of canon law whole-
sale, all legislation will have to be brought into conformity with the only 
true law: the Law of Christ (lex Christi). So it was that, in the opening 
years of the Great Western Schism, Wyclif declared that the faithful are 
not bound to acknowledge either Urban VI or Clement VII except insofar 
as these claimants legislate in accordance with the Law of Christ. In fact, it 
would appear that God had ordained the Schism, says Wyclif, precisely in 
order to demonstrate that the Law of Christ is the sole test of orthodoxy.19 
For Wyclif, the Law of Christ is a distillation of Jesus Christ’s own life 
and teaching, succinctly summed up by Saint Paul: “love is the fullness 
of the law” (Rom 13:10). Civil and ecclesiastical laws, therefore, are only 
beneficial to the extent that they promote this perfect law of charity.20 The 
authority of this law, moreover, is grounded in the Person of Jesus Christ. 
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Thus one does not first obey the law only then to be drawn up towards its 
creator. Rather, according to Wyclif, one first loves the law-giver himself 
and thereupon loves his law, which is the perfect expression of his will.21
Wyclif ’s attacks on the superfluity of papal legislation looked to 
his opponents like an attempt to stifle the legitimate development of 
authoritative texts necessary for the governance of the church. If one 
were to follow Wyclif, so the argument runs, it would seem that the Four 
Gospels should have sufficed, thus rendering the letters of the Apostle 
superfluous and even sinful. Indeed, it would seem that all the commen-
taries of the saints, along with the laws of the church, should likewise be 
reckoned harmful. For Wyclif, the fatal mistake of such an argument is 
its assumption that Holy Scripture and canon law might be placed on 
equal footing, as though the growth of the former justifies that of the 
latter. The inspired authors of Scripture, says Wyclif, added books little 
by little for the good of the church in order to explicate previously hid-
den truths. The Holy Spirit himself determined that the Pauline Epistles, 
Acts of the Apostles and Apocalypse would complement the Gospels. It 
belonged to the divine plan, therefore, that books be added progressively 
to the canonical collection for a defined period of time. The problem 
now, though, is that Antichrist and his disciples daily fabricate new docu-
ments designed to take their place alongside Holy Scripture as co-equal 
authorities, the implication of which is that Scripture is deficient and 
thus in need of supplementation.22
The Glossa Ordinaria on the Papal Authority  
to Dispense
Throughout his later works Wyclif demonstrated not only a familiar-
ity, but even a facility, with canon law and the works of the canonists. 
Hostiensis and Guido de Baysio, for instance, were frequently cited and 
often at length. Professional misgivings aside, engagement with the can-
onists could hardly have been otherwise for a university theologian in 
the late fourteenth century, for the very fact that canon law reached into 
virtually every aspect of Christian life. Just as Wyclif read a glossed Bible, 
so when it came to reading Gratian’s Decretum he would have turned to 
Johannes Teutonicus’s Glossa Ordinaria. If we are to understand Wyclif ’s 
responses to Johannes, sometimes presented in abbreviated form, it 
is best to begin by examining directly those texts from his Gloss that 
framed the debate over papal authority to dispense against the Apostle 
(contra apostolum).
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First of all, with regard to Si subdiaconus (D. 34 c. 17), Johannes 
noted that in this case Pope Martin had permitted the man to remain in 
minor orders “by way of dispensation, since by common law he should 
forfeit his clerical privilege.”23 Then, commenting on Lector (D. 34 c. 18), 
Johannes observed that if anyone in minor orders takes a widow for a wife 
or has been twice married, he can be promoted to subdeacon by way of 
dispensation (ex dispensatione), although in other cases not. What is of 
special note, however, is the comment that follows: “So it is that the pope 
dispenses against the Apostle, as he does here and in the canon Presbyter.”24 
When commenting on Presbyter (D. 82, c. 5) directly, Johannes observed 
that in the time of the Apostles (in tempore apostolorum), clerics were 
deposed for manifest fornication. Yet the holy fathers gathered at the 
council of Gangra tempered this line of severe discipline. There they estab-
lished that a repentant presbyter who freely confessed his crime could be 
restored to his earlier position following a ten-year penance. According to 
Johannes, some understand the ruling outlined in this canon as a dispen-
sation (de dispensatione) while others take it as a matter of law (de iure), 
such that no one may be deposed for fornication today unless he perdures 
in that crime.25 As it is, Johannes finds here in Presbyter further support 
for the principle enunciated previously in Lector, inasmuch as “the council 
dispenses against the Apostle in matters of punishment.”26
A central canon in Wyclif ’s arsenal supporting scriptural authority 
over that of papal legislation was Sunt quidam dicentes (C. 25 q. 1 c. 6). 
In fact, this was one of the most pivotal canons to emerge in the debates 
among theologians and canonists, since it touched directly upon papal 
authority relative to Holy Scripture and the Church Fathers. This canon 
begins by affirming that the pope is certainly entitled to make new laws, 
although it maintains that in those instances where Christ, the apostles, or 
the holy fathers have already clearly defined something, the pope is obli-
gated to defend those precedents. And, what is more, were the pope to 
attempt to undermine apostolic doctrine, such an error would deprive his 
judgment of any force. Salvation consists in not deviating from the stat-
utes of the fathers and thereby preserving the rule of faith.27
It is clear, therefore, that the authority conceded to Holy Scripture 
and apostolic teaching was regarded as sacrosanct. Indeed, Johannes noted 
in his Gloss that if the pope attempted to issue a statute that contravened 
the Gospels, Apostles, or Prophets he would stand convicted as a heretic.28 
Yet this basic statement of principle had somehow to be squared with the 
whole matter of lawful dispensations. For Johannes will then comment: 
“Here it seems that the pope could not dispense against the Apostle or 
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the Lord. How, then, did Martin dispense with the twice-married man 
against the Apostle as we find in the canon Lector (D. 34 c. 18)?”29 As he 
continued, Johannes recalled that one reads in Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5) that 
the Council of Gangra had dispensed against the canons of the Apostles 
that called for the deposition of a fornicating priest. What is more, the 
pope appears to have dispensed against the Lord (contra Dominum) when 
releasing subjects from their oaths and vows as we see in Iuratos (C. 15 
q. 6 c. 4), even as Holy Scripture says, “You shall fulfill your vows to the 
Lord” (Ps 76:11). Given all this, Johannes concluded: “The pope does dis-
pense against the Apostle, but not in matters that pertain to the Articles 
of Faith. And in the same manner he dispenses with respect to the Gospel, 
by interpreting it.”30
Perhaps no single issue so defined Wyclif ’s reform agenda as the 
call for clerical disendowment; private property does not befit those who 
have been called to follow the poor Christ. Does canon law permit cler-
ics to possess private property? This is the first question that Gratian deals 
with in Case 12; and the answer seems to be that it does not: “That cler-
ics are to possess nothing is commanded by many authoritative sources.”31 
As one might expect, however, the full answer is more complicated. In his 
Gloss, Johannes noted that Gratian first proves that clerics should not have 
property, only later to prove the contrary. Then, having cited sources on 
both sides of this issue, Gratian had attempted to resolve the matter. But, 
according to Johannes, he did not do a good job of it (more on this below). 
In his own introduction to this question Johannes offered some guidance 
that might help to reconcile the various competing texts. Generally speak-
ing, clerics can indeed possess property. If, however, they have renounced 
their property, whether tacitly or expressly, then they may no longer keep it. 
Johannes admits that in the primitive church (ecclesia primitiva) all believ-
ers, whether clerics or lay, possessed no property of their own; for all goods 
were held in common. Yet possession of property is lawful today. As such, 
any canons that would appear to prohibit clerical ownership must either be 
referring to the time of the primitive church; to those who have renounced 
their goods; or they are speaking by way of a counsel rather than a precept.32
Wyclif ’s Response to the Gloss of Johannes
Wyclif ’s campaign for clerical disendowment was most fully spelled out 
in his 1376 De civili dominio. Arguing that all goods of the clergy should 
be held in common apart from civil property rights, Wyclif waded into 
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Case 12 and the discussion surrounding the interpretation of its various 
canons. Specifically, he addressed his opponents’ invocation of the canon 
Episcopi de rebus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 19) that permits bishops to leave their 
own property to their heirs, while ecclesiastical proceeds remain in the 
right of the church. Here then, his opponents say, the distinction made 
between the bishop’s own goods and those of the church proves that cler-
ics may possess private property. In response, Wyclif turned to Gratian’s 
attempt to resolve this larger question when commenting on the canon 
Praecepimus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 24), which states that the goods of the church 
are in the power of the bishop. Gratian determined here that clerical prop-
erty rights affirmed in various texts may be applied to Eastern bishops who 
have wives and children; and also to some Westerners, who, as laymen or 
in minor orders, had families before receiving sacred orders. To these men 
is conceded the right to have goods of their own. But, says Gratian, those 
who have been in religious life from childhood are not permitted to pos-
sess their own property. This resolution proposed by Gratian was all that 
Wyclif needed to cement his case that clerical property is limited to use 
alone, rather than civil ownership.33
Yet, as we touched on above, Johannes had specifically criticized 
this attempt by Gratian to harmonize the conflicting canons. In the Gloss 
on Praecepimus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 24) Johannes reminded the reader of his own 
opening appraisal of Gratian’s efforts: “male solvitur.” Thus Johannes once 
again affirmed that clerics can have property; contrary statements must 
therefore be counsels, refer to the early church, or pertain to those who 
had renounced their goods.34 Wyclif was sure, however, that no correct 
reading of the law could allow for clerical civil ownership. Making his case 
he cited the comments of Guido de Baysio on the aforementioned Episcopi 
de rebus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 19) to the effect that clerics are permitted use alone 
rather than ownership of ecclesiastical goods. Guido, as Wyclif duly notes, 
had proceeded to cite many canons to the effect that clerics may not claim 
goods as their own, but must regard them as communal. Bishops therefore 
function as dispensers, not owners, of ecclesiastical goods.35
Displeased as Wyclif may have been with Johannes’s curt “male 
solvitur,” he was positively furious with his gloss on Dilectissimis (C. 12 
q. 1 c. 2) wherein Pope Clement I, determining that the clergy were to 
have only the common use of goods, said “we command you to obey the 
teachings and examples of the apostles.”36 Here Johannes had reduced 
Clement’s “precept” (precipimus) to a word of advice (id est monemus 
...), thereby loosening its strictures for future generations. Allowing for 
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historical development in matters of ecclesiastical discipline, Johannes 
granted that this may have indeed been a precept in the early church, just 
as continence was also commanded. But to demand clerical disendow-
ment today, said Johannes, would amount to deforming the state of the 
universal church (deformare statum ecclesiae universalis).37
Wyclif was aghast at this accommodation; never has he heard such 
an erroneous claim! Rather than introducing deformity, as Johannes 
believes, the observation of this precept would conform the church to 
the life of Christ and the apostles, and thus would constitute a beautiful 
expression of moral conduct (non foret deformitas, sed morum formositas). 
Perhaps, opines Wyclif, it is best to leave such matters to the theologians, 
who have been taught by Christ, when it comes to preserving the “sta-
tus ecclesiae.” That Johannes may have been a great doctor (magnus doc-
tor) in his own discipline notwithstanding, Wyclif continues, one should 
not trust him in matters of theology unless what he says is founded upon 
Holy Scripture. The allowance of clerical civil property is clearly not so 
founded; hence Wyclif ’s appeal to comments of Guido de Baysio on a sep-
arate canon, Nolite timere (C. 11 q. 3 c. 86): “However great the doctor, 
I am not obliged to believe him unless his statement be proven through 
authoritative Scripture.”38
Yet, in an effort to forge some consensus, Wyclif looked for ways 
that Johannes’s gloss could be salvaged. Of note here is that Wyclif seems 
less concerned with what Johannes intended than with what the text itself 
might be construed to support. Here is a case where authorial intention 
appears to be of secondary interest. “Whatever Johannes may have been 
thinking” (quicquid senserit), says Wyclif, on closer inspection his com-
ments might not imply the lawfulness of clerics as civil owners after all. 
Rather, this gloss may mean that they are permitted to have certain goods 
in their private ministry for the sake of distributing them to needy mem-
bers of the church. A little further on Wyclif actually conceded Johannes’s 
point that the holy doctors spoke of the renunciation of goods as an evan-
gelical counsel. But this does not derail Wyclif ’s argument, due to the fact 
that he reckons that all clerics—not just those in religious orders—are 
obliged to observe the divine counsels across the board, most especially 
poverty. “Every counsel of our abbot Jesus Christ,” according to Wyclif, 
ought to be received by his fellow secular clerics as nothing less than a 
precept. As Wyclif sees it, therefore, if one is discussing the “‘state of the 
Church,’ it is more precisely the state of the primitive church (secundum 
statum primeve ecclesiae) that must be preserved; this is the sole standard 
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for clerical life into the present age.”39 A few years later, in his De veri-
tate sacrae scripturae, Wyclif similarly contended that neither historical 
development nor papal dispensation (temporis variacio nec papalis dispen-
satio) can release priests from their obligation to follow the example of 
Christ’s way of poverty. Wyclif has already, he says, proven this from Holy 
Scripture, the testimony of the saints, and from multiple laws which state 
that the goods of the church belong to the poor and are not subject to 
clerical dominion.40
Within the debate over clerical property Wyclif ’s opponents had 
also appealed to the canon Auctoritatem (C. 15 q. 6 c. 2), the central pur-
pose of which was to confirm the pope’s authority to nullify an illicit vow. 
His opponents, however, were primarily interested in another aspect of this 
case. Clerics held captive had been forced to make vows alienating eccle-
siastical goods to their captors. Having released them from the coerced 
vows, Pope Nicholas thereupon urged these churchmen to recover the for-
feited goods by means of both the spiritual and material sword. Wyclif, 
in keeping with his bedrock principles of clerical poverty and disendow-
ment, was not moved by this precedent. Clerics, he said, should not seek 
such civil restitution in the law courts; instead, they ought to be content 
to live by natural and evangelical law alone. Indeed, they should be willing 
to suffer injury with patience. Thus, even as his opponents had appealed to 
the freedom granted clerics under canon law to recover lost goods, Wyclif 
looked to the words of the Apostle Paul: “Take heed lest your freedom 
become a stumbling block to the weak” (1 Cor 8:9). And it is here that 
Wyclif ran up against the Gloss on Auctoritatem, wherein Johannes took 
the opportunity to assert the pope’s right to dispense against the Apostle. 
Having canvassed a range of opinions regarding dispensations from vows, 
Johannes concluded: “I say that [the pope] can indeed dispense against 
natural law, although not against the Gospel or against the Articles of 
Faith. Yet he does dispense against the Apostle [evinced in] Distinction 
34, Lector and Distinction 82, Presbyter.”41
Reckoning this a dangerous principle articulated by “the glossator,” 
as he refers to Johannes here, Wyclif called upon his fellow theologians to 
resist such sweeping claims advanced by the canonists on behalf of papal 
prerogative. The foundation upon which Wyclif ’s objection stands is the 
plenary inspiration of Scripture, which brooks no chasm between differ-
ent portions of the New Testament; they are all equally authoritative. It is 
the Christological nature of Holy Scripture that guarantees full authority 
to all of its parts; the whole of Scripture is replete with the voice of Christ. 
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Wyclif regarded the Apostle’s determinations inviolable, precisely because 
Jesus Christ himself was speaking through Saint Paul (in quo Christus 
loquitur). Having raised the stakes in this way, Wyclif argued that if these 
Pauline injunctions can be overturned, the Catholic faith itself will be 
imperiled. Furthermore, to dispense against the Apostle, whose Epistles 
belong to the biblical canon, would be tantamount to dispensing against 
Holy Scripture itself. And that, in turn, would automatically invalidate 
the papal dispensation. For it would then be proven false by virtue of its 
opposition to Scripture, which is itself the indefectible source of divinely 
revealed truth.42
In this same vein, as Wyclif observes further on, the Apostle Paul 
himself declares that Christ is speaking through him (2 Cor 13:3). Christ 
the Eternal Word speaks not only in the Gospels, therefore, but also in 
the Apostle. Actually, according to Wyclif, the Apostle can claim equal 
authority with the Four Gospels on the strength of the divine revela-
tion he received when taken up into the third heaven (2 Cor 12:2). Here 
again, therefore, if the pope could issue dispensations against the Apostle’s 
directives, there would be no end to his authority over Scripture. Soon he 
would be discounting the authenticity of the Epistles on the grounds that 
the pope alone determines the canonical authority of the biblical books. 
From there, surmised Wyclif, it is but a short leap to the pope dispensing 
from Articles of Faith and declaring previous Catholic truths heretical. 
No matter the exception Johannes makes for the Gospel and Articles of 
Faith, therefore, once the pope is allowed to dispense against the Apostle 
the entire garment of biblical and Catholic truth unravels.43
As Wyclif proceeded to critique Johannes’s argument, he turned to 
the two aforementioned canons cited in support of the papal right to 
dispense against the Apostle: Lector (D. 34 c. 18) and Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5). 
Wyclif does not, in fact, find in these canons any contradiction of the 
apostolic texts. This is an interesting turn of events, as Wyclif sets out to 
secure in these instances canon law’s agreement with Scripture. In so 
doing he will thereby weaken the case for the papacy’s right to dispense 
against the Apostle, precisely by eliminating the apparent contradiction. 
Wyclif observes that in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, the Apostle’s 
law pertaining to the orders of deacon and bishop (and presbyter) are not 
the subject of the canon Lector (D. 34 c. 18), which allows for promo-
tion only to the level of subdiaconate. Of greater import, however, is the 
case to be made on the basis of historical development. Even if Saint Paul 
had claimed it is necessary for every cleric in each of the seven orders to 
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be the husband of one wife—which, Wyclif notes, we do not have in our 
codices—this dispensation would still not be contrary to the Apostle. 
Granted that at the time of the apostles (pro tempore apostolorum) such 
stipulations may well have been fitting, indeed even best practice. Yet later 
on, as the church progressed (in processu ecclesiae), came the realization 
that in cases of necessity it would be permissible to dispense with clerics 
in these orders. Wyclif concludes that such a dispensation is not contrary 
to, but actually consonant with, the words of the Apostle himself: “Let all 
things be done honestly and according to order” (1 Cor 14:40). In other 
words, such a dispensation would still be in keeping with the Apostle’s 
teachings. Yet, as Wyclif knew, Johannes remarked in his gloss on Lector 
that Pope Innocent III had determined that it is not lawful to dispense with 
the twice-married (Nuper a nobis, X. 1.21.4) as had Pope Martin in Si quis 
viduam (D. 50 c. 8). Wyclif, though, countered that Innocent was referring 
to clerics in higher orders (supple quoad superiores), and so too Pope Martin 
in Si quis viduam. The point being that, since these two papal prohibitions 
did not apply to lower orders such as lector, there was never any dispensa-
tion against the Apostle’s own rule. Thus, proclaims a triumphant Wyclif, 
when it comes to the interpretation of Lector, Johannes’s comments have 
been revealed as baselessly incompetent (infundabliter inhercia).44
And so too with the canon Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5) on the matter of 
clerical fornication. Although the “canons of the Apostles” do say that a 
fornicator ought to be deposed, while Pope Sylvester (according to the 
text) determined that he may be reinstated after a ten-year penance, Wyclif 
sees no contradiction. For it is always the case that when a priest commits 
an act of fornication he must be deposed from the state of the priesthood. 
The only question is whether he can be reinstated following a suitable pen-
ance. Thus the decision, allowing for reinstatement after the fact, does not 
thereby contradict the original apostolic ruling.45
It is interesting to note that some years later in his 1382/83 Trialogus, 
Wyclif declared that in the primitive church (ecclesia primitiva) two orders 
of clerics were sufficient, namely presbyter and deacon. Moreover, in the 
time of the Apostle (in tempore Apostoli) presbyter and bishop were one 
and the same; all of which Wyclif believes is made clear in 1 Timothy and 
Titus. Indeed, that “profound theologian” Saint Jerome backs this up in 
his commentary on Titus as recorded in the canon Olim (D. 95 c. 5). So 
it is that by the faith of Scripture (ex fide scripturae) presbyters along with 
the deacons who serve them seem to be sufficient. It was only Caesarean 
pride that introduced all these other orders. Had they been necessary for 
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the church it is rather strange, therefore, that Christ and the apostles never 
made any mention of them. As it is, though, this multiplication of orders 
is just another example of the exaltation of papal laws (papalia iura) above 
Jesus Christ himself.46
Conclusion
Committed as he was to securing the authority of Holy Scripture against 
papal encroachments, it is not surprising that Wyclif staked a lot on the afore-
mentioned canon Sunt quidam dicentes (C. 25 q. 1 c. 6). Here is proof, he says, 
that neither the pope nor an angel from heaven (cf. Gal 1:8) could dispense 
against Holy Scripture. For if Scripture really is an infallible and necessary rule 
of truth, no one could possibly be authorized to abrogate its determinations.47 
Wyclif thus converts to his own purposes the general principle of the decretists, 
that the right to interpret the canons belongs to the one who has the authority 
to make them. Yet, as the pope is not himself the author of the Scriptures, he 
does not have the power to interpret them anyway he likes. In fact, he must be 
resisted in any attempt to distort their original divinely intended meaning.48
Wyclif knew, of course, that Johannes’s extensive gloss on Sunt 
quidam dicentis ends up allowing for the pope to dispense against the 
Apostle. In this case, therefore, Wyclif appealed over the head of the gloss 
to the canon in its own right, which bears the true authority in this mat-
ter. If the pope cannot proceed against the sacred canons, as this text 
makes clear, then by that rationale neither can he dispense against the 
Apostle. Hence the canon itself makes the case against the very action that 
Johannes was advocating in his Gloss. As Wyclif pressed his point, this 
university theologian’s basic disdain for the lawyers was barely concealed. 
“Having set their scythe in another man’s field,” these canonists (doctores 
decretorum) are again revealed to be out of their league.49
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FOR A FELLOW MEDIEVALIST LONG PREOCCUPIED WITH THE COUNCILS OF CONSTANCE (1414–1418) and 
Basel (1431–1449), and with the enduring conciliarist tradition, one of 
Tom Izbicki’s most interesting contributions to our understanding of that 
tangled stretch of ecclesiological history has been his willingness to reach 
out beyond the conciliar epoch itself in order to track down the present 
papalist reactions to Constance and to its historic superiority decree Haec 
sancta (April 6, 1415). By so doing, he was able to highlight the impact 
across time of the constantly changing theopolitical climate on the way in 
which the conciliar epoch and the conciliarist tradition have been under-
stood.1 In the context of a Festschrift, then, what better way of celebrating 
his achievement as an historian than to follow his example and share his 
willingness to step outside the perimeter of the species of home turf famil-
iar to the late-medieval specialist?
In an effort to do precisely that, the step I propose to take is a rather 
long one. It will take me forward beyond the silver age conciliarism of the 
early-sixteenth century, beyond the renewed flurry of conciliarist writ-
ing evoked by the Venetian Interdict of 1606 and the contemporaneous 
imposition of an oath of allegiance on English Catholic recusants, beyond 
the traditional Gallicanism of Bossuet and Tournély in the late seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries as well as the flowering in the Germanies 
of Febronian and Josephinist ideas, not to mention the contemporaneous 
Anglo-Gallicanism prevalent in English Catholic recusant circles affili-
ated with the Cisalpine Club, all the way down, indeed, to nineteenth-
century France and the theopolitical strife that punctuated the decades 
leading up to the assembly in 1870 of the First Vatican Council.2 When, 
in his View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, the English his-
torian Henry Hallam had come in 1818 to write about the ending of 
the Great Schism at the Council of Constance by the deposition of the 
rival claimants, he spoke of “the Whig principles of the Catholic church” 
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embodied in the decree Haec Sancta (asserting the jurisdictional superior-
ity under certain circumstances of council to pope), and described that 
decree as one of “the great pillars of that moderate theory with respect to 
papal authority which ... is embraced by almost all lay men and the major 
part of ecclesiastics on this [the northern] side of the Alps.”3 Within lit-
tle more than a quarter of a century, however, what he had had to say 
was no longer true even of France, the traditional center of theological 
Gallicanism, the country where the four articles of the 1682 Declaration 
of the Gallican Clerg y, with their unambiguous affirmation of the 
Constance decrees, had long loomed so large. Napoleon had embedded 
those articles in the “organic articles” that he appended to his 1801 con-
cordat with Pius VI along with the stipulation that they be subscribed 
to by all French teachers of theology.4 And in many of the theological 
and canonistic textbooks used in French seminaries down into the 1850s 
adhesion to those articles was treated as a matter, at least, of “free opin-
ion.”5 But things ecclesiological had begun to change already during the 
years of Bourbon restoration. At that time, reacting sharply against the 
old-style political Gallicanism of the French bishops of the day, the abbé 
Felicité de Lamennais had struck out in a different direction. Increasingly 
liberal in his politics, emerging as one of the leading intellectual voices of 
his day, and anxious to guarantee the freedom of the church from state 
control, he sought for a while to attain that end by evoking the balanc-
ing power of the papacy and embracing the ultramontane views that he 
propagated with some success among the lower clergy.6 Ultramontane 
sympathies notwithstanding, however, his theopolitical views proved not 
to sit well with Gregory XVI (1831–1846) and, in the encyclical Mirari 
vos (1832), they were to be condemned. That prompted Lamennais in the 
following year to relinquish all his ecclesiastical functions and led him 
thereafter to abandon at least the public profession of the Christian faith.
In the decades that followed, then, it was not to be Lamennais who 
stood at the epicenter of the ecclesiological and theopolitical strife that rum-
bled on in France down into the mid and late nineteenth century. Instead it 
was a churchman who was destined to be overshadowed, historically speak-
ing, by such French leaders of the anti-infallibilist Minority at Vatican I as 
Bishop Dupanloup of Orléans and Archbishop Darboy of Paris. As a result, 
his name is largely forgotten today.7 Staunch affirmer of the principles of 
1789 (rooted ultimately, he believed, in the verities of the Gospel), liberal 
in his understanding of church no less than civil society, critical participant 
in the conflicted process that eventuated in the publication of the Syllabus 
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of Errors in 18648 and in his politics an advocate eventually of Christian 
democracy, Mgr. Maret, the man in question, was the author of what has 
well been described as “the sole French work that counts in matters ecclesio-
logical since the time of Lamennais” and again, indeed, as “the most signifi-
cant work of Gallicanism in the nineteenth century.”9 And the man himself 
is certainly deserving of greater attention than our general church histories, 
at least, have seen fit to accord him.10
Henri Louis Charles Maret, then. He was born in 1805, pursued 
his seminary studies at Saint-Sulpice in the 1820s, was ordained priest 
in 1830, appointed a professor of dogma in the Sorbonne Faculty of 
Theology and as Dean of that Faculty in 1853, but was to find his nomi-
nation to the bishopric of Vannes blocked by Pius IX, who was wary of 
his liberal views and Gallican proclivities. Maret’s appointment instead as 
titular bishop of Sura in partibus infidelium, no more than a consolation 
prize, proved however to be an important one in that it was to make him 
eligible, some nine years later, to participate as a voting member in the 
proceedings of the Vatican Council. And at that assembly he was to be the 
leading French theologian in the ranks of the anti-infallibilist Minority. 
In preparation for that council, moreover, and after a long period of study, 
he submitted to the pope in 1869, and as a species of preparatory memo-
randum, his major piece of ecclesiological writing, the Du concile général 
et de la paix religieuse. It was immediately greeted by a storm of hostile 
commentary and, in the same year by way of response, he published also 
his Le Pape et les Évêques: Défense du livre sur le concile général et la paix 
religieuse.11 It is on what Maret has to say in these two works that I propose 
to dwell here. I should note, however, that in the wake of the total rout of 
his Gallican views at the council, the final definition of papal infallibility, 
and the triumph of the view that “Ultramontanism,” as Cardinal Manning 
was to put it, is nothing other than “Catholic Christianity,”12 he had to 
accede in 1871 to the pope’s demand that he back down from his earlier 
commitments. That is to say, he had publicly to retract anything in his Du 
concile général that might be contrary to the conciliar constitution Pastor 
aeternus with its twin definitions of the pope’s primacy and his infallible 
teaching authority.
Though by that retraction Maret was able to avoid the fate of 
Döllinger and of extrusion into the outer darkness of heterodoxy, he 
was more or less consigned henceforth to the ecclesiastical shadows. His 
admiring friend and long-time secretary, Gustave Bazin, sought in a three-
volume biography published in 1891 to preserve his memory, including 
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helpfully in its pages many a pertinent unprinted document. But the work 
itself is basically hagiographical in tone, and it is one that, by dint of tac-
tical omissions and a careful minimizing of Maret’s Gallican proclivities, 
contrived to position the man as nothing other than what would be viewed 
in the post-Vatican I era as a sound and devoted son of the church.13 And 
while, in 1927, É. Amann’s profile of Maret in the Dictionnaire de théolo-
gie catholique is more balanced in its interpretation, it is interesting that 
Amann clearly seemed to feel it necessary to devote considerable space 
to the five propositions which Deschamps, archbishop of Malines, had 
extracted from the Du concile général and drawn attention to as perhaps 
worthy of censure.14
It was only in the late twentieth century, stimulated largely by the 
rediscovery in 1959 of the bulk of Maret’s papers and also by the convoca-
tion of Vatican II, that more sympathetic studies began to appear.15 One 
should not miss the fact that if the shadow of Vatican I had fallen athwart 
Bazin’s earlier biographical efforts, that of Vatican II falls across some of 
the more recent studies.16 And not always helpfully so. Evident in some of 
their pages is a misleading (if understandable) tendency to align Maret’s 
stance with the teachings of that subsequent council. Speaking of Maret’s 
“consistent objective of promoting conciliation between the Church and 
contemporary society,” Aubin exclaims: “Shades of Vatican II!”17 While, 
more improbably, Bressolette goes so far as to attempt to assimilate to Paul 
VI’s establishment in 1965 of the Synod of Bishops Maret’s affirmation of 
the Constance decree Frequens mandating the regular assembly of general 
councils and providing for their automatic assembly should the pope fail 
to comply with that mandate.18 Strained parallels are also drawn between 
Maret’s much more radical understanding of the pope–episcopate rela-
tionship and the teaching on episcopal collegiality embedded in Lumen 
gentium, Vatican II’s Constitution on the Church. So far as ecclesiology 
goes, indeed, there is a tendency to position Maret as, for his own day, 
something of an avant garde figure, a man born before his time.19 Thus 
Aubin can speak of “strains” of “theological Gallicanism ... [being] heard 
again only a century later and then preferably camouflaged in contemporary 
terms of collegiality.”20 Elsewhere, it is true, she exhibits some caution about 
the matter of any alignment of Maret’s views with those of Vatican II. Her 
caution is warranted. After all, Lumen gentium itself explicitly reaffirmed 
Vatican I’s twin definitions of papal primacy and infallibility. It also made 
it clear that, as head of the episcopal college, the pope alone could “con-
firm certain acts which are in no way within the competence of the bishops,” 
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could proceed, “taking into consideration the good of the church” and 
“according to his own discretion” in the setting up, encouraging and approv-
ing of collegial activity, and, “as supreme pastor of the church [could] exer-
cise his power at all times as he ... [thought] best.”21 Such a point of view 
would have been wholly unacceptable to Maret. That being so, if we are to 
understand the true significance of Maret’s ecclesiological commitments, 
it seems clear that we need to be very careful about permitting twentieth-
century concerns to supervene too directly on our interpretative endeavor. 
In effect, and as we read Du concile général, we need above all to identify 
what Maret’s purpose was in writing that work, what, specifically, were the 
ecclesiological commitments that gave it its driving force, and what were 
the basic presuppositions that sustained those commitments.
Though Maret in 1869 submitted his two-volume work to Pius 
IX as a memorandum intended to help forward the deliberations of the 
upcoming Vatican council, the Du concile général itself is far more than an 
occasional piece whose composition had been evoked by the convocation 
of that council. As far back as 1848 Maret had begun to make the case for 
the assembly of such a general council, one that, like its fifteenth-century 
predecessors, would be charged with reforming the church “in head and 
members.” He had long since become convinced of the need to reconcile 
“the faith and the Church with everything that is true and legitimate in 
science and modern society.” To that goal, he tells us in an unprinted auto-
biographical manuscript found among his papers, he had “consecrated his 
life.”22 Confronted in the 1850s with the intensification of Ultramontane 
pressures and by increasing Roman centralization and the interference 
by the papal nuncio in the affairs of individual French dioceses,23 he had 
committed himself across the course of eight to ten years of study in the 
pertinent sources to the effort that was to eventuate in writing of Du con-
cile général. “Little by little,” he says, he had come to arrive at a doctrinal 
position that occupied middle ground between “orthodox Gallicanism” 
and “Ultramontanism,” a position that would encompass all that was true 
in the two systems, one that envisaged, in fact, a “tempered” or “moderate” 
papal monarchy. The government of the church, he felt, had become “too 
exclusive, too absolute, too Italian.” To remedy such defects a reforming 
council was called for that would reestablish not only “the full exercise of 
episcopal rights,” but also “the periodicity of councils.” It was, he believed, 
the achievement of that goal that should properly be the task of the 
upcoming council. And, in order to promote that end, he had concluded 
that it was now time to publish his treatise which, by 1868, when Pius IX 
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finally convoked the council, he had already succeeded in putting into its 
“definitive form.”24 In so doing, he had not had to depart in any dramatic 
way from the pattern of thought that had long since begun to crystallize 
in his mind. He had simply had to give it expression in a more simple, 
more explicit, more rightly-focused, more fully-elaborated and better-
documented form. The type of argumentation he deployed was one that 
derived less from the older, scholastic, theological mode still dominant at 
Rome. Instead, it was more akin to the type of historically grounded rea-
soning favored before him by such as Bossuet and Febronius. It was also a 
mode of argument, however supple, that was not always informed by the 
most recent findings of German “scientific” historical scholarship.25 And, 
perhaps because of that, Döllinger was to characterize the treatise, not 
without condescension, as “a companion piece to Bossuet’s Defensio.”26
Dependent on Bossuet (he refers to him as “that sublime genius”) 
Maret of course was, and he had certainly absorbed much of the spirit of 
that great bishop with whom the school of Paris, faithful to “the good 
traditions of Constance,” had reached, he said, its state of “immortal bril-
liance.”27 During the decade prior to the publication of Du concile général, 
indeed, he had made a systematic study of the Defensio, and he often relied 
on it as a guide to the sources. But, as Thysman’s careful analysis of the texts 
makes very clear, Maret often pursued his historical investigations beyond 
the witness of Bossuet’s book, reaching back directly to the sources, and 
sometimes deploying them more accurately and effectively than had 
Bossuet himself. It is obvious that he was directly familiar with the concil-
iar writings of Pierre d’Ailly (1350–1420) and Jean Gerson (1363–1429), 
as well as with those of such early-sixteenth-century conciliarists as Jacques 
Almain. And it is clear that he had done his reading of those authors in 
the first two volumes of Louis Ellies Dupius’s edition of the works of 
Gerson, where the conciliarist works of Almain and his teacher John Mair 
(the latter of whom Maret does not cite) are also printed.28 Dale Van Kley 
has properly pointed out that the French “constitutional patriots” of the 
previous century, men like Claude Mey and Gabriel Nicholas Maultrot, 
had relied less in their Gallican moments on the 1682 Declaration of the 
Gallican Clergy than on the older Parisian conciliarists.29 And while one 
cannot quite say the same of Maret, there is no doubt that he did reach 
back to Francisco Zabarella (writing in the era of Constance) and to the 
fifteenth-and sixteenth-century “divines of Paris”—i.e., d’Ailly, Gerson, 
and Almain. He also reached further back to the conciliar writings of 
William Durand of Mede at the time of the Council of Vienna (1311), 
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as well as, after that, to the works of Nicholas of Cusa and Panormitanus 
(Nicholas de Tudeschis), written in the era dominated by the Council of 
Basel (1431–1449).30 In 1867, moreover, hoping to be appointed as offi-
cial French ambassador to the upcoming council, he wrote to Lavigerie 
that it was his wish to follow in the footsteps of Gerson, to be
Gerson’s successor to the School of Paris ..., like him, ambassador 
to the general council, [in which capacity] my only aim would 
be to maintain those doctrines that great and holy man upheld 
successfully at Constance.31
Further than that, and notwithstanding Maret’s characteristically Gallican 
reverence for “the great bishop” Bossuet, there are also clear differences 
between the forms of Gallicanism the two men espoused.
In the first place, the regalism of the anciene régime and its expression 
in the form of the political Gallicanism then regnant was obviously alien to 
the liberal sympathies and (increasingly) democratic sensibilities that even-
tually led Maret to embrace a species of separation between church and 
state. Bossuet himself, of course, had been a leading spokesman for divine 
right kingship. Much of his Defensio, in fact, had been devoted to vindicat-
ing the first of the four Gallican articles that, while accepting the power of 
the pope in spirituals, had denied to him any temporal power over kings. 
It had devoted much attention, therefore, to the matter of the proper rela-
tionship between the two powers, spiritual and temporal. Of those sections 
of Bossuet’s work Maret made little use. Although he had hoped to produce 
a third volume of his own devoted to such matters, he never did so, and the 
two volumes he actually produced focused exclusively on matters pertain-
ing to the church’s internal constitution.32
In the second place, it is true that the Constance superiority decree 
Haec sancta (1415) was at the center of Bossuet’s conciliar thinking. And 
that decree had declared that the Council of Constance was a legitimate 
general council, that it derived its authority immediately from Christ, and 
that all Christians, including the pope himself, were bound on pain of pun-
ishment to obey it and all future general councils on matters pertaining to 
the faith, the ending of the schism, and the reform of the church.33 But its 
companion decree Frequens (1417), which sought to make general councils 
a regular and reformative part of the universal church’s governance, does 
not loom large in his thinking. For Bossuet, general councils were to be 
no more in fact than extraordinary occurrences in the life of the Church. 
While doubtless necessary, they were for him only relatively necessary.34 
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For Maret, however, it was otherwise. The conciliarist thinking of the 
Parisian theologians of the Constance era whom he cites, as also that of 
Zabarella, reflected the momentary weaving together into a coherent, 
meaningful, and historic pattern of three broad strands, distinct in their 
origins and, in some measure, in their subsequent careers. One of those 
strands, envisaging the church’s constitution in quasi-oligarchic terms, its 
government ordinarily in the hands of the curia, claimed that the pope was 
in some measure limited in the exercise of his power by the cardinalate, 
with whose advice he had to rule.35 That strand in the conciliarist pattern 
understandably found no resonance in Maret’s thinking. But the other two 
strands did—not only the strict conciliar theory itself (with its assertion 
that under certain specified conditions the general council possessed an 
authority superior to that of the pope), but also the call for reform of the 
church in head and members, along with the conviction that the frequent 
and regular assembly of general councils was the constitutional instrumen-
tality essential to the achievement of that goal. Hence his insistence on the 
importance and continuing validity of Frequens.36 In this combination of 
the strict conciliar theory with the (older) reforming strand in conciliarist 
thinking, Maret stood somewhat closer in spirit to the great conciliarists 
of the fifteenth century than he did to his immediate Gallican forebears, 
Bossuet himself included.37
The same is, I think, true—and in the third place—of the marked 
degree (as Bressolette claims)38 to which his can properly be called a 
“political ecclesiology.” In common with most ecclesiologists, it is true, 
Maret clearly felt called upon to stress the danger of pushing too far (as 
had Joseph de Maistre) analogies between the ecclesiastical and secular 
polities. The church’s mode of governance, divinely instituted, is sui gen-
eris; it is not to be assimilated to the modalities of any merely human gov-
ernment rooted in the natural order.39 At the same time, making a move 
very similar to that made in the early sixteenth century by his Parisian pre-
decessor, Jacques Almain,40 he parts company again with Bossuet in his 
willingness to deploy precisely such analogies, doing so in his Du concile 
général, indeed, with a comparative lack of diffidence.
That work he organized into five books, moving from the ecclesiolog-
ical generalities of the first, via his central analysis of the church’s monarchi-
cal constitution, to which books two and three are devoted, to the currently 
pressing issue of papal infallibility in the fourth, and on to a final attempt 
in the fifth to justify his own rejection of the impending move to endow the 
pope with a “personal, absolute, and separate prerogative of infallibility.” 
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For that, he was convinced, would amount to nothing less than a funda-
mental change in the church’s constitution. My concern here being with 
Maret’s conciliar views, my principal (though not exclusive) focus will be 
on what he has to say in Books two and three. And here the political nature 
of his ecclesiology is certainly foregrounded.
Embedded in human society at large, the church, he argues, 
does not endure through time in some sort of lonely isolation. Instead, 
between the ecclesiastical and temporal polities a process of reciprocal 
influence has to be acknowledged. “Public powers are the very bases of 
civil and political societies in that they confer upon those societies order, 
justice, and peace.” And, in that respect, “the spiritual society established 
by Jesus Christ” is not to be seen as altogether an exception.41 Maret was 
moved, it seems, by the serene assumption that the relationship of the 
two spheres, temporal and spiritual, should properly be one of harmony 
and analog y. Both spheres, he thought, should be infused by the sort 
of “wise liberalism” that had led him long since to proclaim the need 
for a general council to reform the internal life and government of the 
church. While analogies between temporal and spiritual societies can, of 
course, be “false and deceitful,” they can also be helpful and, believing 
this, he opts for the view that, although “the constitution of the Church 
is truly sui generis,” in its “mixed” and “tempered” nature it clearly comes 
close to “the best forms of human government” and can readily be com-
pared with “constitutional and representative monarchy.” And that can 
undoubtedly help us better to understand how it is that “the bishop can 
at the same time be submitted to the pope and [yet be with him] a member 
of the sovereign.”42
Maret sought, then, to identify in the church’s constitution a liberal 
element that could open the way to his longed-for “reconciliation of the 
Church with the modern notion of freedom.”43 Conceding the presence 
in the ecclesiastical constitution of a “democratic” element, in that any 
member of the faithful could be called to the episcopal state and that it 
was the original practice of Christian communities to elect their bishops, 
he insists, nonetheless, that “democracy cannot claim sovereignty in the 
Church.” But neither does that sovereignty reside in any sort of absolute 
monarchy. It belongs, instead, to monarchy tempered with aristocracy—in 
one place he calls it “monarchy essentially aristocratic and deliberative.” 
What is involved, in effect, is what is sometimes called a mixed govern-
ment, one framed along the same lines as “constitutional and representative 
monarchy” in the world of modern secular regimes.44
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Even without determining the precise relationship between pope 
and bishop, this much, Maret concludes, can be said. But attempt that 
determination and one comes up against the difficult challenge of hav-
ing to decide between two long-standing and well-established schools 
of thought, both competing for one’s allegiance. The first is the Italian 
school, which he describes as “celebrated and worthy,” the great repre-
sentative of which is Cardinal Robert Bellarmine. “In the system of this 
school,” he says, “the pope possesses a monarchical power that is pure, 
indivisible, absolute, and unlimited. To that power, rhetorical gestures 
to the contrary notwithstanding, no counter weight is conceded—other 
than that furnished by the Christian virtues” and “shared doctrine of the 
faith.”45 The competing school, that of Paris, with Bossuet, “the incompa-
rable doctor,” as its great representative, asserts to the contrary that while 
the pope is indeed monarch of the church, that monarchy is “truly and 
efficaciously tempered by [the] aristocracy of the bishops.” For the bishops 
are not merely vicars-delegate or advisers to the pope but, by divine right, 
co-judges and legislators with him, constituting in union with him “the 
ecclesiastical sovereignty.”46
Between these two competing schools one has to decide. And 
in order to do so, he suggests, one has to put them to the test of both 
Scripture and tradition. So far as the Scriptures are concerned, the cru-
cial cluster of texts (notably Matthew 16 and 18) that together constitute 
what he calls the very “constitutional charter of the Catholic church,” cer-
tainly seem to suggest that sovereign power was given by Christ not to 
Peter alone, but to the “collective unity of Peter and the other apostles,” 
excluding from the government of the church, therefore, any sort of “pure, 
absolute, and undivisible monarchy.”47 But, for the “authentic commen-
tary” on and “legitimate interpretation” of that fundamental and scrip-
tural “constitutional charter,” it is to the acts of the general councils down 
through the centuries that one must turn. From them, he says, “it is easy to 
grasp the vital play of the Church’s constitution.”48
To that “authentic commentary,” then, Maret wastes no time in 
turning; devoting half as many pages to the forty-year period dominated 
by the fifteenth-century councils from Pisa to Florence as he had devoted 
to the entire thousand years stretching from the Council of Nicaea (325) to 
that of Vienne (1311). And more space to Constance, and especially its 
fourth and fifth sessions, than he does to any other general council, Trent 
itself not excluded.49 That he does so is no accident. He himself tells us 
that in the crucial and conflicted issue of the pope–bishop relationship 
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the decrees emanating from the Councils of Constance (1514–1518) and 
Ferrara-Florence (1438–1445) are “the most weighty and celebrated.” 
And, in so doing, he makes it clear that the enactments he has in mind 
are the Constance decrees Haec sancta and Frequens and the Florentine 
decree Laetentur coeli, the first conciliar definition of the Roman pontiff ’s 
primacy.50 Perhaps because of the intensity of his focus on these fifteenth- 
century councils, Maret succeeds in constructing a more coherent, com-
plete, and consistent account of unfolding events than do many of the 
standard early-to-mid-twentieth-century accounts. For, post-dating 
Vatican I, those accounts tend to bear the imprint of an unacknowledged 
ultramontane orientation, assuming the legitimacy of the Roman line of 
papal claimants, the legitimacy of Constance as a general council only, 
therefore, after Gregory XII (the Roman claimant) was permitted, prior 
to his resignation, to reconvoke it, thereby defanging the neuralgic provi-
sions of the superiority decree Haec sancta, which had been voted on ear-
lier in the fifth session.51 But the Council of Pisa (1409), often brushed 
aside as having done little more than deepening the crisis by adding a third 
line of doubtful papal claimants to the mix,52 Maret himself treats with the 
utmost seriousness. “Legitimate in its convocation,” he says, “it was general 
in its composition because it represented the universal Church.” Testimony 
to that is the fact that Alexander V, the pope of unity whom it elected, “has 
always been counted among the legitimate popes.”53 That being so, Maret 
was attempting to close the door to the claim that, even among historians 
of distinction, proved to be alive and well on into the late twentieth cen-
tury—and that despite the difficulties posed for it by the very text of Haec 
sancta. Namely, the claim embedded in the “emergency measure” argu-
ment, which goes back, it seems, to one of Juan de Torquemada’s subsidiary 
arguments,54 but was revived in the 1920s by Johannes Hollnsteiner and, 
of more recent years, was deployed with force and ingenuity by Hubert 
Jedin and Walter Brandmüller. That argument pivots on the assumption 
that the fathers assembled at Constance did not recognize as a true pope 
John XXIII, Alexander V’s successor, and believed themselves, therefore, 
to be confronting an extraordinary emergency situation in which there 
were three contenders for the papal office, all of them claimants of doubt-
ful legitimacy. It was under such emergency conditions, or so the argument 
goes, that Constance framed the provisions of Haec sancta, which is there-
fore (or so Jedin argued for a while) no “universal as it were free-floating 
definition of belief,” but to be understood, rather, as an “emergency measure 
[intended] to meet a quite exceptional case.”55
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With any such “emergency measure” argument, however, Maret 
avant le propos would have nothing to do. Having affirmed the legitimacy 
of the actions taken at Pisa to depose the Roman and Avignonese claim-
ants alike, he had gone on to note that while at Constance the claims of 
Gregory XII and Benedict XIII to the papal office were certainly viewed 
as doubtful, that of John XXIII, the pope who had convoked the council, 
was not. Instead, it was recognized as valid both by the Roman church 
and by “an immense majority” of the faithful at large.56 Like Pisa before it, 
Constance was, therefore, and right from the outset, a legitimately assem-
bled council and Haec sancta the valid decree of such a council. Nor, he 
went on to add, should any particular weight be given to the extension to 
Gregory XII, prior to his resignation, of the privilege of reconvoking the 
council. For Maret, that was no more than an “act of admirable indulgence 
and Christian wisdom,” a pragmatic diplomatic move to help secure his 
resignation. It was also, he was at pains to note (and it is something that 
the twentieth-century accounts tend to pass over in silence), a privilege 
extended also to the Avignonese claimant, Benedict XIII, in an effort to 
secure his resignation too.57
What, then, does Maret conclude on the central matter of the 
pope–bishop relationship? First, that notwithstanding the “legitimate 
subordination of bishop to pope,” Scripture, tradition, and conciliar his-
tory alike preclude any attribution to the pontiff of a “pure, indivisible and 
absolute monarchy.”58 Precluded also, however, is the opposite extreme, 
namely, the attribution to the general council of any “absolute and unlim-
ited superiority over the pope.” But, then, he correctly insisted, and con-
trary to Ultramontane claims, neither the council fathers at Constance 
who framed Haec sancta nor the French clergy who approved the Gallican 
Declaration of 1682 (and, among them, least of all Bossuet) had advanced 
any such extreme position.59 The conciliar superiority which all of them 
had in mind was one limited to the ending of schism, matters of faith, and 
reform in head and members. And what emerged from Constance (itself a 
legitimate assembly from the moment of its first assembly)60 was the medi-
ating position expressed quintessentially in Haec sancta itself. And while 
Maret conceded that that decree did indeed “touch on matters of faith” 
and pertained to “the domain of faith,” he did not take it to have pro-
claimed “a dogma of faith, rigorously defined.”61 Instead, it was properly to 
be viewed as a “constitutional law” having for its objective the regulation 
of the use of ecclesiastical power, and it was one deserving of the “most 
profound respect.”62
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Subsequent history was to show, or so he went on to argue, that that 
profound respect was indeed accorded to it. Recognized in practice by suc-
cessive popes from John XXIII and Martin V onwards, reaffirmed more 
than once by the Council of Basel (Eugenius IV himself approving), and 
in no way qualified by the ecclesiological decrees of councils of Florence 
and Lateran V (1512–1517),63 Haec sancta was a decree that simply stated 
“more clearly and solemnly” than heretofore what had in fact been “the 
constant and universal law of the Church,” grounded in Scripture itself, 
affirmed by fifteen centuries of tradition, and of continuing validity all the 
way down to the present.64 In accordance with the position it affirmed, 
the church’s constitution was to be understood as a mixed one, “a mon-
archy ... essentially aristocratic and deliberative,” one in which the pope, 
while possessing by divine authority the plenitude of power, was no pure, 
absolute, and unlimited monarch, but a ruler who, in the exercise of his 
power, was limited by the aristocratic element which the bishops consti-
tuted. The latter were, he added, “true princes” possessing by divine right 
a share in the church’s sovereign power.65 That power they were to wield in 
general councils regularly assembled as Frequens had stipulated, working 
to eliminate the abuses that centuries of over-centralization had spawned, 
and forming a permanent part of the church’s constitutional machinery. 
And, as Haec sancta had specified, in certain extraordinary cases—schism, 
matters pertaining to the faith, and reform in head and members—those 
bishops assembled in council, acting alone or in opposition to the pope, 
could stand in judgment over him. In so doing, via a determinative judicial 
process, an “act of jurisdiction over the pope” and not merely (as some 
have supposed) via some sort of “declaratory” judgment, it can punish him 
and, if need be, proceed even to depose him.66 In reaching that conclusion, 
Maret (except possibly on one point)67 is nothing if not precise. Thus he 
is careful to reject the claim of Alfonso Muzzarelli and other members of 
the (high papalist) Italian school to the effect that the provisions of Haec 
sancta represented emergency measures applicable only to the time of 
schism and limited to popes of doubtful legitimacy. In driving that point 
home, moreover, he was at pains to cite the authority of Jean Gerson’s Au 
liceat in cansis fidei appellare, a tract written in 1418 just after the end of 
the Council of Constance. There, having rejected the notion of papal self-
deposition or ipso facto loss of office, Gerson had insisted, speaking specifi-
cally of the judicial process leading up to the deposition of John XXIII, 
that what Constance had effected was nothing less than the trial and dep-
osition of a legitimate pope (verus papa).68
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All in all, then, what Maret gives us in the Du concile général is an 
impressively robust and precise reaffirmation of the age-old tradition 
of conciliarist constitutionalism in the Latin Church, one in which the 
conciliarists of the classical era would certainly have recognized not only 
the broad outlines of their own ecclesiology but also, in its very specifics, 
something even more familiar than that. Maret has more than once been 
described as the last of the Gallicans and his Du concile général as “the swan 
song of Gallicanism.” But, given the faithfulness with which he evoked once 
more the conciliarist position set forth in the early fifteenth century by 
such Parisian predecessors as Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Gerson, he could also 
(his own acceptance of the Gallican label notwithstanding) be dubbed, and 
perhaps more accurately, as the last of the conciliarists. In his self-conscious 
adherence to a fundamentally Gersonian formulation of the strict conciliar 
theory, there is a sense in which he looked backwards, beyond the Gallican 
orthodoxies of Tournély and Bossuet, to the “classical” fifteenth-century 
age of conciliar theory. If his irenicism and his calm embrace of a dawning 
modernity can well be seen as looking forward to views that came to quali-
fied fruition in the documents of Vatican II,69 his unambiguously conciliar-
ist commitments look back, rather, to a very distant past. And in the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the seeds of those commitments were 
destined to fall on unreceptively stony ecclesiological ground.
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49 Maret devotes the whole of books 2 and 3 of the work (ibid., 1:145–504) 
to the exploration of the “authentic commentary” provided by conciliar history. 
The discussion of Constance alone runs from pages 386 to 432.
50 Ibid., 1: 379. For the text of Laetentur coeli, see Alberigo and Tanner, 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2:528.
51 For the contours of the traditional constitutive narrative see Oakley, “The 
Conciliar Heritage,” 82–97. For the growing tendency from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards to treat the Roman popes as the sole legitimate claimants and 
the Avignonese claimants simply as antipopes, see Izbicki, “Papalist Reaction.” It 
was only in 1947 that Angelo Mercati, in what has since become the quasi-official 
listing of the popes, demoted the Pisan claimants Alexander V and John XXIII to 
the rank of antipopes. In Maret’s day, their legitimacy was not questioned.
52 Even Alberigo and Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, a work of 
revisionist stamp, treats Constance as from its inception a legitimate general 
council and reproduces its decrees in their entirety. But it gives no place at all to 
the Council of Pisa.
53 Maret, Du concile général, 1:380–81.
54 Izbicki, “Papalist Reaction,” 19.
55 Thus Jedin, Bischöfliches Konzil oder Kirchenparlament, 11–13. In a post-
script to the second edition, however (37–39), he confessed second thoughts 
about the argument because Haec sancta’s claim that the council possessed an 
authority superior to that of the pope was one advanced, not simply for Con-
stance, but also for “any other legitimately assembled general council.” For other 
versions of the “emergency measure” argument, see Hollnsteiner, “Das Kon-
stanzer Konzil, 295–420; Brandmüller, “Besitzt der Konstanzer,” 1–17.
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56 Maret, Du concile général, 1:383–84.
57 Ibid., 1:393–94.
58 Ibid., 1:337–38; where he notes, too, that “certes, s’il y a quelques chose de 
clair, de certain dans l’histoire de ces neufs siècles que nous venons d’étudier, c’est 
que le Pape avec les èvêques est plus grand, plus respecté, que lorsqu’il est seul.”
59 Ibid., 1:342, 417–19.
60 Ibid., 1:386.
61 Ibid., 1:408–12. On this point he invokes the criteria which Melchior 
Cano (d. 1560) had stipulated if one were to classify a conciliar enactment as a 
dogmatic definition.
62 Ibid., 1:408–12. In classifying Haec sancta as a constitutional law, Brian 
Tierney comes very close to Maret’s position but, unlike Maret, qualifies the 
import of the decree in relation to a pope of unquestioned legitimacy in the intro-
duction to the revised edition of his Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, xxiii.
63 In relation to Lateran V and its alleged abrogation of Haec sancta via the 
bull Pastor aeternus, Maret endorses the point made by Bossuet and Tournély to 
the effect that that bull was concerned with a different issue and that the glanc-
ing and rather general words some had interpreted as an abrogation of Haec 
sancta were merely incidental to the bull and susceptible of a different and more 
restricted reading. See Maret, Du concile général, 1:493–98; compare Oakley, 
“Conciliarism at the Fifth Lateran Council,” 461–63, for the point at issue.
64 Maret, Du concile général, 1:387–504. The words cited appear at 425.
65 Ibid., 1:536–41.
66 For the pertinent texts, see ibid., 1:379–468; 530–47 (esp. 415–17, 423–
24, 540); 2:201–7. Also, Maret, Le Pape et les Évêques, 20, 26.
67 The moment of unclarity in his thinking concerns the nature of the conciliar 
judgment on an erring pope. While he seems to brush to one side the distinction 
between judgments that are determinative and those that are merely declaratory, 
he still regards the council’s judgment as an act of true jurisdictional authority 
over the pope, views the notion of ipso facto loss of office by a pope who falls into 
heresy as “full of danger,” evokes approvingly Cajetan’s teaching to the fact that a 
pope was not deposed by the sole fact of his heresy but by the general council that 
carried out his deposition, and cites approvingly Gerson’s rejection in An liceat of 
the notion of ipso facto deposition and his insistence that John XXIII was “true 
pope” until the very moment of his deposition (for which, see below, n. 68). 
And yet, in a fleeting passage in his Le Pape et les Évêques, 80, perhaps because 
of an infelicitous choice of words, Maret seems to wobble on this very matter of 
ipso facto papal deposition. Noting that the canonical procedures leading up to 
the conciliar deposition of a pope do indeed involve the exercise of a jurisdic-
tional authority superior to that of the pope, he then seems to veer off course 
by adding confusingly: “mais sur un Pape qui cesse de l’être devant Dieu; sur un 
Pape qui ne serait plus Pape en réalité. Et cependant il ne pourrait être dépouillé 
de sa dignité suprême que par le sentence du concile.”
HENRI LOUIS CHARLES MARET (1805–1884)  249
68 Jean Gerson, An liceat in causis fidei a Papa appellare, in Oeuvres complètes, 
6:283–90 at 286: “Unde et in toto processu usque post sententiam definitivam 
suae depositionis reputatus est ab eodem concilio [Constantiensis] verus papa.”
69 Thus, his sensitivity to the elements of truth he saw embedded in the beliefs 
of the separated Christian brethren, his quest to harmonize Christianity and sci-
ence, his heartfelt desire to reconcile the church with the great achievements of 
the modern world and to promote the recovery of a more liberal and participa-
tory regime within that church—all of that can be seen to look forward to power-
ful trends that surfaced in the Catholic life of the late twentieth century.
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A Personal and Intellectual Appreciation
Gerald Christianson
THE CONTOURS OF THOMAS M. IZBICKI’S CAREER, the subject of this tribute volume, are suggested in the title: Inventing 
Modernity in Medieval European Thought. His work builds on, and 
extends, the scholarship of the late medieval/early modern period in the 
past seventy-five years and more. The history of ideas is his bedrock, but 
closely connected are institutions as attempts at community-building and 
centers of power. These general principles are then related to the history of 
the era and to Western culture. Mix these principles and methods together 
with a large helping of scholarly research and the result is a very large num-
ber of books and articles. I will not attempt to describe them all, but rather 
look at what shaped Izbicki and how he has shaped what we know about 
the “edge of modernity.”
An always-intriguing issue that continues to stimulate histori-
ans is whether the Late Middle Ages (including the Renaissance and 
Reformation) is the source of modernity or a break with the past that has 
little or nothing to contribute. Within this general framework, Izbicki is a 
bit of a paradox. He holds both together at the same time. As he sees it, the 
medieval/early modern period—broadly conceived—rests along a contin-
uum roughly between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries. Within this 
continuum, shifts and nuances point forward and backward at the same 
time. This is especially true of the fifteenth century—a period not unlike 
our own so-called “Post-Modern” times. Tom has made his mark here—
by examining how exemplary figures, events, movements and institutions 
retain something of the old when adapting to the new.
We can illustrate this point with one prominent example. Tom was 
schooled in the origins of conciliarism, which celebrated the links between 
the Middle Ages and the early fifteenth century. At the same time, he 
expanded his vision into the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries 
where the conflict between consent and authority, representation and hier-
archy, makes it even clearer that the picture was not all one-sided. In this 
256  GERALD CHRISTIANSON 
pursuit, Tom benefited, as so many of us have, from a generation of schol-
ars who came to prominence after the Second World War, the shock of 
which brought renewed dedication to the origins and goals of Western val-
ues and institutions. The likes of Paul Oskar Kristeller, Heiko Oberman, F. 
Edward Cranz, Charles Trinkaus, Francis Oakley, and Brian Tierney were 
responsible for this “renaissance” and for setting an agenda to be addressed 
by younger students.
For Tom, this was not just a general inheritance. He studied at 
Cornell with Tierney, a scholar to whom many others, whether in sup-
port or opposition, are indebted. In Foundations of the Conciliar Theory, 
Tierney argued that the conciliar movement, which taught that the pope 
was a constitutional ruler susceptible to correction, was far from a radi-
cal affront to traditional institutions, but arose from a solid tradition of 
Scripture and canon law.
With this “foundation,” Tom has focused on those controversial 
years following the Great Schism of the West (1378–1417), during which 
the papacy was divided among two and then three “obediences.” The 
recurring issue that he addresses is how the challenges of Schism and con-
ciliarism caused jurists, theologians, and humanists to rethink accepted 
norms of church government, piety, and sacraments and to balance the 
need for reform and representation with the need to preserve order in the 
visible church.
From the beginning, however, Tom did not stop here. Even in recent 
times some historians treated the Council of Basel (143l–1447) as a kind 
of pariah. Those who acknowledged papal supremacy thought the assem-
bly an aberration. Even those sympathetic to the idea of a conciliar church 
tended to stop at its gates because conciliarism seemed to fall apart. Izbicki, 
on the other hand, took this reticence as a challenge. He immersed himself 
in the later Council of Basel and beyond, where lines shifted and parties 
became polarized, and where leaders of conscience were sometimes com-
pelled to make life-altering decisions. By adding his voice to the debate, 
and without a polemical agenda, he brought greater balance to the con-
ciliar element in the rough and tumble of late medieval church politics.
Typical of those who faced this dilemma and contributed to the re-
establishment of papal hegemony were three figures who have benefited 
from Tom’s research: Juan de Torquemada (Turrecremata), Nicholas of 
Cusa and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II). Because all attended, 
then abandoned, the Council of Basel he saw opportunity for moving into 
under-explored territory.
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While writing a review of Tom’s first book, Protector of the Faith: 
Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata, I met him for the first time in 
Kalamazoo. This was some time ago, and the case he made for moderating 
the traditional picture of this supposedly high papalist struck me as fresh 
and persuasive. To put the pretensions of conciliarists to rest, Torquemada 
had felt it necessary to teach himself canon law. Here he found that 
councils had resisted popes who had fallen into heresy and consequently 
showed himself more nuanced and guarded than other papal champions 
of the time.
If Juan de Torquemada was a theologian who became immersed 
in canon law, Nicholas of Cusa was a canon lawyer who turned to the-
ology. Scholars usually divide their attention between the early, conciliar 
Cusanus, author of The Catholic Concordance (De concordantia catholica) 
with its doctrine of consent, and the later “Hercules of the Eugenians” 
who abandoned Basel, supported the pope, and wrote a series of bril-
liant philosophical-theological treatises. Izbicki, however, bridges the two 
sides by demonstrating, from both these tracts and lesser-known works, 
that Cusanus had not abandoned the fundamental principles of the 
Concordance, but in changing circumstances found it necessary to empha-
size hierarchy over consensus.
Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II, may not have 
been as theologically profound or canonically astute as Torquemada and 
Cusanus, but he championed Basel longer than either, and then repudi-
ated it even more emphatically. He did this by revising his earlier histories 
of Basel which he now portrayed as a largely rowdy and radical assembly. 
When Aeneas became Pius, he intended to deal the conciliar movement 
a death-blow with the decree Execrabilis, which prohibited appeals to a 
council. He soon realized, as Izbicki has shown, that the life and growth 
of conciliarism still possessed a potent political punch. And while Aeneas, 
the revisionary historian, was often taken at face value, Izbicki’s transla-
tions have given modern scholars a chance to compare the two Aeneases.
Each of these three leaders chose a different path than Basel. Each 
one had to navigate uncertain territory that began in the shadow of Schism 
and witnessed the restoration of papal authority. Thanks to Tom’s dedi-
cated labor, we now have greater clarity about how these council fathers 
had to contend with shifting alliances, conflicts of interest, and careerism, 
and at the same time how each had to rethink concepts of church and 
councils, collegiality and authority, hierarchy and consensus while still 
preserving their dedication to reform.
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Beyond this all-too-brief summary of Tom’s scope, what also sets 
Tom apart is the special set of skills he possesses and how he has marshalled 
them in fresh and meaningful ways. His publications prove that he is well 
grounded in history, theology, philosophy, and political theory. Most 
scholars possess many or all such skills, but Tom’s range includes areas few 
have mastered. He became immersed in the intricacies of canon law, as 
well as manuscripts and their transmission, while studying with Tierney 
at Cornell, but went the second mile when Stephan Kuttner enlisted him 
in his research program at the School of Law in Berkeley. These studies 
inform all Tom’s publications, especially those on specific jurists, but have 
taken on new life with his investigation of canon law and the sacraments 
which, I suspect, reflects Tom’s role as an Episcopal lay minister, and prom-
ises to draw revealing inferences about “ordinary” life in parish practice.
Moving on from these years of apprenticeship, and after a bit of 
wandering in the world of lectureships and research fellowships, he set-
tled on a career as a research librarian. This has made him a distinguished 
and helpful bibliographer whose resources grace chapters on “Nicholas of 
Cusa in English” in books published under the umbrella of the American 
Cusanus Society and in the rich and rewarding lists in the Society’s 
Newsletter.
Since those early days with Torquemada and canon law texts, Tom 
has flourished as a Latinist. He translates rapidly and with a limpid style 
that settles somewhere between literal and colloquial. This makes the 
result readable but still sounding like the original. His writing is also 
a matter of envy. Careful preparation is followed by an original draft 
that flows smoothly and quickly. Usually it needs no more than a single 
re-write.
On that day in 1983 when I first met Tom, the American Cusanus 
Society was reborn with the election of Morimichi Watanabe, its presi-
dent for many years. This was sheer coincidence but in no way detracts 
from the fact that Izbicki has remained an anchor of this vibrant com-
munity of scholars ever since. He has also taken a leading role in a related 
activity, the “working conferences” at Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary, 
and has served as an intrepid editor of its publications more often than 
anyone else.
Tom Izbicki’s legacy (happily, we can add “to date”) is extensive 
and useful. He has published widely in his field. He has addressed topics 
that engage us and are of lasting value. He has illumined the creative mix 
between conciliarism and papalism. And he has enhanced the on-going 
dialogue over the boundary between medieval and modern.
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This list can only hint at the range of Tom’s career, at the independ-
ence and originality of his research, and at an inner consistency that arises 
out of his respect for the value of human creatures and their communi-
ties. When I read Thomas Izbicki, I get the feeling that we are important 
to him. He doesn’t simply write; he writes something to us. Many walls 
have tumbled; others arisen. But Tom builds bridges, and not just bridges 
between people. Tom builds bridges from the past to the present and back 
again; and certainly also, as he invites us to reflection, into the future.

BEGINNING WITH MY UNDERGRADUATE YEARS, the rela-tionship of theory to practice has intrigued me. Whether the sources 
employed are texts written by theologians, lawyers or men of letters, their 
ideas of how things should be can be assessed against accounts of the things 
which happened. In some cases, there is a wide gap. In others, ideas per-
colated down to the local level and entered practice. This can be traced in 
canon law. Ideas born in the medieval universities reached the diocese and 
the parish through received texts, whether decrees of general councils, local 
enactments by provincial and diocesan synods, papal letters, or practical 
advice given to pastors by learned men. The enforcement of these norms 
can be tracked by reading the records of official visitations by bishops and 
archdeacons. Lapses are revealed, of course, as are measures taken to impose 
discipline on the many priests and lesser clergy. In other cases, the visitors 
were satisfied with what they found. The consilia or legal opinions of the 
university-trained jurists also were aimed at practical matters although 
rooted in the received texts of the Corpus Juris Civilis. They might be part 
of the documentation of a practical case or hypothetical considerations of 
issues which could arise in the courts. The jurists might even be consulted 
about political issues, including dynastic succession and the status of local 
regimes, even those governed by tyrants.
This line of inquiry requires engagement with a wide variety of 
sources. In turn, this involves use of both printed and manuscript texts. The 
study of paleography and the use of the skills acquired allows finding and 
employing sources not otherwise available, broadening the scholar’s reach. 
It also becomes possible to read older printed texts and newer editions 
critically, finding nuances even in the most familiar written works. These 
inquiries also require serious engagement, especially empathy, applied to 
persons whose ideas, beliefs and acts differ from those accepted at the pres-
ent time. The historian’s task, after all, is to understand before attempting 
any critical assessment of past ideas, persons, institutions, and developments. 
Afterword
Thomas M. Izbicki
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This effort is outlined in the Appreciation by Gerald Christianson, the 
colleague who best knows my interests and their wellsprings.
Nearly fifty years have passed since I undertook these inquiries. 
There is no greater tribute to the labors of a half century than to have col-
leagues engage with such issues. Bettina Koch and Cary Nederman have 
brought together several colleagues to address relevant topics. The focus 
of these essays is on the years 1100–1450, which has been identified as the 
period which invented ideas of modernity. These ideas emerged in part 
from conflicts over religious issues which contributed to increasing secu-
larization, but they also granted humanity much greater dignity than had 
Augustine’s disciples with their emphasis on curbing sinfulness. My own 
research having focused most intensely on the early fifteenth century, a 
time when the Italian Renaissance, often identified with the emergence of 
the modern, was flourishing, these essays advance areas of research which I 
value even when I have not pursued them myself.
Many of these studies show how the medieval Church gradually lost 
unity even before it was fractured by the Reformation. The Dominican 
theologians who defended papal privileges against secular apologists like 
Jean de Pouilly caused confusion over the coherence of the Church’s his-
tory and validity of authoritative sources. This opened the way for dis-
sidents like Marsilius of Padua to rewrite the ecclesiastical polity by using 
the received texts in new ways. John Wyclif was able to find texts in the 
Decretum of Gratian to use against the canonists on issues like clerical 
property and papal dispensations. The Great Western Schism (1378–
1417) fractured unity, but it also made ecclesiastical statesmen like Pierre 
d’Ailly aware of the need for personal, as well as institutional, reform. 
However, it also generated heated debates over the Church’s divisions, 
language which evoked ideas of tyranny and tyrannicide. This language 
was echoed in the defense of the murder of Louis of Orléans by minions 
of his rival, John duke of Burgundy, during France’s contemporaneous 
civil strife. The effort of the Council of Constance (1414–1418) to reu-
nite the Church was coupled with a defense of orthodoxy. The trial of the 
Czech reformer Jan Hus turned not only on the canon law of heresy but 
the belief that heresy arose from contumacy, intellectual stubbornness car-
ried to the extreme. The conciliar arguments arising from the Schism were 
used to reestablish unity, but they also were used to support royal con-
trol of churches. These conflicting uses endured to the time of the First 
Vatican Council (1870) at which even the most temperate conciliarism 
was rejected by the Ultramontanes. An irony is that the liberal and secular 
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currents we identify with modernity were met at the Vatican Council with 
an affirmation of papal primacy and infallibility.
Authoritative texts could be used in creative, not just destructive, 
ways. Ptolemy of Lucca, using Classical writings, described ancient Rome 
as inspired by providence in preparation for the coming of Christ while 
also pursuing the common good through virtue. Marsilius of Padua, how-
ever, used Cicero and other ancient authorities to create a “naturalistic” 
idea of social order far apart from the pretensions of the papacy. Marsilius 
was received in the Reformation context but not as he would have 
expected. An abridged translation of the Defensor pacis into German done 
for a Protestant claimant to the Palatine Electorate omitted anything not 
supportive of princely power, including lay power over ecclesiastical prop-
erty, an early step toward secularization. The Platonist strain of the twelfth 
century, found in writings of Thierry of Chartres and Peter Abelard, was 
reflected in the works of Anselm of Havelberg and, much later, in the 
unique thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). Cusanus, a polymath, 
is often seen as a transitional figure from medieval to modern. The De 
venatione sapientiae, his intellectual autobiography, treats all the neolo-
gisms he coined in his intellectual development, engaging in dialog with 
Plato, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius as he broke out of the Aristotelian 
framework of late medieval Scholasticism. Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla 
both were dissatisfied with Scholastic precision, wanting to attain some-
thing more practical. The cardinal expected the monks of Tegernsee to 
have a shared experience when gazing at the icon, while Valla wanted his 
readers to expand responsible participation in life. Cusanus had a view of 
the larger world. His vision encompassed non-Christians, but he expected 
them to conform more closely to Christianity in a concord of peoples. 
This vision of concord was replaced in the New World with a papal effort 
to establish spheres of influence for European powers enabling protection 
for missionaries dealing with peoples who never had heard of Christ while 
princes persuaded their own interests. This time of discovery, contempora-
neous with the Reformation, forced Western Europe to confront a wider 
world not versed in either Classical or Christian texts, a modern world 
facing issues of cultural clash and adaptation to entirely new contexts.
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